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ABSTRACT 
 
THE NATION AS A COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCT: 
 
TOWARD OF THEORY OF DIALOGIC NATIONALISM 
 
 
By 
Joseph T. DeCrosta 
May 2014 
 
Dissertation supervised by Janie Harden Fritz, Ph.D. 
This project seeks to explore the subject of nation and nationalism in the context of 
rhetoric and the philosophy of communication.  By exploring ancient tropes of nation through 
rhetorical figures such as Isocrates in Ancient Greece and Cicero in the Roman Republic; 
through Kant, the Enlightenment and modernity; and, through postmodern interpretations, I 
attempt to reconceptualize the nation as a communicative construct while pointing to what may 
lie ahead for the future.  By applying Anderson’s (2006) concept of “imagined communities” as 
an interpretative framework, the nation appears to be a more fluid, contingent space for 
communication that is grounded in ancient and Enlightenment ideals, but is perhaps 
reconfiguring in the face of postmodern complexity as advanced by scholars such as Appadurai 
(1996) and Smith (1979, 1983, 1995, 1998, 2008, 2010).  The transition from antiquity and 
modernity to postmodernity is characterized by what I call a theory of “dialogic nationalism,” 
which has roots in Martin Buber’s understanding of dialogue (1988, 1996, 2002) and his writings 
 v 
on nationalism (2005).  Dialogic nationalism may serve as an alternative hermeneutic for the 
nation within the postmodern moment. The experience of international students in the United 
States and the complex issue of immigration around the world are also explored as practical 
applications for dialogic nationalism.   
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Chapter 1 
 
The Nation as a Communicative Construct: 
 
Grounding the Nation in Communication and Rhetorical Theory 
 
Throughout history the concept of the nation has textured our notions of 
communication and community. Disagreement abounds about how and when the nation 
occupied our social consciousness and constructed the ways in which we have organized 
our lives in personal, social, political, economic and communicative realms (Anderson, 
2006; Gellner, 1983; Kedourie, 1993; Smith, 1983, 1995). The structural components of 
the nation seem to serve as a panacea for political, social, religious, and communicative 
problems, while others have seen the nation and nationalism as a significant cause for 
many political, social, and communicative problems (one must only refer to American 
Exceptionalism (Bell, 1989; Huntington, 2004; Tyrrell, 1991), Nazism in Germany 
(Bendersky, 2013), Fascism in Italy (Gregor, 1979), and Afrikaner and African national 
movements in South Africa (Mandela, 1995), to name a few). Although often viewed as a 
social and political construct that we often take for granted (see Billig’s concept of “banal 
nationalism,” 1995), the nation seems to shape the ways in which we view our 
situatedness within it and communicate across its physical and existential-
phenomenological borders to address the complexities and ambiguity of everyday life.  
This project assumes that the nation plays a significant role in our everyday identities and 
the ways we choose to communicate and structure our realities. 
Although the nation has been analyzed mainly as a historical, political and 
economic construct, this project considers the nation specifically through a 
rhetorical/communicative lens that shapes the ways in which we consider our place in the 
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world as individuals and social beings.  We can see the rhetorical qualities of the nation 
as they have been characterized more recently through tropes such as “imagined” 
(Anderson, 2006) and “discursive” (Calhoun, 1997) that offer alternative renderings of 
what has traditionally been framed as the nation. The foundation for this thinking seems 
to be grounded in rhetorical principles—or, what I view as the formal and informal 
construction of communication that helps us attain truths by engaging communication to 
negotiate our realities through social cooperation and communal action. Bitzer’s (1968) 
and Hauser’s (1999) characterizations of rhetoric resonate with such an understanding.  
While defining what he terms “the rhetorical situation,” Bitzer (1968) suggests that, 
“…rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, 
but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought 
and action,” while Hauser (1999) sees rhetoric not merely as persuasive language, but 
“the symbolic inducement of social cooperation” (p. 14).  
At the moment it seems that the traditional understanding of the nation currently 
seems to be under scrutiny, as the postmodern moment appears to present a number of 
challenges.  As a historical and academic concept, the postmodern moment is wrought 
with qualities that express deep rhetorical contingency and fluidity, multiple and varied 
points of reference, and frequent narrative disagreement about historical, social, political, 
economic and communicative issues in our world. I will discuss understandings of the 
postmodern moment through voices such as Lyotard (1984) and Giddens (1990) in more 
detail later, but this conception of postmodernity underlies the overall purpose and theme 
of this project since the characteristics of postmodernity create a tension that does not 
seem to allow ideas of the nation to persist as they have in the past.  Rather, the concept 
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introduces a cacophony of voices that question the traditional understanding of the nation 
and its legitimacy and utility in our current historical moment (Appadurai, 1996; 
Habermas, 2001; Smith, 1998).  As the postmodern moment and a modern concept of the 
nation seem to run concurrently, we may be able to find new ways of negotiating national 
and cultural identities that respond to the nuances of human interaction in the postmodern 
moment.  Questions of the nation and nationalism are foregrounded on a daily basis as we 
witness and experience the effects of war, terrorism, social, cultural and economic 
globalization, migrations (forced and voluntary), cultural conflict, and transformed 
cultural identity.  Nations and nationalism provide such unreflective structures in which 
we function as political and cultural beings that we fail to consider any other system that 
could manage our political, economic and cultural challenges.  This unreflective 
assumption seems to be a result of modernity. 
The nation as a modern construct, emerging and developing with the dawn of 
modernity in the Enlightenment is a common theme (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983; 
Habermas, 2001; Kedourie, 1993).  Anthologies on the nation and nationalism often 
begin with Enlightenment thinkers (Dahbour & Ishay, 1995); however, as we will see, the 
overall concept of the nation has been communicated in cultures and societies as early as 
the Greeks and Romans.  Post-Enlightenment, contemporary renderings of the nation 
have consistently resulted in a concept that has been appropriated by various intellectual, 
political, cultural and economic perspectives that tend to place the concept at odds with 
itself.    
Anderson (2006) insists that the concept of the nation is a paradox – although 
nations carry the political weight to exert powerful influence on people and frame 
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cultures, theories of nation lack the substantive philosophical ground that permits us to 
invest a great deal of faith in this social structure that organizes and frequently interprets 
our lives.  “In other words, unlike most ‘isms,’ nationalism has never produced its own 
grand thinker: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, Webers.  This ‘emptiness’ easily 
gives rise, among cosmopolitan and polylingual intellectuals, to certain condescension.  
Like Gertrude Stein in the face of Oakland, one can rather quickly conclude that there is 
‘no there there’” (Anderson, 2006, p. 5). For Anderson, the nation is nothing more than 
an empty concept; he highlights Hobsbawm’s statement that nationalism is “Marxism’s 
great historical failure” (p. 3).  Ernest Gellner (1983) contends that we are better served 
by studying those scholars who contributed to the understanding of the nation more 
indirectly such as the philosophers and the rhetoricians, than by those scholars who chose 
to study the concept of nation itself.  
[Nationalism] preaches and defends continuity, but owes everything to a decisive 
and unutterably profound break in human history.  It preaches and defends 
cultural diversity, when in fact it imposes homogeneity both inside and, to a lesser 
degree, between political units.  Its self-image and its true nature are inversely 
related, with an ironic neatness seldom equaled even by other successful 
ideologies.  Hence it seems to me that, generally speaking, we shall not learn too 
much about nationalism from the study of its own prophets.” (Gellner, 1983, p. 
125, emphasis added) 
The internal structure and actual reality of the concepts frequently seem to contradict 
themselves, and for this reason scholarship and even popular debates on nationalism are 
widely varied, polarizing and often controversial.  
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A common feature of the nation and the field of communication is their 
unreflective, interdisciplinary nature and how they are often embedded into quotidian life 
without question or contest (Billig, 1995).  Thus, a communicative approach is not only 
unique but also productive when exploring the nation’s and nationalism’s roots in 
premodern, modern and postmodern orientations.  Anderson’s analysis that the idea of 
nationalism has never produced a “grand thinker” may be pre-emptive or even inaccurate, 
while Gellner provides an alternative constructive approach for exploring the nation 
through multiple scholarly viewpoints that may have in fact granted the concept various 
“grand thinkers” who would have understood this particular concept emerging from 
questions arising in given historical moments (Arnett & Arneson, 1999).   The question 
rests with whether we would consider ancient thinkers like Isocrates and Cicero as 
“prophets” of the nation or rather thinkers who discussed such ideas more as products of 
their overall philosophies.  Contemporary scholars rarely refer to these ancient 
predecessors as thinkers who engaged ideas about the nation, but by taking a more 
deliberate rhetorical stance, we see that the seeds had been planted and nurtured even 
within antiquity.  More recent scholarship (Cohen, 2000; Smith 1979, 1983, 1995, 1998, 
2008, 2010) understands the value of classical political philosophy and the ground from 
which much scholarship on the nation must begin.   This project recognizes the value of 
ancient rhetoricians in particular, as Isocrates and Cicero provide substantive glimpses 
into the beginnings of nationalistic thinking and how the nation emerges, not only as a 
political entity, but also as a rhetorical and phenomenological entity. Scholarship in 
modernity enlarges the ideas of these ancient scholars, and transforms ideas of the nation 
and nationalism, as we tend to understand them today.  It is important to recognize the 
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communicative continuity involved in understanding the nation and nationalism and how 
such continuity in rhetorical representation has shaped the ways in which we have 
engaged the nation’s power, not only through political, economic and juridical 
metanarratives, but also in individual, interpersonal and dialogic micronarratives.   
Marx’s project is perhaps the most intense modern account of the nation, but 
clearly it is based on economic principles; the economic construct acts as a hermeneutic 
entrance through which we can begin to comprehend the complex relationship of 
individuals, society and the economy under the rubric of nation.  For Marx, bourgeois 
actions and behaviors based in feudalistic economic structures had to be burst asunder 
and a new organizing entity generated through economic forces and framed by 
nationalistic, even isolationist tendencies, had to rise up to protect the workers of the 
world (Findlay, 2004).  For Anderson (2006), this Marxist form of the nation never truly 
takes shape as it focuses purely on economic origins and lacks a substance that addresses 
real social and human dimensions.  Rather, for Anderson, the nation is most significantly 
a rhetorical phenomenon—“’an imagined political community,’ imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign.  It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006, 
p. 6).  Although nations are, at first glance, territorialized within particular physical 
spaces, this “imagined” character is phenomenological; nations not only exist on land, 
they live in the minds, hearts and souls of people.  Anderson also points out that national 
identity often supersedes forms of inequality and discrimination that tend to emerge in 
social contexts within the nation’s imagined borders.  For Anderson, in other words, 
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regardless of conflicts of race, culture or class, individuals and groups alike often are 
prepared to identify themselves through national citizenship without question. “It is an 
imagined community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that 
may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 7).   
The validity of Anderson’s claim that the idea of the nation is not substantially 
philosophically grounded is questionable, however. We can see early versions of the 
nation even in the ancient world.  Aristotle advanced the idea that humans are essentially 
at their core political creatures: individual beings that are naturally organized into 
communal structures for the good of the polis.  The first lines of Aristotle’s Politics bring 
the communal life of the polis into focus:  
Observation tells us that every state is an association, and that every association is 
formed with a view to some good purpose.  I say “good,” because in all their 
actions all men do in fact aim at some good, that association which is the most 
sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at the 
most sovereign of all goods.  This is the association which we call the state, the 
association which is “political.” (Aristotle, 1981, Politics, p. 54)  
To understand this Aristotelian principle, one could argue that modern (and postmodern 
citizens, for our purposes of this study) are teleologically pulled toward community life 
realized in the structure of the nation.  For Aristotle (1999), the polis provided the 
structure in which its members were free to engage in debate and deliberation under 
which the minimal good could be attained and agreed upon (Ethics, p. 2). Plato, Aristotle, 
Isocrates, and Cicero all recognized that the polis or civitas provided the existential-
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phenomenological space in which individuals and groups could strive for justice and 
rational thought.  Just as the family (oikos) provided a similar, but more interpersonal, 
structure under which individuals could function, the polis provided a larger, public 
structure under which individuals could work, worship, and interact productively on a 
larger scale.   Although Aristotle saw the polis as a much smaller version of the modern 
nation-state, he still saw its function as a sovereign political unit (Irwin, 1999, p. 320).   
Anderson (2006), perhaps, fails to see the power of Ancient Greek thought as a 
precursor to the nation, or perhaps considers the polis to be a diluted form of the modern 
nation.  In understanding these scholars’ commentary on how one’s dedication to an 
identity linked to the nation can often trump other internal social conflicts and inequality, 
we can explore the idea of the nation in terms of a polis extended to larger land masses 
and populations. Cohen’s (2000) work on considering Athens as a nation is rife with the 
complexities of a nuanced society.  Cohen engages Anderson’s work to justify Athens’ 
foundational role in nation studies.   Although Anderson does little to acknowledge the 
value of the ancient world in the historical development of the nation, Cohen employs 
Anderson’s idea of “imagined communities” to ground his idea of Athens, and thus the 
polis, as an early form of nation.  The nation, even as an extended form of the polis, 
offers us a social structure under which we can socially and culturally identify where 
other commonalities may not exist.  In other words, we may begin to give the idea of 
nation-state some philosophical weight by engaging Aristotle’s and Isocrates’ 
understanding of the polis and Cicero’s analysis of the res publica.  This “horizontal 
comradeship” (Anderson, 2006, p. 7) that supposedly exists within individuals of the 
modern nation may have also existed in Ancient Greece and Rome.  
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Imagined, Discursive and Existential-Phenomenological Communities 
 As mentioned earlier, scholars such as Anderson (2006), Calhoun (1997) have 
defined the concept of the nation through metaphors of  ”the imagined community,” and 
“ a discursive construct,” respectively; Deutsch (1966; 1969) sees the nation “a product 
of social communication,” mostly through the channels of modern communication 
technologies.  He adds, “A Nation, so goes a rueful European saying,‘is a group of 
persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their 
neighbors’” (Deutsch, 1966, p. 3, emphasis added); more specifically, Deutsch defines a 
nation as, “a people who have hold of a state or who have developed quasi-governmental 
capabilities for forming, supporting, and enforcing a common will.  And a nation-state is 
a state that has become largely identical with one people” (Deutsch, 1966, p. 19, 
emphasis added).  Deutsch offers a rather straightforward historical, practical 
understanding of the nation; his understanding is largely framed in modernity as it offers 
a more technical explanation of the qualities of a nation, while tropes such as “imagined” 
and “discursive” seem to provide an existential-phenomenological hermeneutic entrance 
for understanding alternative renderings of what has traditionally been framed as the 
nation.   
In this discussion of “altering reality” (Bitzer, 1968) and “social cooperation,” 
(Hauser, 1999) communication and rhetoric are the foundations and the channels through 
which the nation becomes a reality through our communication with others.  For these 
reasons we will see that an application of Anderson’s concept of the “imagined 
community” (2006) is appropriate for the various forms of the nation and nationalism 
throughout Western history.  Since I will define the nation largely as a communication 
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construct (not mainly political, economic or cultural), by applying concepts and theories 
of communication and rhetoric, we will see how our understandings of the nation have 
begun a transmutation from monologic forms of communication to dialogic forms of 
communication (Buber, 1988; 1996; 2002). 
As a theoretical framework, this project will employ Anderson’s (2006) 
understanding of the nation as an “imagined community” as a transition toward a theory 
of the postmodern nation and nationalism.  Such a paradigm provides us with substantive 
scholarship for the way in which the nation might be conceived in postmodernity, after 
investigating the various iterations of national phenomena in particular historical 
moments.  The “imagined community” has been cited in recent scholarship on the 
contemporary nation (e.g., Appadurai, 1996; Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997; Smith, 1995, 
1998, 2010), as it appears to touch on what seems to be most present and salient to our 
understanding of the development of nations and nationalism—the constitutive power of 
communicative action.  Nations are not the monolithic, permanent structures that we 
often consider them to be, but rather collective existential-phenomenological entities that 
live in the hearts and minds of their inhabitants.  Once the community is imagined, more 
permanent political, economic, social and communicative structures emanate to form 
what we see to be real, tangible entities.  Although Anderson’s theory is clearly anchored 
in post-Enlightenment phenomena, as it depends on the absence of a dynastic ruling 
structure and the use of modern communication methods such as the printing press, the 
underlying themes of participatory communicative structures still ring true.   
Two elements of Anderson’s conceptual framework are important for our study: 
that is, the development of print capitalism, and the ability for mass-produced texts to 
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allow for simultaneous communication across wide geographic areas.  Nations are 
communities imagined in their citizenry because citizens are able to produce and access 
the same information in their own language over large land areas.  The development of 
the printing press and the ability to distribute this information to multitudes of people 
throughout one politically unified area not only allowed for the distribution of far-
reaching, cohesive messages to one “people” who spoke the same language, but also 
allowed for a more temporal phenomenon which Anderson outlines as “simultaneity” 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 24), which he borrows from Benjamin (1973).  Simultaneity is the 
ability for us to construct phenomena of the past and future concurrently in the present 
moment.  Simultaneity plays a significant role in the way people feel as members of 
groups as large as nations.  Here, in the recesses of “suspended” moments divorced from 
our chronological understanding of time, the idea of an imagined world emerges. This 
phenomenon, however, is not a metaphysical imagining of our consciousness to construct 
abstract notions of national structures, but pragmatic displays of how, in fact, we 
participate in the large context of nation as citizens.  This phenomenon of simultaneity 
channeled through powerful forms of communication, mostly mass communication in 
this case, reconstructs larger, more tangible ideals of culture and nation.  Anderson 
attributes such phenomena to the power of the novel and the newspaper (p. 25).   
The significance of the mass ceremony—Hegel observed that newspapers serve 
modern man as a substitute for morning prayers—is paradoxical.  It is performed 
in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull.  Yet each communicant is well aware that 
the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or 
millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he 
 12 
has not the slightest notion.  Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated at 
daily or half-daily intervals through the calendar.  What more vivid figure for the 
secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned.  (Anderson, 
2006, p. 35) 
Anderson (2006) places this phenomenon at the dawn of the Enlightenment when the 
understanding of cosmology and history were no longer conceptualized as one integrated 
identity (pp. 22; 35); rather, the invention of new communication technologies, 
particularly print media, allowed for the two to live in separate realms, where history 
began to create new perceptions of peoples’ place in their worlds.  One might argue, that 
ancient rhetorical practices (which were often considered the basis for all forms of 
education by orators like Isocrates and Cicero) are perhaps an early form of 
communication that led to this simultaneity as a driving force for constituting political, 
social, and cultural communities. We see the idea of community formation through moral 
rhetorical practices emerge consistently throughout the works of Plato, Aristotle, 
Isocrates, and Cicero that focus on politics and rhetoric itself, to name a few.  As an 
example, Nichols (1987) points out that, “In writing a Rhetoric about speech that aims at 
the advantageous and the just, Aristotle is therefore trying to strengthen political 
community…The potential harmfulness of rhetoric is outweighed by its potential good. If 
rhetoric does unite men in speech about the advantageous and the just, it would promote 
political community” (p.  676).  For the purposes of this project, I extend the notion of 
political community to that of the nation in modernity and postmodernity.   
Much scholarly inquiry, such as Cohen’s and Nussbaum’s (1996) volume For 
Love of Country, Benhabib’s (2006) Another Cosmopolitanism, and Appiah’s (2005) 
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Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, has posited cosmopolitan thought as a 
counterpoint to nationalism through themes of patriotism (a form that takes into the 
account the need to rebuke radical isolationist patriotism), hospitality to cultural others, 
and ethical approaches for understanding the Other. Nationalism is often lurking deep in 
the subtext of each of these conversations, but little work in the field of communication 
or, more particularly, the philosophy of communication has called the idea of nationalism 
to the forefront as a communicative construct that openly affects the ways in which we 
talk about the world around us, our very existence in that world, and the existence of the 
self in relation to the Other in the world.  At best, some scholars have explored the 
rhetorical power behind nationalist sentiment (Shields, 1974; Breuning and Ishiyama, 
1998; Van Noije and Hijmans, 2005), but few have constructed a theory that offers an 
active response to the transformative historical moment of postmodernity where national 
structures appear more tenuous and, quite possibly, intercultural.  One exception is 
Appadurai’s (1996) inquiry into what he views as the slowly disintegrating character of 
the nation, on which I will focus in more detail later.  At first glance, we can credit the 
growth of communication technologies, transportation and the global economy for this 
transition, but if we are to excavate a bit deeper, we might find more substantive 
theoretical constructs that offer an alternative understanding of why and how such a 
phenomenon is emerging. 
There is a need to explore this tension with nation itself and how we, as a human 
family, can begin to transform traditional ideas of the nation into postmodern identities 
that speak directly to the challenges, alliances, and negotiations of contemporary life.  
Nationalism has been a rhetorical trope through which we seek solace, identify our 
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friends, and organize against our enemies; yet, it is axiomatic that nationalistic, political 
issues have been the subject of the most powerful rhetoric ever spoken, redirecting, 
recasting, and reconstituting the world in which we live. One must only refer to a few of 
the influential rhetoric and speeches of national leaders such as Abraham Lincoln, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini 
(Bytwerk, 2008; Gilbert, 2012; Safire, 2004; Welch, 1993) to understand how the role of 
language and rhetoric has deployed entire societies toward communicative action at time 
of conflict and national pride.  At the center of this rhetoric resides the existential-
phenomenological entity of the nation. There seems to be a teleological power in the 
phenomenology of nationalism; however, this power is currently questioned in a context 
of connected, but competing, often conflicting, narratives (Lyotard, 1984; Appadurai, 
1993; 1996; Arnett and Arneson, 1999). These narratives are products of communicative 
acts, whether through the increasing complexity and frequency of culturally diverse 
human encounters or the proliferation of highly advanced technologies that change the 
way we communicate with those within and outside of our own national structures.  In 
other words, we must ask: How can communication theory help us explore traditional 
understandings of the nation and offer an understanding of the emergence of the 
postmodern nation?  How does a postmodern perspective shift our traditional 
understanding of the nation and nationalism?  How can the philosophy of communication 
and communication theory situate an interpretative theory of the postmodern nation that 
responds to the current historical moment? 
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Multiple Narratives, Shifting Epistemologies 
 I hope to answer these questions by focusing this project will focus on 
rhetorical/historical understandings of the nation within antiquity, modernity and 
postmodernity. I will attempt to frame modernity and postmodernity through the eyes of 
Giddens (1990) and Lyotard (1984) to situate the question at hand.  Both scholars have 
helped define these significant historical moments that have textured the ground from 
which communication about the nation emerges.  
 Giddens’ (1990) sociological inquiry into the concept of modernity illuminates 
various characteristics of modernity and how it has guided the direction in which 
institutions and people have developed since the Enlightenment.  He points out that the 
emergence of modernity can, in fact, be pinned to a particular place and time—17th 
century Europe, which often simplifies the complexities and social phenomena that began 
to emerge, and according to him, continue to emerge today.  However, Giddens believes 
that modernity must be defined in terms of particular characteristics that emerged from 
this rhetorical shift and continue to persist until today.  According to Giddens, time-space 
distanciation (p. 14), the disembedding of social systems (p.21), and the reflexivity of 
knowledge (p. 36) are three phenomena that have contributed to the emergence and 
establishment of modern norms. 
These concepts are particularly significant because of the way modernity is 
thought to have reorganized the existential-phenomenological construct of time and place 
and how this bifurcation, which did not exist in premodern societies, altered the ways in 
which we perceived social phenomena and our place in them.  Such a phenomenon 
encouraged individuals to be more “bounded” to certain modern social constructs such as 
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the nation; perhaps the most obvious form of modern institutionalization thus far.  
“Modern societies (nation-states), in some respects at any rate, have a clearly defined 
boundedness.  But all societies are also interwoven with ties and connections which 
crosscut the sociopolitical system of the state and the cultural order of the ‘nation.’ 
Virtually no pre-modern societies were as clearly bounded as modern nation-states” (p. 
14).   “Disembedding” is the concept that Giddens describes as a certain form of “lifting 
out of social relations from local context of interaction and their restructuring across 
indefinite spans of time-space” (p. 21).   Disembedding takes on two different forms, 
symbolic tokens, much like the complex system of money which symbolizes value but is 
not the value of something itself, and expert systems, or the reliance on professional 
knowledge that reassures us that information is valid and reliable without questioning its 
legitimacy.  We rely on these disembedded systems and trust them without question (pp. 
21-29).   
Reflexivity is how we epistemologically systematize our world based on the 
knowledge we gain from the “lifting out” and bracketing of particular social phenomena 
(p. 36).  This reflexivity alters the role of tradition in that it radically shifts the ways 
people have engaged the past and focuses them more on the future.  Social decisions and 
human behavior become a result of this reflexive knowledge and, in this sense, 
knowledge is driven by rational claims backed by clear evidence.  In other words, grand 
narratives are guided by rational knowledge that is a result of bracketed social 
phenomena on which we choose to focus our energies.   
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Postmodernity, on the other hand, is often viewed with the end of this 
foundationalism within modernity as well as the “end of history” (Giddens, 1990, p. 50).  
Giddens (1990) interprets postmodernity as something very specific and pins it to:  
[The fact] that we have discovered that nothing can be known with certainty, 
since all pre-existing ‘foundations’ of epistemology have been shown to be 
unreliable; that ‘history’ is devoid of any teleology and consequently no version 
of ‘progress’ can plausibly be defended; and that a new social and political 
agenda has come into being with the increasing prominence of ecological 
concerns and perhaps of new social movements generally. (p. 46) 
Postmodernity seems to lack the rigid certitude and the epistemological confidence that 
seems to be a feature of modernity; rather, it throws us into a realm of contingency where 
the modern structures that we depend on for knowledge and action may no longer apply. 
These aspects that emerge in postmodernity may force us to reconsider the 
epistemological, ontological and existential structures of our world.   
Having identified postmodernity in the face of modernity, Giddens (1990) 
believes that we are not actually involved in a clear historical break from modernity, but 
that perhaps these characteristics are more accurately representative of what we might 
consider to be “late modernity,” since the ability to do such a thing would be anti-
postmodern, by definition.  More importantly, these uncertainties about human reasoning 
and empiricism were really an essential part of the foundational thinking of modernity.   
Rather, than the absolute end of modernity and the dawn of postmodernity, Giddens sees 
this more specifically as “modernity coming to understand itself” (p. 48). These elements 
from Giddens offer helpful insight for our understanding of modernity; these particular 
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characteristics that he identifies as part and parcel of modernity all point to the existence 
of what we refer to as grand narratives that guide people and social knowledge deeply. 
This academic question regarding the end of modernity and the emergence of 
postmodernity is an important one, but for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to 
focus on how Giddens understands the shift in the way modernity has been characterized 
and how it has been understood.  Most importantly, Giddens sees these changing 
characteristics that seem to explain modernity more accurately occurring in the power 
relations of the West with the rest of the world.  These power relations that are a result of 
a developing modernity are, in fact, implicating the nation and referring to characteristics 
of what we now call globalization (p. 52).   Regardless of how we choose to define it, 
rhetoric plays a role in redefining how we understand society and actively engage 
communication, from the interpersonal to the international.  This paradigmatic shift 
shapes the ways in which we understand the nation.  
Lyotard (1984), on the other hand, views postmodernity as a more imminent 
emerging phenomenon. In his seminal work, “The Postmodern Condition,” Lyotard 
describes postmodernity as a moment in which knowledge is framed by an “incredulity 
toward metanarratives” (p. xxiv).  Unlike the modernist project of constructing a 
centralized, monolithic, universal narrative that guided our epistemological stance, 
postmodernity recognizes a moment when critical, reflexive, hermeneutic knowledge 
essentializes the organic whole of social life (Lyotard, 1984).  This organic quality is 
interpreted through systems of complexity and difference that are characteristic of the 
postmodern moment.  “Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it 
refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
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incommensurable.  Its principle is not the expert’s homology, but the inventor’s 
paraology” (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxv). 
Postmodern knowledge questions the legitimacy of social order as it is rhetorical 
and discursive in nature and lacks a central metanarrative to which the modern 
framework refers.  Rather, it lives in the grassroots that generate civil societies and, to 
paraphrase Hauser’s (1999) concept, “vernacular publics” that force us to consider 
alternative modes of social organization through discursive practices.  For Lyotard, the 
internal continuity of the postmodern moment not only affects culture, institutions, and 
how we communicate, but also the very structure and narrative of the nation as we 
understand it in modernity.   
For the mercantilization of knowledge is bound to affect the privilege the nation-
states have enjoyed, and still enjoy, with respect to the production and distribution 
of learning.  The notion that learning falls within the purview of the State, as the 
brain or mind of society, will become more and more outdated with the increasing 
strength of the opposing principle, according to which society exists and 
progresses only if the messages circulating within it are rich in information and 
easy to decode.  The ideology of communicational ‘transparency’ which goes 
hand in hand with the commercialization of knowledge, will begin to perceive the 
State as a factor of opacity and ‘noise.’ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 5)   
Lyotard situates public discourse and the diversity of messages within those discourses at 
the center of a transforming idea of nation, which is situated within these conceptions of 
postmodernity. Throughout this project, I will attempt to characterize the “postmodern 
nation” as a phenomenon that is indeed “affected by the mercantilization of knowledge” 
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and morphs into an entity that is perhaps a product of “opacity and noise,” in Lyotard’s 
terms.  Access to information and how that information is conveyed in the post-industrial, 
postmodern moment undermines our current notion of national structures and forces us to 
look beyond for systems, or, better, multiple narratives, that will tell the story of 
complexity and multiplicity while recognizing the need to organize learning and 
knowledge under a new rubric. Lyotard acknowledges the dissenters who believe that 
“the breaking up of the grand Narratives” will disrupt society beyond repair, but contests 
this notion, recognizing that modernity is not the only answer to utopian notions of 
“organic” societies (p. 15).  On the contrary, postmodernity engages social “organicism” 
more readily and realistically than modernity and, as a result, may transform the very 
notion of the nation-state, nationalism and national identity, as we know it.  
President Barack Obama’s inaugural speech on January 20, 2009, exemplifies this 
dialectical tension of a modernist nation and nationalism situated in postmodern 
principles.  Attempting to call forth a new era of optimism in the face of daunting 
political, economic and cultural crises, Obama is compelled to invoke traditional, some 
might say, modernist, language and images of nationalism while recognizing 
concomitantly the shifting nature of modernity.   
What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them, 
that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long, no longer 
apply… Our challenges may be new, the instruments with which we meet them 
may be new, but those values upon which our success depends, honesty and hard 
work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism—
these things are old.  These things are true. They have been the quiet force of 
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progress throughout our history.” (emphasis added, New York Times, January 20, 
2009) 
Obama emphasizes the liminal (to borrow Turner (1964) and Van Gennep’s (1960) term) 
moment in which we live—a need to “shift the ground beneath us” while continuing to 
reflect on the universal qualities that have grounded us in modernity since antiquity and 
the Enlightenment.  Obama’s campaign focused almost incessantly on the metaphor of 
change, but the fact may be that this is more a moment of “prudent change,” since we 
must still rely on those virtues and values that have grounded us for so long.  
Nevertheless, rhetoric like Obama’s is symbolic of a new transitional moment, where the 
dialogic “between” (Buber, 2002) can become powerful and real; such rhetoric plays 
directly into the transformative character of the nation and the power of nationalism in 
postmodernity. 
Nationalism continues to command substantive power in all levels of political, 
social and economic life despite its amorphous, loosely-defined nature (Anderson, 2006); 
but, more accurately, the nation is a genuine ontological expression of how we are 
encouraged to live in communion with each other while simultaneously emphasizing a 
world of discrete cultural, political and economic differences.  One must look only to 
recent international events such as September 11, 2001, to understand the power of 
nationalism and national identity in the face of threats and contrasting narratives 
presented to us through alternative, “other,” frameworks (Huntington, 2004).  In these 
cases, nationalism becomes what seems to be a natural human response to threat and 
outside pressures.  Images of homeland are reified in tangible institutions such as the 
Department of Homeland Security that were created in response to extra-national 
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pressures like the tragedies of September 11, 2001. When our governments and the public 
sphere respond to conflict by enacting institutions and modes of thinking that reinforce 
nationalistic thinking, it is difficult to accept that the nation-state, especially in terms of 
power and protection, may transform in reaction to a shift in epistemological and 
ontological narratives. I would suggest, however, that the postmodern moment announces 
epistemological and ontological narratives for the condition of the nation and nationalism 
that encourage us to recast traditional understandings and the current condition of the 
conceptualization of the nation.    
As a powerful rhetorical device, one hermeneutic entrance into understanding the 
nuanced historical and philosophical underpinnings of the nation, or what some scholars 
would consider the lack thereof (Anderson, 2006 p. 5), could be to explore the rich 
metaphors of the nation throughout history, particularly through the words and 
conceptual constructs of the rhetoricians who were embedded in their particular time and 
place.  By examining these various rhetorical metaphors from the Greeks, Romans, 
modern, and postmodern scholars, we begin to see common themes, but also transitional 
moments—the rhetorical turns—that have shaped the conceptualization of nation in 
various ways, all characterized in persuasive and influential ways that work powerfully 
because of their incorporation into the universe of discourse of scholars and citizens.  
Although Anderson’s main objective was to show us how the nation as an “imagined 
community” is largely a product of modernity, we can apply the overall concept of an 
imagined community to earlier forms of communication throughout history.   
An existential-phenomenological stance allows us to bracket theories of the nation 
to permit them to emerge as ideas that respond to the current historical moment to create 
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ground for taking action to improve public (and private) life. By bracketing these theories 
we can limit their totalizing effect and allow a new understanding to emerge.  
Poststructuralist approaches reflect the contingent, diverse world in which we live; 
themes of “post-modernity” (Lyotard, 1984), a “post-national” society (Appadurai, 
1993), “post-colonial” environments (Appiah, 1991), or “post-ethnic” contexts 
(Hollinger, 2006) have emerged with vigor and have been accepted throughout the 
academy.  These rhetorical tropes of “post-ness” intensify our need to comprehend 
existential-phenomenological reality of change in social life.  Moving beyond antiquity 
and modernity, post-positivist and post-structuralist approaches are indicators that we, as 
a society and interconnected world, have begun to understand what intercultural 
complexities present to us and how they offer a particular hermeneutic to open up a world 
in flux wrought with contingency and possibility—if, in fact, we are open to experience 
such phenomena.  These problems are not new, but rather framed within a new, more 
realistic and pragmatic context that expresses not what “is,” but what “might be” in a 
complex world of multiplicity and cultural diversity.  The concept of nation rests on the 
cusp of this “post-ness,” as it seems to struggle between acknowledging its deep roots in 
linear, unidirectional, monologic modernity while actively living in a world of holistic, 
multidirectional, dialogic postmodern uncertainty. 
In this exploration of the nation as a rhetorical structure we will examine 
particular metaphors and thinkers in the development of nationalistic thought.  This study 
will not be an exhaustive historical analysis, but rather an exploration of important 
rhetorical turns in our thinking about the nation, or the “imagined community.”  Although 
Anderson parallels contemporary ideals of the nation with metaphors of antiquity, such as 
 24 
the fall of the “dynastic realm” and the development of “print capitalism,” the metaphor 
of his “imagined community” still holds true when we apply it to concepts of 
rhetorical/civic education as the basis for the nation as it is grounded deeply in 
communicative culture. We will explore earlier rhetorical understandings of communal 
life, how its boundaries are imagined and how they contribute to our current context and 
the postmodern iteration.   
 These glimpses provide an understanding of how the modern nation has 
developed and how its foundation is formed in communicative action, which often is 
taken for granted in our thinking about the nation.  Such an exploration holds 
implications for educational, geopolitical, economic and cultural spaces.  Most 
importantly, this study will attempt to offer a postmodern understanding of the nation as 
opposed to the current context of our world that continues to be dominated by 
Enlightenment thinking.   
Dialogic Communication:  A Hermeneutic for Postmodern Nationalism 
 To what extent, then, can communication framed by the nation be perceived as 
monologic or dialogic communication?  Martin Buber (2002) outlines his idea of dialogic 
communication as an existential-phenomenological occurrence in everyday life.  It is 
through dialogic communication that we engage the world and respond to the Other; 
meaning emerges “between Man and Man,” in the communities in which we live, not in a 
vacuum of solitary confinement (p. 23).  Buber defines dialogic communication in 
relation to what he calls technical dialogue and monologic communication.   
There is genuine dialogue- no matter whether spoken or silent—where each 
participant really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular 
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being and turns to them with the intentional of establishing a mutual relation 
between himself and them.  There is technical dialogue, which is prompted solely 
by the need of objective understanding.  And there is monologue disguised as 
dialogue, in which two of more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in 
strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the 
torment of being thrown back on their own resources.  The first kind, as I have 
said, had become rare; where it arises, in no matter how “unspiritual” a form, 
witness is borne on behalf of the continuance of the organic substance of the 
human spirit.  The second belongs to the inalienable sterling quality of “modern 
existence.”  But real dialogue is here continually hidden in all kinds of odd 
corners and, occasionally in an unseemly way, breaks surface surprisingly and 
inopportunely — certainly still oftener it is arrogantly tolerated than downright 
scandalizing — as in the tone of a railway guard’s voice, in the glance of an old 
newspaper vendor, in the smile of a the chimney-sweeper. (Buber, 2002, p. 22) 
This notion of dialogic versus monologic communication has been appropriated 
throughout the academy to describe what we might popularly call not only “effective” 
communication, but also meaningful communication guided by an ethical orientation 
(Anderson, Arnett & Cissna, 1994; Anderson, Baxter & Cissna, 2004; Arnett, 2004).  
Although monologue and technical dialogue are important in the realm of human life and 
action in appropriate contexts (Arnett, Fritz & Bell, 2009), a dialogic orientation provides 
a fitting approach to the current project.  Dialogic communication provides substantive 
ground for a study about the postmodern nation, as it contextualizes and situates an 
 26 
understanding of contemporary nationalism within the disciplinary domain of 
communication theory.  
Buber (2005) also wrote prolifically on issues of nationalism in regards to the 
Palestinian question in the early part of the 20th century.  Buber’s philosophy of dialogic 
communication pervades his work on nationalism, and like many of these aforementioned 
scholars, Buber views nationalism as a necessary spiritual and pragmatic force that 
organizes and gives credence to certain political goals; however, he sees a strong human 
tendency for the misappropriation of such powerful ideas (p. 54).  Nationalism does not 
mean that individuals and society as a whole must only look within for answers; instead, 
the nationalism that actually creates the possibility of difference based on physical 
borders and human sentiment concomitantly allows us to exist in a dialogic world of 
discrete difference.  We must gaze within to see clearly without, but we should not 
remain only within (pp. 57; 61; 86).  An isolated form of nationalism only results in what 
Buber calls “false nationalism” and misleading ideologies (p. 54).  Here, dialogue seems 
to allow nationalism to tell a more accurate story within the competing narratives of a 
postmodern world.  
My goal will be to understand how historical moments such as postmodernity, 
manifested in its incessant multiplicity and lack of common philosophical center, convey 
monologic or dialogic forms of communication as a substrate for philosophical and 
applied considerations of the nation and nationalism.  Before we attempt to interpret the 
postmodern nation, however, we should explore other pertinent historical moments that 
contribute to our thinking about it.   
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The Project: An Overview 
For the purposes of this project, I view the nation as a communicative, discursive 
public phenomenon that allows private citizens to engage issues of belonging and identity 
rhetorically within strongly defined political, social, economic and communicative 
boundaries. Following the work of Anderson (2006), Calhoun (1997) and Appadurai 
(1996), although bound to physical characteristics in our current understanding, the 
nation seems to be defined more by imagined, existential-phenomenological horizons that 
offer guidelines for interaction with cultural, political, social and economic selves and 
others.  In this regard, physical boundaries become less stringent, more contingent and 
permeable.  Nationalism, then, is the intellectual and emotional manifestation of that 
reality in the hearts and minds of that nation’s citizens and interlocutors.  It is important 
to keep in mind that the terms nation and nationalism are often conflated in writings on 
the subject.  Although nationalism is often the sentiment and reaction regarding one’s 
nation, the term nationalism is often employed to speak about the study of the nation 
itself (Dahbour & Ishay, 1995).  In short, any study of the communicative nature of the 
nation will ultimately affect the ways in which nationalism emerges and takes shape.   
Why phenomenology?  Phenomenology as applied to communication theory and 
research has become an acceptable method for exploring issues of communication and 
human interaction.  Husserl (2012) and, later, Heidegger (2010), provided a framework 
for appropriating phenomenology to the field of communication, but in the 1970s 
communication scholars seemed to become particularly interested in exploring a 
hermeneutic for the phenomenology of communication (Hawes, 1977), its use for the 
study of organizational communication (Sanders, 1982), understanding identity issues 
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and social cooperation issues (Gresson, 1978), and the dynamics of interpersonal 
communication and dialogue (Arnett, 1981).  “Phenomenology seeks to make explicit the 
implicit structure and meaning of the human experience.  It is the search for ‘essences’ 
that cannot be revealed by ordinary observation” (Sanders, 1982, p. 354).  
Phenomenology offers an alternative for the study of human communication because it 
takes a different stance from traditional, positivistic approaches where the research 
scholar is often seen as an onlooker, prefiguring the world that he is about to investigate 
(Hawes, 1977).  The phenomenologist on the other hand, “assumes the world is 
perpetually constituted, and ‘what is real’ and ‘how realness is accomplished’ become the 
phenomena of interest” (Hawes, p. 35).  In a phenomenological methodology then, 
researchers are not only onlookers, but also participants in the world that is constantly 
constituted and reconstituted before them.  Phenomenology is more concerned with 
ontology and what and how something is, as opposed to epistemology alone and why 
something is (Hawes, 1977).  Holstein and Gubrium (1994) explain that Schutz (1964) 
brought Husserlian phenomenology into contemporary research methods and gave it 
credence as a method that investigates the world as it actually is: “Schutz (1964) argued 
that the social sciences should focus on the ways that the life world—that is, the 
experiential world every person takes for granted—is produced and experienced by its 
members” (p. 263).  This is accomplished through the phenomenological approach of 
“bracketing” certain phenomena to better explore that which reveals itself in certain 
instances.    
Although scholars have referred to phenomenology applied in such a way as 
“qualitative research” (Sanders, 1982), this qualitative research seems to move beyond 
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what is traditionally considered to be qualitative methods because it is energized by 
philosophical inquiry.  At moments during this study, I refer to the phenomenological 
qualities of the nation and nationalism as an attempt to describe the nation as an 
existential, ontological, constitutive phenomenon that is a product of communicative and 
rhetorical practices.  Hawes (1977) provides an explanation for the reason that this study 
can benefit from a phenomenological perspective grounded in the study of 
communication:  
By viewing human communication phenomenologically and putting commonsense 
assumptions out of play, one achieves the perspective of an anthropological 
stranger. Once the familiar is rendered strange, the historicality of the 
phenomenon—its horizons of possibilities in its past and future—stand out in 
sharper relief.  Hermeneutic explication interprets the now strange communication 
by displaying it and its implicit suppositions in an understandable fashion; 
understandable to the speaker as the contemporaneously present non-speakers. 
(Hawes, 1977, p. 33)   
I hope to not only “bracket” the idea of the nation as a communicative construct and strip 
it of the common sense, shared notion the we have of the nation, but also in the spirit of 
existential phenomenology, to analyze the ontological questions of the nation that 
ultimately affect human life.  An existential-phenomenological perspective expands on 
the notion of phenomenology discussed above because the existentialist approach to 
phenomenology allows us to move beyond an ontology that only takes into the 
consideration the metaphysical, spiritual realm to one that considers the “wholeness of 
the person” (Buber, 2002, p. 192), or in this case, the wholeness of human life. Martin 
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Buber’s concept of dialogue is deeply grounded in existential phenomenology because of 
the manner in which his form of dialogic communication relegates these ontological 
questions that emerge through acts of communication to concrete human beings in their 
lived experience (Czubaroff, 2000, p. 169).   
This project will seek to establish rhetorical and philosophical ground for 
recasting theories of the nation in a postmodern framework by illuminating theories of 
rhetoric and communication throughout the Western canon. I will not attempt to reiterate 
a chronological history of the nation and nationalism, but rather point to its power as 
rhetorical and cultural currency that has emerged in selected historical moments.  Most 
importantly, we will see that the nation offers an existential-phenomenological, and more 
significantly, existential-spiritual power that emerges from and offers responses to ideas 
of belonging and interaction with others.  We refer to ancient rhetorical scholarship 
because of the philosophical and rhetorical foundation it provides for discussions of the 
modern nation and emerging trends in nationalism.  Classical rhetoric, though seemingly 
distant in time and space, provide us with “elaborate theories” that ground contemporary 
rhetorical situations and allow to analyze discourse productively (Welch, 1990, p. 5). 
This attempt to appropriate ancient rhetoric for the purposes of this project fall under 
what Welch (1990) coins the Dialectic School of Classical Rhetoric, which relies “not on 
discovering palpable rhetorical ‘reality’ out there, but concentrate[s] instead on 
contemporary epistemological constructions that in turn are capable of producing an 
interpretation of classical rhetoric” (p. 11).  My hope is that we can begin to unravel the 
problem of nation and nationalism through a rhetorical and communicative lens that 
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begins with those in the Western trope who have essentially established the bedrock on 
which the tenets of nationalism has been constructed, which includes those in antiquity.  
In Chapter 2, I will explore the idea of the nation as it was communicated 
rhetorically by the single figure who might be considered not only the “Father of Liberal 
Education,” (Kennedy, 1994, p. 46), who consistently communicated about the ideal of 
panhellenism—Isocrates.  Isocrates offers us a point of departure from which we can 
explore ideas of the nation and how they are formed through rhetoric in antiquity.  
Mostly, we will find that Isocratean rhetoric, a staple of ancient rhetorical theory based in 
logos and phronesis, was an influential method in the way understandings of the nation 
and nationalism were carried into the Roman Republic and modernity.  For Isocrates, 
rhetoric serves as the guiding principle for civic education, and therefore for the moral 
and political development of the polis.  Cohen (2000) believes that the Greek polis is 
actually a viable social structure that helps us understand earlier forms of the nation 
through the ways in which it influenced its own citizens as well as those living outside of 
the polis. Paideia, a centrifugal social force, as described by Jaeger (1967; 1986), 
pervades every element of Isocratean rhetoric and forms the foundation for his ideas 
about education and culture, and ultimately his ideas about nation and nationalism. As a 
nuanced approach to understanding culture, paideia becomes an essential element in later 
understandings of the nation.   
In Chapter 3, I will explore how the Greek understanding of the polis carries 
through to the Roman Republic to affect ideas of nation and what constitutes a viable 
republic. Cicero, one of Isocrates’s intellectual followers (Hubbell, 1913), continues this 
conversation about nation in terms of citizenship in the civitas—Rome’s polis.  I will 
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attempt to understand how Rome continues to develop ideals of the nation through 
Cicero’s understanding of civic republicanism and the function of the state, as influenced 
not only by Isocrates, but also by foundational philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.  
Civic republicanism’s focus on justice and the common good echoes goals similar to 
those of the polis.  As an influential orator, Cicero advanced ideas of civic responsibility 
and equality through the construct of the res publica—the republic.  Again, I turn to 
Anderson’s (2006) concept of the “imagined community” to understand Cicero’s res 
publica as a nation, using civic republicanism as its philosophical ground.  As we will 
see, republicanism reflects some of the central ideals of structural diversity and 
multiplicity centered on a common good, but differentiated by Cicero’s focus on human 
laws embodied by natural law as a guiding principle.  I will also briefly explore Cicero’s 
influence on important Christian rhetoricians, such as Lactantius (1964) and St. 
Augustine (1984), who would go on to explore the late Roman Empire and Christianity’s 
role in the development of the nation.  My goal in Chapter 3, as it was in Chapter 2, is to 
set the stage for the idea of the nation and principles of nationalism as rhetorical 
structures.   
In Chapter 4, I will focus on how these ideas transformed into what we 
understand to be the nation and nationalism today.  It seems to be widely accepted in the 
academy (e.g., Carr, 1945; Kedourie 1993; Anderson, 2006) that the current form of the 
nation is a direct result of rhetorical forces of the Enlightenment and the work of key 
philosophical figures such as Kant (1963, 1990, 2003) and his contemporaries.  The 
Enlightenment provided the context for a major rhetorical shift in the way most scholars 
and everyday citizens perceived the structure of the nation; the notion of the nation was 
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viewed as the driving force behind events such as the French and American Revolutions, 
which were enactments of human freedom and democracy in a struggle for nations of 
their own. I will touch on thinkers such as Hobbes (1968), Renan (1995), and Mazzini 
(1995) to understand how the nation was situated in the modern moment and to explore 
how they configured the nation as an existential-phenomenological expression of 
“imagined” human communities and identity.  Kedourie (1993) contends that Kant is the 
central figure in shifting the philosophical conversation about the way we think about the 
nation in modernity and how it is expressed in these terms; however, other voices such as 
Gellner (1983, 1994) will challenge this notion that Kant played such a significant role 
and will introduce other social forces that seemed to be more significant. 
Postmodernity provides an important philosophical and rhetorical framework that 
influences the nature of our communication, which in turn shapes the construction of our 
world.  In Chapter 5, I will explore how postmodernity may affect the way we perceive 
current understandings of the nation.   The nation becomes a community that is 
“imagined” through a new lens, a shifting epistemology that influences the ways in which 
we interact interpersonally, interculturally and socially.  I will explore how scholars like 
Habermas (2001), Appadurai (1996), and Huntington (1996) characterize the postmodern 
nation, which seems to be a direct expression of narrative disagreement and virtue 
contention.  In response to this deconstructed version of the nation, I will also engage 
Martin Buber’s dialogic theory as a hermeneutic entrance to the postmodern nation, and 
attempt to provide a possible communicative framework within the seemingly discordant, 
but productive, tension of postmodernity.  
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 My intention is to fill a particular lacuna in nation and nationalism studies 
through the lens of philosophy of communication.  Schlesinger (2001) suggests that 
scholars such as Anderson and Deutsch are focused more on “communications” (media-
generated forms of communication at a macro-level) than a “philosophy of 
communication.”  Although these thinkers’ ideas certainly contribute to studies in the 
philosophy of communication, it seems that very few have taken the tack of deliberately 
attempting to interpret the concept of the nation within philosophical and 
phenomenological frameworks.  By exploring the nation within these various historical-
metaphorical contexts from the ancients to postmodernity, we may find ground for 
moving beyond traditional theories of the nation, whether they are historical, political, 
social, economic or even based in “communications.”  We may also find elements for 
justifying the promotion of a theory of nation and nationalism framed by dialogic theory, 
often overlooked in debates about the nation and international communication.  In short, 
it seems that the conversation about the salience of the nation in everyday life is still very 
present in contemporary discourse.  As a philosophy of communication scholar, I hope 
that these shifting philosophical contexts can guide us toward an understanding of the 
nation that responds to this historical moment.   
 
 35 
Chapter 2 
Isocrates’ Rhetorical Influence on the Idea of Nation:  
Civic Education, Paideia and Panhellenism 
To begin, we turn to Ancient Athens and the metaphor of the polis as our first step 
in this exploration.  The polis itself provides ground from which can begin to understand 
early concepts of the nation (Cohen, 2000).  We must keep in mind, however, that our 
contemporary understanding of nation is a construct of modernity, developing in the 
Enlightenment, and any reference to nation should be recast within the understanding of 
the polis in its historical moment.  The polis, understanding the polis as a national 
structure, and Isocrates’ emphasis on the power of language and the educational use of 
that language to influence society in productive ways allowed the imagination of the polis 
as a national structure as we understand it today. 
Aristotle’s Politics (1981; 1998) provides us with a descriptive account through 
which we can structure and engage a community of thinkers, workers, and outsiders 
within a framework of communal action. Arendt (1998) tells us that Aristotle 
characterizes the polis as a mechanism for communal action: “…[T]he political realm 
rises directly out of acting together acting together, the ‘sharing of words and deeds.’ 
Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world 
common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it” (p. 199). 
Arendt highlights this Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially, at their core, political 
creatures – individual beings that are naturally organized into communal structures for 
the good of the polis, the common good (Aristotle, 1981; 1998). 
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To understand this Aristotelian principle, one could argue that citizens are 
teleologically pulled toward community life realized in the structure of the state.  For 
Aristotle (1999), the polis provided the structure in which its members were free to 
engage in debate and deliberation under which the minimal good could be attained and 
agreed upon (Ethics, pp. 1-2).  The polis provided the existential-phenomenological space 
in which individuals and groups could strive for justice and rational thought.  Just as the 
family (oikos) provided a similar, but more interpersonal, structure under which 
individuals could function, the polis provided a larger, public structure under which 
individuals could work, worship, and interact productively beyond the family and 
personal relationships.   Although Aristotle saw the polis as a much smaller version of the 
modern nation-state, he still saw its function as a sovereign political unit (Irwin, 1999, p. 
320). 
Communitarian scholars like Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) are important 
contributors to this conversation because they ultimately reject communicative norms that 
emerge in modernity and encourage us to return to an understanding of traditional and 
ancient virtues that existed in the polis—a “face to face” society that readily allowed for 
the creation of a moral, democratic society that was interactive, intimate, and community-
based (Cohen, 2000; Clayton, 2006). In the Politics, Aristotle defines the polis in terms of 
its territorial size (not too small or large), and the fact that its citizens know one another; 
if not, the essence of the polis is impossible (Aristotle, 1998, p. 199). (Arendt also offers 
a perspective of the Greek understanding of the population of the polis and its political 
effectiveness (1998, p. 43)).  However, Cohen (2000) extends this notion of the Athenian 
polis by identifying its form as an ethnos, which is more closely related to the concept of 
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the nation as we understand it today.  For Cohen, polis is often a confusing term that 
applies to all levels of society simultaneously and does not offer a sense of continuity, 
which Athenians considered to be the true essence of their society. For the purposes of 
this project, the Athenian polis may be understood as a form of nation, but with a diverse 
set of qualities and perceptions different from how we understand the nation today.  
Cohen understands the polis as a different conception from this “face-to-face” 
environment:   
My Athens is quite different—a nation where households of varied origins and   
individual persona, created a culturally homogenous world of intricate and 
multidimensional institutions and ideas, unified by a mutually conceptualized 
group identity forged partly through historical fabrication; where demographic 
mobility, civil mutability, cultural complexity, and a dynamic economy generated 
a society of relative anonymity; where membership in the polis (citizenship) was a 
fluid asset ultimately available (or deniable) to all segments of the local 
population, but where “power”—the manifold aspects of control, command, and 
influence in a society—transcended political arrangements and manifested social, 
economic, religious, and even sexual dimensions. (p. 9) 
By refuting Athens as a mosaic of poleis, and recognizing it as ethnos (nation), Cohen is 
essentially characterizing nation as a society that responds to the heterogeneity and 
complexities of human life where the polis is a more provincial, limited notion of 
communal life that does not allow for the possibility of phenomenological distance from 
our neighbors.  It is for these reasons that Anderson’s work on “Imagined Communities” 
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(2006) is useful when exploring the idea of the nation, even when engaging the ancient 
world.   
Cohen (2000) employs Anderson’s concept of imagined community to offer a 
better description for this idea of the polis.  Physically, Athens was larger than many 
modern nations – what made Athens different from other poleis was not only its size but 
its political unity.  Other poleis were not politically unified and did not function as the 
political structure that Aristotle had described (Cohen, 2000).  Thus, it seems that 
Aristotle’s idea of “knowing each other” may not actually represent true interpersonal 
relationships, but rather “knowing” others’ political affinities, cultural understandings 
and ways of life in order to create a coordinated, fluid social context that was easily 
identifiable among its citizens. Culture, then, provided the channel through which citizens 
were able to “know” each other politically (through the polis).   
Connecting Isocratic Rhetoric to Nation Studies 
To investigate these ideas I turn to a prominent Greek scholar, politician and 
rhetorician who would have a remarkable impact on the history of the Greek world and 
its influence on Western culture: Isocrates.  I choose Isocrates not only for his 
contributions to our understanding of the Greek world and rhetoric, but also because 
some consider his rhetoric on panhellenism to resemble “nationalist” rhetoric in antiquity 
(Jaeger, 1986; Haskins, 2004); DeRomilly (1992) suggests that Isocrates was the first in 
antiquity to shape his political rhetoric in terms of Greece (what she calls Europe) in 
opposition to Asia (Persia).  However, Haskins (2004) points out that this understanding 
of Isocrates’ panhellenism as nationalistic is misguided and rather an attempt to: “to 
criticize the contemporary historical situation by comparing it with mythologized 
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historical past and to remind the audience of its collective identity,” and not a precursor 
to Nazi Fascism as suggested by scholars such as Vitanza (1997) (Haskins, 2004, p. 125). 
Most importantly, his teachings of “citizenship education” set the stage for the 
justification of the power of the liberal arts in education and the effects of education on 
transformational personhood, mostly for creating citizens who formed rational and 
productive communities (Poulakos, 1997).   
First, it is necessary for us to understand Isocrates’ rhetorical program as what he 
believed to be the ultimate form of citizenship training.  Isocrates saw rhetoric as a form 
of practical philosophy; for him, the philosophy and rhetoric are inextricably linked.  In a 
sense, Isocrates’ rhetoric was a sort of compromise where philosophy and rhetoric met in 
a utilitarian compromise for the good of Athens.  He encourages us to “reconsider the 
conceptual categories” of philosophy and rhetoric as they were traditionally understood 
by conflating the two into an integrated system of thought and action (Livingstone, 2007, 
p. 19).  Philosophy was useless without the power of rhetoric because of the contingent 
nature of reality, but rhetoric depended on philosophical ground to forge ahead.  In 
Against the Sophists (2000) Isocrates is mostly concerned with the potential damage 
Sophistic rhetoric can cause, but like the Sophists he admits that transcendental truth is 
humanly (and even divinely) unattainable; rhetoric allows us to engage contingency as 
philosophical thinking which can fill this space with viable alternatives. “…Homer, who 
has been conceded the highest reputation for wisdom, has pictured even the gods at times 
debating among themselves about the future —not that he knew their minds but that he 
desired to show us that for mankind this power lies in the realms of the impossible” 
(Isocrates, 2000, pp. 163-165).   
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The power of rhetorical education was the central theme of Isocratean theory. 
Much like Gorgias’ (2001) critique of language having similar effects on the human soul 
as drugs on the body (p. 32), Isocrates recognized this same power of language in the 
context of education and politics: “Bodies are naturally built up through measured tasks, 
the soul through honorable words” (Isocrates, 2000, To Demonicus, p. 22). In Isocratean 
terms, education “corrected” the Platonic “cookery” of rhetoric and improved this 
overwhelming power in substantive ways: 
Because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to 
make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of 
wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and 
invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man 
which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things base and 
honorable; and if it were not for those ordinances we should not be able to extol 
the good.  Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the understanding, 
and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of the good 
and faithful soul.  (Nicocles or Cyprian Orations, 1980, pp. 79-81) 
It is clear that Isocrates sees dialogue and rhetoric as essential elements not only for 
public life in the polis, but also as a form of moral education that can ultimately generate 
the good.  Although language is the foundation of rhetoric, human action that is derived 
from this language in particular frames Isocratean rhetoric.   
Isocrates is concerned with the person’s role in the power structure of the polis 
and how rhetoric and civic education cultivate this role.  Isocratic rhetorical and civic 
education is considered a model for life, a powerful intellectual tool that incorporates 
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citizens into the larger context encouraging them to act justly for the good of the polis 
(Morgan, 2003, p. 126). Yunis (as cited in Livingstone, 2007) points out that the 
“rhetorical situation” of Ancient Greece was that citizenship meant a direct involvement 
in politics, engaging in politics was ultimately a means of persuasion (p. 16).  In other 
words, citizens were rhetorical beings who shaped the identity and position of the polis 
through powerful and well-educated language (logos).  Isocrates believed that logos not 
only makes us uniquely human, but also it challenges us to shape our social and political 
milieu in distinctive ways.   Therefore, the very act of communication formed the polis 
and made it viable: “Isocrates assumes that all higher education of the intellect depends 
on cultivating our ability to understand on another.  It is not an accumulation of factual 
knowledge in any sphere; it is concerned with the forces which hold society together.  
There are summed up in one word logos” (Jaeger, 1986, p. 143).  In this way, Isocrates 
legitimizes his position in Ancient Greek scholarship alongside other significant Greek 
philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle by creating a consistent narrative, particularly in 
regards to public identity within the polis, which contributes to how citizens structured 
the Greek state.  Isocrates’ method was not what the Greeks called mere tekhne, but 
rather a holistic approach for thinking and engaging in the polis (Walzer, 2007, p. 271).   
Rhetorical education considered the citizen as a cause and effect of rhetorical 
discourse (Poulakos, 2004).  Through a “hegemonic” form of logos politikos, rhetoric is 
able to lead citizens toward worthwhile ends which benefit society by constructing social 
reality, building necessary institutions, and creating human communities shaped by 
common beliefs (Poulakos, 2004).  Rhetorical civic education was understood to mediate 
political upheaval and harmonize individual and collective purposes to restore Athens to 
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its inherent greatness (which was Isocrates’ priority).  In other words, “hegemonic logos” 
can bring forth unification, cooperation, consensus, and stability in the wake of political 
turmoil (Poulakos, 2004, p.73). Rhetoric as a civic force provides direction for the state 
and the citizens within that state; it equips us with the language and ideas necessary for 
understanding the challenges and goals of the cultural context in which we live with one 
another: paideia.  Poulakos characterizes such Isocratic rhetoric as “centripetal” since it 
encourages individuals to direct themselves toward a common center in moments of 
disagreeable diversity, while Sophistic rhetoric’s inconsistency provided a more 
centrifugal force shifting individuals to a more doubtful periphery, which did not guide 
citizens to a common center for the good of the state:  
Unlike the Sophists, Isocrates found himself in a dispersed culture, one plagued 
with the ills inherent in excessive individuation—conflicting claims and 
competing interests.  His reaction to this state of affairs manifested itself in a 
rhetoric pointing away from the periphery and towards a center.  At this center, 
there lay arguments for the need of leaders, the importance of rhetorical 
education, the benefits of political stability, and the advantages of pan-Hellenism. 
(Poulakos, 2004, p. 82) 
Concepts such as “hegemonic” and “center” seem to suggest an inflexible system of 
rhetoric in reference to political action.  As mentioned earlier, Haskins (2004) explains 
that some scholars have even gone so far as to posit that Isocratic theory of paideia and 
logos paved the way for extreme political movements such as Nazi Germany and Hitler’s 
Third Reich, and has justified actions of cultural imperialism in the contemporary world.   
Regardless of how some view Isocrates’ orientation, his emphasizes on the “common 
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center,” “common sense” and “citizenship” all reflect enduring themes of nationalism and 
an understanding of the nation.  Most important, rhetoric provided the channel through 
which the polis was established, by educating citizens about the virtues of citizenship and 
moral action within the construct of a formal community. This centripetal force is quite 
clearly indicated in Isocrates’ belief about the Athenian power in Hellas, and therefore 
panhellenism.  This focus on purity plays out even as Isocrates calls for Greek unity, with 
the Athenians at the helm.  This idea of purity connected to the homeland, or what 
scholars like Tuan (1977) and Geschiere (2009) describe through the Greek concept of 
autochthony, is the notion that one has a natural connection to one’s native soil by birth, 
or what Geschiere describes as “the most authentic form of belonging” (p. 2). Tuan 
(1977) points out that Isocrates’ emphasis on Athenian autochthony is actually quite 
evident throughout his work, especially in the Panegyricus (p. 154).  
Paideia: Culture as a Central Force 
One conceptual framework that applies to the idea of “imagined communities” is 
the foundation of paideia from which Isocrates establishes his own arguments. These 
imagined communities are created rhetorically through a process that allows citizens to 
collaborate to form “common sense” in Athenian society. Vico (1999) later defined 
common sense or “sensus communis” as such: “Since human judgment is by nature 
uncertain, it gains certainty from our common sense about what is necessary and useful to 
human kind; and necessity and utility are the two sources of the natural law of nations.  
Common sense is an unreflecting judgment shared by an entire social order, people, 
nation or even all humankind” (p. 79-80).  Arendt (1998) engages common sense as a 
mechanism by which we can collectively gauge the reality of our world.  Once an 
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understanding of that which we share in common begins to decline, the more we are 
“alienated from our world” (p. 209).  For Isocrates, common sense takes the form of doxa 
(personal and public opinion/belief) and kairos (rhetorical appropriateness to the 
occasion); they are subsets of and function as characteristics of the larger whole of 
paideia (Poulakos, 2001; 2004).  Instead of Isocrates accepting episteme (knowledge) as 
the guide for personal and public conduct, Isocrates enacts this paideic educational 
program with doxa as its guide.  However, doxa is not sophistic, as it must also be 
mediated to reach an acceptable form that will benefit society—this mediation occurs 
through what Isocrates defined as rhetorical education. (Poulakos, 2001;2004).  We also 
see Plato, who addressed concerns of sophistic rhetoric in the Phaedrus (1973), 
recognized Isocrates’ desire to improve the inherent quality of doxa through education 
(Poulakos 2001, p.49); however, Plato positioned doxa on a continuum between 
knowledge and ignorance (Poulakos 2001, p.51), as it did not fulfill the need for Truth.  
For Isocrates, doxa sublimates episteme by rhetorically constructing the public through 
the logos, ethos and pathos.   Common sense characterized as such becomes the basis for 
Isocratean rhetoric and ultimately is applied to his project on Greek panhellenism.  
However, before we address the controversial theme of panhellenism, it is necessary to 
explicate paideia as the foundation of Greek culture, particularly as Isocrates employed it 
in Greek thought.   
 In his landmark work, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Jaeger (1967; 1986) 
traces the development of Greek paideia through its mythology, history, politics, culture, 
literature and rhetorical tradition.  The idea of paideia originates from the Greek principle 
of arête, or taking possession of the beautiful (Jaeger, 1967).  Arête was the basis for 
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happiness and the teleological principle for Greek society, the pursuit of the cultural 
ideal; paideia is the integrated system of Greek arête, the cultural ideal that encompasses 
the meaning of human life in ancient Greece.  Paideia was “connected with the highest 
arête possible to man; it was used to denote the sum total of all ideal perfection of mind 
and body—complete kalokagathia, a concept which was not consciously taken to include 
a genuine intellectual and spiritual culture.  This new comprehensive conception of the 
cultural ideal was firmly established by the time of Isocrates and Plato” (Jaeger, 1967, p. 
286). 
Although mostly present in aristocratic circles, paideia also extended to the polis, 
as it was the center of Greek life.  Jaeger (1967; 1986) tells us that the polis encompassed 
the whole of Greek life; the polis was the context in which education occurred and 
allowed for a consistent, integrated message to create cohesive cultural ideals in Greek 
society.  Paideia is perhaps one of the first systematic attempts to create a framework that 
would envelop the whole of Greek life and within which education, and rhetoric for that 
matter, would become the center of life in the polis not only for elite aristocracy, but all 
citizens who participated directly or indirectly in the process.   
The emergence of the Sophists and their controversial educational program was a 
clear indication that the nature of the Greek state structure was transforming (Jaeger, 
1967, p. 281).  The Sophists’ engagement of culture through intellectual pursuits was 
conducted with the Greek polis not only as its context but as its ultimate goal.  The polis 
was a comprehensive educative force and the Sophists, although their methods were 
questionable at times, sought to create a complete program using paideia as its main 
thrust (Jaeger, 1967, p. 321).  The polis was the main field in which sophistry was 
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executed; rhetoric became the mode of communication that created productive citizens 
who then advanced the highest arête. It was the Sophists who began the timeless 
conversation about why and how to teach civic engagement.  The following exchange 
between Socrates and Protagoras, one of the most prominent Sophists of the 5th century 
BCE, in Plato’s Protagoras elucidates this point: 
“What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic affairs—how to best 
manage one’s household, and in public affairs—how to realize one’s maximum 
potential for success in political debate and action.” 
“Am I following what you are saying? [Socrates] asked.  “You appear to 
be talking about the art of citizenship, and to be promising to make men good 
citizens.” 
“This is exactly what I claim, Socrates.” 
“Well, this is truly an admirable technique you have developed, if indeed 
you have…The truth is, Protagoras, I have never thought that this could be taught, 
but when you say it can be, I can’t very well doubt it…Protagoras, I just don’t 
think virtue can be taught.  But when I hear what you have to say, I waver; I think 
there must be something in what you have to say…” (Plato, 1992, pp. 13-15)  
Protagoras’ discourse is significant, particularly because it originates from a Sophistic 
orientation. For Socrates, this debate about the ability to teach the concept of citizenship 
is ongoing.  The key turning point here is that the Sophists open up the field of inquiry 
about education and moral virtue; the problem was that the Athenians viewed Sophistic 
education as a model that lacked a strong moral standpoint (Barrett, 1987; DeRomilly, 
2002). The Sophists’ lack of moral direction and questionable activities put their 
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educational system and their goal of citizenship education in jeopardy (Barrett, 1987; 
DeRomilly, 2002). Nonetheless, we see that the question does not die; rather, it takes on a 
new form through Isocrates.  Isocrates insists on the power of rhetorical education in 
citizenship formation, but understands how such an approach must be grounded in the 
cultural context — the paideia — of the historical moment (Jaeger, 1986).  Isocrates’ 
work attempted to infuse a moral consciousness driven by the solid foundation of Greek 
paideia (Marsh, 2013). Although Plato felt obligated to search for more definitive 
responses to what he and others considered morally reprehensible Sophists, Isocrates 
attempted to marry the two perspectives and transforming sophistic practice by grounding 
it in philosophical inquiry to orient his rhetoric toward higher moral standards.  Isocrates’ 
deep understanding of Greek paideia within the context of the power of the Athenian 
polis elicited his unique form of rhetoric (Jaeger, 1986; Poulakos, 1997). 
Morgan (2003) suggests that Isocrates' idea of paideia is consistent because its 
focus begins with individuals, extends to the polis, and then to the larger political 
structure – in this case, the Greece beyond Athens.  Isocrates was committed to the 
fluidity and dynamism of paideia, the rich, textured culture of a society, and not Platonic 
a priori worldview (Jaeger, 1965, p.84).  Isocrates viewed culture as a wider, deeper and 
more indicative field of inquiry than Plato; it was a space where humans are able to 
engage a truth, which is located in everyday living-in-the-world. For this reason, many 
view Isocrates conception of paideia as not only culture, but education in an appropriate 
cultural context.  Isocrates (1980) notes: 
[Athens] knew…that whether men have been liberally educated from their earliest 
years is not to be determined by their courage or their wealth or such advantages, 
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but is made manifest most of all by speech, and that this had proved itself to be 
the surest sign of culture [paideia] in every one of us, and that those who are 
skilled in speech are not only men of power in their own cities but are also held in 
honor in other states. (Panegyricus, p. 149)  
Isocrates believed that specific schemata structuring rhetoric, such as the rhetorical 
guidelines put forth by Aristotle, limited its inherent abilities; rather, rhetorical education 
could find the mean between what Isocrates saw as moral indifference and education to 
create practical political action (Jaeger, 1965).  In other words, Isocrates points us in the 
direction of critical thinking and balanced arguments, not rote technical instruction on 
how to be an effective and virtuous citizen (Walzer, 2005). In Isocratic terms, rhetorical 
education cannot change a person, but it can shape and cultivate his/her thoughts through 
the negotiation of nature, art and paideia.  Such an education could provide communities 
with the means to bring the polis back to its original vigor and its spiritual renaissance 
since moral forces were lived out in the communal structure; education helps individuals 
and communities attain spiritual leadership to find new approaches for life (Jaeger, 1965).   
As we have seen, Isocratic rhetorical principles are based in civic education, the 
foundation on which Athenian culture is constructed and guided.   A holistic education 
creates citizens who can participate in social discourse while changing it from within.  
Philosophy and rhetoric are inseparable, one and the same, but this practical approach to 
philosophy requires a solid ground on which it can successfully function and call 
attention to the importance of the polis’ citizenry.  Isocratean rhetoric could quickly 
devolve into sophistry because it appears to lack philosophical ground.  Paideia fills this 
void.  Paideia might be understood as the philosophical ground for everyday Athenian 
 49 
life, as it provides a “common center” to which citizens can refer and construct new 
realities.  Said differently, culture is the philosophical ground from which rhetoric, and 
civic education, can thrive and serve the polis.  
[Isocrates] held that the nation, the ideal of Greece, was the point round which 
new elements in the spiritual renaissance were to crystallize…The new rhetoric 
had to find an ideal which could be translated into practical political action.  This 
ideal was a new moral code for Greece.  It gave rhetoric an inexhaustible theme; 
in it the ultimate topic of all higher eloquence seemed to have been discovered 
once and for all.  In an age when the old beliefs were losing their binding force 
and the long-established structure of the city-state was breaking up (the structure 
in which, till then, the individual had felt his own moral foundations securely 
embodied), the new dream of national achievement appeared to be a mighty 
inspiration.  It gave life to new meaning.  (Jaeger, 1986, pp. 52-53) 
Taking into account Jaeger’s description of this “spiritual renaissance” based in the 
formation of new attitudes toward the nation, we could view Isocrates’ conception of 
rhetoric and rhetorical education wrought with the intricacies and nuances of culture as 
“imagining” a transformed community of citizens—a nation.  Yes, this rhetoric still took 
the form of orations and pamphlets, but by recasting and combining the two conceptual 
categories of philosophy and rhetoric to create a new form of education, particularly civic 
education, Isocrates was forming a new rhetorical approach to social life that would carry 
into subsequent ages.  The goal of this new approach was the good of the polis achieved 
through the highest Greek arête available— paideia.   Isocrates no longer saw rhetoric as 
an instrument of politics but rather as an educational tool that allowed Athenians to rise 
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above political life and direct the pursuit of political life itself (Jaeger, 1986).  By 
teaching and engaging rhetoric properly, students form ideas and patterns of thought and 
argument to enhance spiritual life, and therefore the practical life, of the polis.  But, in a 
sense, it becomes difficult to term Isocrates’ method of education as rhetoric or 
philosophy; instead, it becomes an entirely new system of thought and instruction that 
leads the conversation about Athens, the polis in general, and the whole of Greece in a 
new direction (Livingstone, 2007, p. 19).  Isocrates’ new form of formal communication 
and education, centered on uniquely human logos and rich paideia, is contextualized by 
the community of citizens called the polis.  The polis is the common center to which 
citizens refer and direct transformative action simultaneously. One cannot transform the 
polis through persuasive measures without the engagement of paideia.   
For Isocrates, quality rhetoric produced practical reasoning, or the Greek ideal of 
phronesis, by educating students about rhetorical techniques, eloquence and fitness to the 
occasion — a complex Greek concept termed kairos (Marsh, 2013). Kairos is an essential 
element of effective and realistic rhetoric for Isocrates, and which played a major role in 
his overall educational program, or paideia.  Stated in more contemporary terms, Marsh 
(2013) explains that kairos is both the responsiveness to a particular moment and the 
ability to act adroitly within that moment: “The Isocratean concept of kairos, then, is 
somewhat similar to the moment in a wrestling match one wrestler, through rigorous 
training, simultaneously recognizes an opportune instant and a complementary maneuver 
that will lead to success” (p. 129). Farrell (1993) defines kairos as a form of refigured 
phronesis, which can be defined as “proper choices at propitious moments” (p. 39) or a 
“mastery of the moment” (p. 236). In Against the Sophists (2000), Isocrates outlines three 
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necessities of rhetoric to develop an educated rhetorician, in which kairos occupies a 
prominent place: “But the greatest proof of the difference between [letters (techne) and 
rhetoric (the creative art)] is that oratory is good only if it has qualities of fitness for the 
occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment, while in case of letters there is 
no such need whatsoever” (p. 171).   Paideia provides the parameters for kairotic action 
within rhetoric.  Again, Isocrates’ teachings are grounded in the real world, constantly 
guided by that which surrounds us: “…[I] hold that men who want to do some good in 
the world must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculations and all activities 
which have no bearing on our lives” (Antidosis, 2000, p. 335).  
Poulakos (1997) explains that Isocrates’ use of rhetorical education promoted 
individual self-understanding that would then encourage citizens to work toward a good 
for the polis.  In addition, rhetorical education meets its goals and encourages cultural 
change by tapping into available narratives within society. Poulakos goes on to note that 
citizenship is not an a priori concept; rather, it is constructed through logos and paideia.  
Isocrates adds to such ideas of logos by ensuring a kairotic response to paideia.  
Ostensibly, for Isocrates a panhellenistic approach to the Greek poleis, with Athens at its 
intellectual and cultural center, was a fitting response for the cultural and historical 
moment.  
Isocrates’ Panhellenism: A Model for Early Nationalism? 
  Isocrates’ orations, letters and discourses discuss the importance of Greek politics 
at the time and the need for the Greek poleis to put down their weapons and join forces in 
a loose confederation of Greek states to defeat and dominate their eternal enemy, the 
Persians (Norlin, 1980). Sophists such as Gorgias (speech of 392 B.C.) and Lysias 
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(speech of 388 B.C.) introduce themes of panhellenism and encouraging citizens to band 
against the barbarians in their famous speeches on Mt. Olympus (Walbank, 1951), and 
although Isocrates’ was not the first to introduce the idea of panhellenism, his efforts 
expanded upon these ideas as they were geared toward political education textured by 
paideia (Norlin, 1980; Jaeger, 1986; Walbank, 1951).  Walbank (1951) suggests that 
Isocrates was the rhetorician to give the concept of panhellenism “cultural value” (p. 46).   
Isocrates believed it necessary for the various city-states of Greece to band 
together in order to form a more cooperative, integrated effort against the “barbarians” in 
Persia.  “It is not possible for us to cement an enduring peace unless we join together in a 
war against the barbarians [Persians], nor for the Hellenes to attain to concord until we 
wrest our material advantages from one and the same source and wage our wars against 
one and the same enemy” (Panegyricus, 1980, p.231).  Panhellenism entailed a 
“brotherhood” of Greek cultures coming together to deal with the complexities of 
Isocrates’ time (Nash, 1968, p.71).   
De Romilly (1992) discusses how Isocrates was among the first to recognize and 
highlight the cultural difference between Greece (which he refers to as Europe) and 
Persia, as not much of a distinction was made before the Persian Wars.  We might 
consider Isocrates as a cultural conservative because he considered the Athenian culture 
as superior, not because of blood and race, but because of its central influence on the 
intellectual culture of society—a superior paideia. Throughout the Panegyricus (1980), 
Isocrates makes claims regarding the superiority of Athens and its role as a leader for 
Greece, particularly in opposition to Persia (Tuan, 1977), but also attempts to create 
solidarity among the Greek poleis in the name of panhellenism.   
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For it is admitted that our city is the oldest and the greatest in the world and in the 
eyes of all men the most renowned…And so far as our city has distanced the rest 
of mankind through and in speech that her pupils have become the teachers of the 
rest of the world; and she has brought it about that the name ‘Hellenes’ suggest no 
longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title ‘Hellenes’ is applied rather to 
those who share our culture than to those who share our common blood. (pp. 131-
133; 149)    
Such a feat, however, would not have been possible without Isocrates’ educational 
program.  Nash (1968) explains that Isocrates education system stood out among other 
systems in terms of promoting a “universal concept of culture” in the creation of a unified 
Hellas; he suggests that Isocrates’ rhetorical-educational program has been more 
influential on the Western canon than even Alexander the Great’s controversial political 
program for panhellenism (Nash, 1968, p.75).   
Isocrates’ push for panhellenism is articulated in what is often considered to be 
his masterpiece, the Panegyricus (Kennedy, 1999, p. 43; Norlin, 1980, p. 119; Romano, 
2012, p. 555). Isocrates’ ideas of panhellenism necessitate a horizon of nationalism and 
isolationism, buttressing Greek power while separating it from the rest of the world.  He 
identifies Athens as the political and cultural center of Greece that is capable of leading 
the effort of joining various city-states under one entity.  Athens is the most appropriate 
haven for those that are both “prosperous and unfortunate,” but seek refuge in a 
“welcoming and friendly city” (Isocrates, Panegyricus, 1980, p. 143).  Isocrates seems to 
echo the Aristotelian phenomenon of friendship for the good of the polis: “…[W]e come 
together in one place, where, as we make our prayer and sacrifices in common, we are 
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reminded of the kinship which exists among us and are made to feel more kindly towards 
each other for the future, reviving our old friendships and establishing new ties” (1980, p. 
145).  Throughout the Panegyricus, we hear Isocrates’ intention to create a single nation 
against an enemy by encouraging the common paideia they all share with Athens at its 
center.  
Isocrates’ rhetorical structure is holistic in that he does not depend solely on 
dialectical Truth like Plato, rhetorical structure and mechanisms like Aristotle, history 
like Herodotus or Hesiod or myth and narrative like the great Homer.  Instead, Isocrates 
transforms rhetoric to combine all these elements to create a paideia and an integrated 
message to the Athenian people.  This rhetorical work may, in turn, influence citizens’ 
attitudes about their nation to form a powerful nationalism that would surmount other 
political and cultural problems amongst various poleis.  Jaeger (1986) explains that 
Isocrates’ Nicocles or Cyprian Orations lay the groundwork for his paideia that 
eventually lead us to the work that structures his entire educational program, the 
Panegyricus.  These Cyprian Orations are directed at the leaders in Greek society in 
hopes of changing the paideia as a whole; this paideia is grounded in education which can 
result in a rather structured understanding of nationalism.  “…[T]hese speeches introduce 
us directly to a problem, which must, in these circumstances, be of the very first 
importance – the possibility that culture may influence the state by educating its leaders” 
(Jaeger, 1986, p. 85).  Again, we see how Isocrates’ practical stance is focused on the 
direct impact logos and paideia have on creating a new spiritual context for Greek 
nationalism.  This spiritual context, in turn, “imagines” a community into new attitudes 
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and practices.  The leaders who embody the Greek ideal and carry it into the everyday 
life of the polis exemplify these attitudes and practices. 
To Nicocles (1980) is a prime example of what Isocrates was attempting to 
accomplish when educating leaders.  He not only seems to direct their thoughts and 
actions from a standpoint that would benefit Greek society, but attempted to create a form 
of paideia that would result in Greek nationalist ideals.  Jaeger (1986) points out that 
Isocrates’ advice to Nicocles, a new Cypriot leader, rests in the idea of “practical 
statesmanship,” a compromise between the “Periclean tradition of practical politics…and 
the ethical criticisms of the philosophers” (pp. 93-94).  In other words, rhetoric serves as 
the engine for which a ruler can function well and in the citizenry’s favor.  Paideia, then, 
is the field in which practical statesmanship functions and gives life to nationalist 
phenomena.  The nation is formed through communication and education of leaders who 
impart their wisdom on their people and help them “imagine” what the Greek state should 
be and how it materializes.  “…[F]or it is evident that that [kings] will reign well or ill 
according to the manner in which they equip their own minds.  Therefore, no athlete is so 
called upon to train his body as is a king to train his soul; for not all public festivals in the 
world offer a prize comparable to those for which you who are kings strive every day of 
your lives” (To Nicocles, 1980, p.47).  What is pertinent here is the king’s thoughts, or 
imagination, toward how a nation is formed through its citizenry.  Rhetorical education is 
how leaders are trained in order to bring the citizenry together through nationalistic 
ideals.  Fitting communication is the key to how a nation is formed, and it begins with its 
leaders, who have been trained to think and act appropriately through rhetorical 
principles.  Rhetoric is the engine through which its citizenry is educated and formed to 
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create political communities that not only make life manageable, but with a collective 
sense of the good, the highest paideia found in arête.  For Isocrates, the highest arête for 
the Greek people will result in Panhellenistic paideia, a world that is teleologically driven 
toward defending Greek life against its eternal enemy—the barbaric Persians.   
Like Gorgias’ Helen, at first glance Isocrates’ Encomium of Helen, although 
considered to his least important works, is an alternative to the sophistic model for 
rhetoric, employing the power of sophistical rhetoric to defend Helen’s position in Greek 
history within Isocrates’ practical rhetoric grounded paideia (Poulakos, 1997; Van Hook, 
1968). However, such works also point to Isocrates’ focus on cultural historicity and 
identifying the cultural needs of the moment.   Poulakos (1997), like Walbank (1951), 
suggests that Isocrates’s rhetoric was not tied to the traditional rhetorical devices, but 
dependent more on culture and art: “More closely tied now to the cultural and the 
thematic, eloquence could afford the time it needed to become an art” (p. 70). He grounds 
his argument in deeply entrenched understandings of history and Athenian paideia while 
creating new conception of why and how a united Greece can save its people, just as 
Helen did.  The encomium not only trains the student in effective rhetorical technique, 
but also is a justification and praise for Hellenism.  As the most influential figure in 
Greek paideia, Isocrates persuades the Greeks to consider Helen as the central figure in 
the first movement toward panhellenism (Kennedy, 1958).  For the Greeks, Helen is the 
ultimate cultural ideal, or arête, that persists throughout history and forms the ground on 
which the Greek structure their thought and practice; Helen encompasses ideals of 
beauty, virtue, influence, power, and her influence directed Greece in ways that secured 
its dominance and protection against the barbarians.  “Out of fear of strife the states all 
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swore to unite on behalf of the one who won her.  That is, panhellenism was achieved for 
the first time under the one who possessed Helen [Theseus]” (Kennedy, 1958, p. 82).  As 
a result, Helen becomes a metaphor for the Greek imagination in political rhetoric and 
literature, and Isocrates effectively employs the power of her cultural ideal to create a 
strong case for panhellenism (Kennedy, 1958).  While attempting to instruct students on 
rhetorical principles for the formation of important political ideals and citizenship, 
Isocrates invokes emotional connections for the Greek mind and unites Greek citizens 
through powerful metaphors that engage them to a common goal.   
From Panhellenism to Modern Nationalism: Isocrates’ Influence 
 Isocrates is an important point of departure for the way in which we can 
understand the rhetoric and culture of nationalism in the ancient canon.  We focus on 
Isocrates not only for his rhetorical “philosophy” but also for what seems to be his 
understanding of the nation-state and its significance for the Greek citizen, and ultimately 
the relationship between the citizen and the nation in many contexts.   We can apply 
Isocrates’ rhetorical methods to contemporary understandings of rhetoric and 
communication practices (see, for example, Marsh, 2013) and to the requirement to 
communicate effectively by deploying logos as the energy that drives (and transcends) 
that which we need to accomplish in both the political world and everyday interactions of 
citizens within a shared culture and nation-state.  The scholarship reviewed thus far as 
well as scholarship that we will explore later in this project suggests that our 
contemporary understanding of the nation was formed in the Enlightenment, but as we 
see, its foundations in the Western trope may begin in Greece and are exemplified by 
rhetorical figures such as Isocrates.   
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 For Livingstone (2007), Isocrates provides substantial ground for shifting our 
conversation about rhetoric and its subject matter from a monologic form of 
communication to a dialogic view.  I would argue that Isocrates’ focus on nationalism 
also helps us interpret the history of thought behind nationalism that may lead us to a 
postmodern understanding of the nation and nationalism.  However, before we venture 
into this territory we need to understand how such thinking leads to other understandings 
of nationalism through a rhetorical standpoint throughout the Western trope.  Isocrates’ 
nuanced approach to rhetoric within deeply entrenched Greek paideia not only forms 
works from within Greek culture itself, but expands and develops more complexity 
within Greek paideia.  While a traditional view of Greek paideia and rhetoric is often 
interpreted through a form of one-way, monologic style of education, Livingstone 
suggests that Isocrates’ approach carries rhetoric into much more textured ground. 
By creating an adaptable, self-confident Hellenic political discourse which takes 
“commonsense” ethical values for granted, Isocrates inaugurates the tradition of 
Hellenic paideia, and thus, indirectly, the later humanist culture built on Greco-
Roman models, with the ideal of culture as a mutually respectful exchange 
between (elite) individuals united by their commitment to edifying and civilizing 
the power of logos.  On the other hand, in abandoning antilogy in the name of 
consensus and homonoia, he also anticipates situations in the modern world where 
the transition from the public or parliamentary debate to monologic 
communication in the mass media risks creating an overweeningly confident, 
unitary political discourse in which dissent and critique are easily marginalized as 
irrational or absurd. (Livingstone, 2007, p. 31)   
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Livingstone’s analysis directs us to an important theme of this study.  By understanding 
the salience of paideia and directing his attention to it in all his work, Isocrates seems to 
see the slippery slope that occurs in what we now philosophically comprehend as 
“monologic communication.”  Although not always an inappropriate form of 
communication, monologic communication is problematic in this particular instance 
since, in Isocratean terms, it would not be considered kairotic because it does not seem to 
fit his notions of participatory rhetoric and communication, as Livingstone points out 
above.  Instead, I advance the notion that dialogic communication may emerge as a more 
fitting response to this historical and contextual moment.  Although not often part of 
scholarly opinion, Isocrates’ approach may be understood as participatory and somewhat 
inclusive when it came to citizen development, as it encouraged more involvement in 
civic life while evoking action and results.  Thus, the polis, or the nation, was a result of 
citizens who were well trained to participate and interact within the complexities of the 
nation.   
Implications 
 So, we begin with Greece, and by proxy Isocrates, as the first logical foundation 
for the nation as a rhetorical structure.  Although countless other rhetoricians that came 
before him and lived alongside him constructed the paideia that provided the context for 
Greek life and the way citizens lived within the polis, Isocrates’ focus on panhellenism 
and ideas of national and nationalism paved the way for others that would follow and 
employ rhetoric, education and an holistic understanding of the world around them to 
create national identities and devotions to their particular paideia.  Jaeger (1986) 
advances that no other culture that we know of advanced the ideals of community in the 
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way the Greeks did, and this organized notion of community helped formed the 
foundation for the modern nation as we know it.  Most important, the way in which ideas 
of the nation were communicated, in turn, created a culture that understood citizenship, 
democratic participation and the function of the polis.  However, access to the polis, as in 
contemporary society, was not always inclusive for certain groups.  Literature regarding 
the Athenian metic (foreigner) and his or her rights within Athenian society suggest that 
many foreigners may have been active participants, but not without limits to particular 
rights and access to democracy (see, for example, Cohen, 2000; Whitehead, 1977); 
however, addressing these issues in detail would reach far beyond the scope of this 
project.  Nevertheless, understanding Greece through the eyes of Isocratean rhetoric at 
least forms a consistent paideia under which these ideals were allowed to flourish and 
translate into new, shifting cultural ideals that would then carry into the transformed 
historical moment.   
[The Greeks] established an entirely new set of principles for communal life.  
However highly we may value the artistic, religious, and political achievements of 
earlier nations, the history of what we can truly call civilization — the deliberate 
pursuit of an ideal — not begin until Greece.  (xiv)… It is true of Greek art as 
well as of Greek literature that until late in the fourth century it is principally the 
expression of the spirit of the community...But the true representatives of paideia 
were not, the Greeks believed, the voiceless artists – sculptor, painter, architect – 
but the poets and musicians, orators (which means statesmen) and 
philosophers…They considered that the only genuine forces which could form the 
soul were words and sounds, and — so far as they work through words or sounds 
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or both—rhythm and harmony; for the decisive factor in all in paideia is active 
energy, which is even more important in the culture of the mind than in the agon 
which exercises physical strength and agility. (Jaeger, 1967, p. xxvii) 
Jaeger’s comments are salient because they highlight why Greece and its pursuit of a 
cultural ideal were so important in Western history, and for the purposes of this project, 
essential to ideals of community and the establishment of nations.   
 Isocrates positions his “imagined community” within the holistic nature of the 
world around us; in other words, it is situated in the liberal arts.  If we take Livingstone’s 
(2007) interpretation into account, this imagined community could presumably result 
from an early form of dialogic communication as we understand it today—
communication grounded in this understanding of common sense that emerges from 
multiple voices and participation centered around a common goal.  Isocratean 
conservatism originates from the idea of paideia centered on a common goal and from the 
concept of kairos.  The nation forms and flourishes from such ideals.   However, his 
ability to invoke a rhetoric based in intellectual thought that incorporates myriad areas of 
life and shared experiences draws on a dialogic understanding of communication.  As 
Jaeger (1986) states, the rhetoricians were considered responsible for the formation of the 
polis and the nation.  The nation and its various systems are formed out of logos — the 
thoughts and words of its leaders and citizens.  The nation is “imagined” through rhetoric 
and therefore communicative life.  Grounding the initial phase of our conversation in the 
Greeks and Isocratean participatory rhetoric may offer new openings for the goal of 
exploring postmodern nationalism framed by dialogic communication theory. 
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 Our next step will be to carry this unique Greek ideal into the consequent 
historical moment experienced in the Roman Republic and its approach to “civic 
republicanism.”  Civic republicanism, and Cicero in particular, build on the profound 
statements and rhetorical tradition of Greece and Isocrates to expand on the 
understanding of community and the nation.  
 63 
Chapter 3 
Cicero’s Political Rhetoric: Early Foundations of the Republic 
“But when you view everything with reason and reflection, of all the connections none is 
more weighty, none is more dear, than that between every individual and his country.  
Our parents are dear to us; our children, our kinsmen, our friends are dear to us; but our 
country comprehends alone all the endearments of us all” (Cicero, 1855, On Duties, 
Book I, p. 32). 
The great Roman rhetorician, Cicero, offers a nuanced understanding for our 
thinking about the ancient rhetorical roots of the nation and the idea of nationalism. 
Cicero, like Isocrates, was a proponent of liberal arts education who not only provided 
important observations and lessons about rhetoric in general, but whose rhetoric shaped 
the ways in which the Roman Republic, and the Roman Empire for that matter (Digeser, 
2004), considered concepts of justice, the common good, civic morals and virtue, and 
citizenship within Rome’s version of the polis, the res publica—the republic.  We see 
that Isocrates’ and Cicero’s notions of civic education and a focus on the common good 
influence notions of nationalism and some of the essential elements of what we now 
understand as the structure of a nation.   
Cicero’s focus on a dialogic form of rhetoric is also significant for the purposes of 
this study.  Casaregola (1998) points out that Cicero’s revival of Platonic dialogue is 
perhaps an early understanding of how rhetoric and oratory can produce “shared 
meaning” among publics (p. 73).  Ancient rhetoric serves as a foundation where dialogue 
was seen as more of an intellectual conversation—the ever-important dialectic—to 
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expand on philosophical ideas and moral conversations, as we can see in Plato and 
Cicero.  We do not necessarily see the concept of dialogue developed philosophically as 
we understand it today through thinkers like Buber (1988,1996, 2002, 2005), Bahktin 
(1981), Levinas (2004), but Casaregola’s point helps us connect the study of Cicero’s 
traditional rhetoric to more contemporary ideas of dialogue.  Czubaroff (2000) also points 
out that a case should be made for a “dialogic rhetoric” that moves beyond the ancient 
ideal of dialectic and a modern form of rhetoric that focuses exclusively on social and 
psychological aspects but ignores the ontological and existential notions of the dialogic 
act (p. 170). Although Cicero was quite obviously engaged in dialectic quite deeply, we 
may be able to make a case to recast his traditional rhetoric regarding the republic as an 
ancient form of dialogue that in fact attempted to create an existential-phenomenological 
realm of civic engagement for the Roman Republic.  In other words, ancient rhetorical 
antecedents like the work of Cicero may have begun the conversation that eventually 
leads us to dialogic theory. When analyzing Cicero’s dialogic rhetoric in works such as 
the Republic, it seems that dialectic may serve as a point of departure for producing 
“shared meaning” in the Roman community that perhaps helped shape his ideas about the 
Roman republic itself.  
Cicero’s concept of res publica set the stage for ancient renderings of the nation-
state and the contemporary concept of the republic.  Scholarship regarding Cicero’s 
influence on the concept of the nation tends to be confounding at moments since terms 
like state, nation, nation-state, country, and republic are often used interchangeably and 
without consistency.  For the purposes of this project, I see the state and the nation as 
symbiotic concepts that rely on each other.  Cicero’s system of state serves as an essential 
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foundation and hermeneutic entrance for the formation of the nation, but the concept of 
the nation allows the states to function as a social mechanism. (see Gellner, 1983; Smith, 
1983, 1998, 2010 for treatment of state and nation). 
 With recent scholarship dedicated to the revival of civic republicanism in contrast 
to the Western focus on liberalism (Digeser, 2004; Honohan, 2002; Nederman, 2000; 
Weinstock and Nadeau, 2004), we turn to Cicero to understand the origins of the republic 
situated in the Roman civitas, which provides a foundation for contemporary 
understandings of the state (Wood, 1988).   
 Rhetoricians Isocrates and Cicero played an essential role in understanding how 
human dialogue and education contribute to the development of the nation-state.  Plato 
and Aristotle grappled with comprehending and espousing notions of the polis for the 
greater good in canonical works such as Plato’s Republic and Statesman and Aristotle’s 
Politics, but as a rhetorician, Cicero makes a pragmatic move toward viewing rhetoric 
itself as an essential element for the development of the state.  In De Oratore (1904), 
Cicero draws a direct connection between the rhetorical ability and human 
communication and the development of the state:   
It is the fact this one characteristic that give us our chief superiority over the brute 
creation, the habit, I mean, of conversing with one another, and the power of 
expressing our feelings in words…Finally, to come to what are the main 
advantages of speech, what other power could have gathered the scattered 
members of the human race into one place, or weaned them from a wild and 
savage life to the humane and civilized life of citizens, or, when their various 
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communities were once established could have defined for them their laws, their 
judicial procedure, and their rights? (Cicero, 1904, p. 14)   
We continue to see this connection to rhetoric and communication can be seen 
throughout his seminal works, but through Cicero’s political-rhetorical lens.  In De 
Officiis, or On Duties (1855), Cicero again highlights the human ability to communicate 
and reason to the good society: “…[T]hat which is perceived in the society of the whole 
human race, and of this the bond is speech and reason, which by teaching, learning, 
communicating, debating, and judging conciliate men together, and bind them into a kind 
of natural society” (Cicero, 1855, pp. 27-28). 
Plato and Aristotle provided a solid foundation for discussing the philosophical 
characteristics and complexities of the ethical and moral embodiment of a state and its 
function, but as was already discussed in the previous chapter, Isocrates and Cicero as 
rhetoricians in the tradition of the School of Civic Rhetoric see philosophy and rhetoric as 
symbiotic, the function of each dependent on the other (Hubbell, 1913).  Like Isocrates, 
Cicero foregrounds human action through language and community, as he utilizes 
rhetoric as the vehicle through which community is formed and maintained—
demonstrated by his belief that the functions of the orator and statesmen must be joined 
as one and the same (Hubbell, 1913).  Where Isocrates’ conservative focus is on 
recognizing and developing a common ground among citizens through the available 
means of persuasion (Poulakos, 1997), in The Republic, Cicero recognizes the need for 
common ground contextualized by ratio, the human ability to reason and to reflect on 
that reason.  For Cicero (1998), reason is a God-given ability only available to humans 
who can engage language for the formation of community and, therefore, the republic 
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(On Laws, p.105).  Reason not only has the ability to teach us, but also the ability to learn 
from itself (On Laws, 1998, p. 107).   Above all, we see how rhetoric in antiquity 
contributes to the larger conversation about nation and citizenship. Through antiquity, 
rhetoric is an essential force in the ways we enlarge our thinking about our embeddedness 
in the social and political context as a whole.   
 Since the “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006) is our hermeneutic entrance 
to our renderings of nationhood and nationalism, we will also explore the idea of Cicero’s 
republic as an imagined community in the late Roman Republic.  How did rhetoric and 
education capture the political, social and cultural narrative of the moment?  Why is 
Cicero’s conception of the republic important for understanding the nation as an 
existential-phenomenological instance, allowing its participants to imagine their 
situatedness in a particular way?  How can his ideas lead us to a theoretical understanding 
of the nation and nationalism in the postmodern moment?  In short, why is Cicero’s work 
on the republic an important component of nationhood as a communicative construct in 
contemporary times?  Do these ideas burst asunder our contemporary notions of the state, 
or do they reinforce and enlarge the individual’s role in society, and therefore, the nation? 
Cicero’s Philosophical and Rhetorical Influences: Moving from Isocrates to Cicero 
Although a student of rhetoric can readily recognize the various principles and 
elements of rhetoric both Isocrates and Cicero share, very little scholarship has identified 
Isocrates’ prominent influence on Cicero’s work in any direct way. Muir (2005) states, 
“Cicero’s Republic and Laws are modeled on Plato’s dialogues of the same titles, but are 
intended to provide an Isocratic alternative to them, substituting Isocrates’ learned orator 
for Plato’s philosopher king” (p. 182).   A relatively obscure work by Hubbell (1913) 
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addresses this issue in much detail.  Hubbell (1913) purports that both men had a 
tremendous respect for a comprehensive knowledge of the liberal arts and that the idea of 
universal knowledge was paramount to a rhetorician’s ability to persuade and educate 
those who would serve the polis or republic.  He notes that both men recognized the 
power of language for political influence and practiced those principles of influence, 
engaging human action as an essential element of rhetoric that, when engaged properly, 
can benefit the greater whole—the nation, in this regard.  Isocrates and Cicero understand 
that human action should not be bracketed but must emerge and resolve within a complex 
social framework; in short, rhetorical action requires social conditions for its performance 
(Hubbell, 1913).  Therefore, becoming a virtuous citizen requires acculturation, example, 
and education (as repeatedly advanced by Isocrates and Cicero throughout their works 
like Against the Sophists and De Oratore, respectively).  A good state can allow us to 
realize these common goods and to exercise virtues to participate in society and to 
reciprocate the gifts society has bestowed upon us (Cicero, 1998, The Republic, p. 8). 
Cicero and Isocrates also place a strong emphasis on rhetoric as a mode of 
education; rhetoric is education in their worlds, and education prepares citizens for 
service to the polis and res publica.  Aristotle (1998) in the Politics espouses that 
education makes citizens aware of their interdependence and of the importance of 
supporting the common goods shared in the polis: ”...[O]ne should not consider any 
citizen as belonging to himself alone, but as all belonging to the city-state, since each is a 
part of the city-state” (p. 227).   Both Isocrates and Cicero follow this line of thinking and 
believe that speech/language and communication allow us to sustain life; however, the 
republic is essential in providing a field, an existential-phenomenological context, in 
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which this communication and hence education is productive and apparent (see Chapter 2 
regarding Isocrates advocacy of panhellenism; Cicero, 1998).  For Cicero, a political 
community is the highest association in which we function, the embodiment of rhetorical 
action that manifests in communicative acts (Cicero, 1998, p. 4; Honohan, 2002). 
As part of this discussion, then, rhetoric as an expression of the nation is not an 
expression of permanence but is rather purely contingent, responsive and contextual to 
the historical moment.  As we explored earlier, Isocrates “sees logos as the expression of 
a particular kind of truth, and he locates it within a given cultural and social context, 
moving in space and time” (Fontana, 2004, p.29).  Rhetoric and the nation are 
interdependent—each provides the existential-phenomenological space in which the other 
can respond to the issues, actions, and culture at the time.  Rhetoric is essentially a form 
of republican and democratic communication that thrives within an environment of 
conflict, multiplicity, plurality and difference, which simultaneously attempts to bring 
some stability to the contingency caused by these uncertain conditions.  For these 
reasons, effective orators take on a significant role in the functioning of the state 
(Fontana, 2004, pp. 29-30). 
Isocrates sees participation in the public sphere differently from Cicero in that 
Cicero does not view it as full participation but rather as the participation of the ruling 
elite that keeps the “interests of the whole of society at heart” (Honahan, 2004, p. 36). 
Cicero’s (1998) ideal republic is governed by a mixed constitution that grants power to 
both the aristocracy and a democratic government, but gives precedence to an aristocratic 
ruling class that keeps the best interests of the common citizens in mind.  In other words, 
although both were committed to the idea of the civic republican tradition, Isocrates 
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considered civic participation in self-government at a broad, inclusive level while Cicero 
placed enormous emphasis on constitutional rule of law, monitored and regulated by the 
ruling class (Honohan, 2002, p. 40).   
Isocrates’ belief that the orator has great authority over political questions guided 
his principle that orator, statesman and philosopher are one and the same (Hubbell, 1913).  
Cicero bases his ideas of the orator in De Oratore largely on Isocratean ideals (Hubbell, 
1913).  “Yet in the debate between philosophy and rhetoric, philosophy and politics, 
Cicero seems to return to Isocrates’ understanding of rhetoric.  It is a technique and 
method by which power may be acquired, but also, precisely because it is a means to 
power, it assumes a determinate political, moral and social order within which it acquires 
meaning and value” (Fontana, 2004, p. 51).  Still into the modern age, there was much 
criticism about how these thinkers were actually practicing philosophy.  Karl Marx, 
although applying Ciceronian thought to his own studies in political science, declared 
that Cicero “knew as little about philosophy as the President of the United States of North 
America” (Wood, 1988, p. 7). Regardless of this debate, Ciceronian principles have 
impacted the way in which scholars have understood the Roman Republic and the 
function of the state into modernity. 
For Cicero, the orator is by default a statesman at large, a leader, educating 
citizens and imparting useful knowledge to citizens in the res publica (Hubbell, 1913, 
pp.19; 30).  Cicero saw the orator as a powerful player in the rehabilitation of the Roman 
Republic, which was slowly deteriorating before him (Lacey & Wilson, 1970).  Isocrates 
viewed oratory as the main function of the state, an art responsible for the transmission of 
ideas and practices that contribute to and transform the state into nation (Hubbell, 1913, 
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pp. 2; 11).  Rhetoric reigns as the supreme art for creating a social and national 
consciousness among its citizens; the idea of nation is a state of mind within its citizens, 
shaped by the language, ideas, and culture, or in Greek terms, paideia. Cicero’s work 
reflects how the orator as statesman uses the craft of rhetoric to convey very distinct 
language to persuade Roman society of what a political society should look like.  His 
ability to address national issues reflects his predecessor’s ability to speak (and write) 
quite convincingly about the state of affairs in their own political environments — polis 
for Isocrates, and res publica for Cicero.  For both men, rhetoric is ultimately a moral 
venture, educating fellow citizens about the needs and the best conditions of their 
political environment (Hubbell, 1913).   
As discussed earlier, Isocrates expounds ideas of the Greek polis and statesmen, 
but above all the idea of panhellenism.  Cicero’s rhetorical philosophy is not confined to 
the function of oratory and language.  Like Isocrates, he carries his expertise particularly 
as a rhetorician to outline and influence the nature of his republic in very specific terms, 
particularly when it comes to the role of reason in rhetoric. However, unlike Isocrates, as 
we will see in The Republic, Cicero is not necessarily promoting a Pan-Roman world, but 
rather turning within to strengthen his own society, which consequently bolsters its 
political structure and the overall ideal of the nation through which citizens can thrive, 
function and serve. To explore this point more deeply, I will focus mainly on two 
Ciceronian texts, On The Republic and On Law, to explain how Cicero sets the stage for 
premodern ideals of state, nation and nationalism. 
In summary, both Isocrates and Cicero emphasize metaphors of the common 
center/common good to convey ideals of political economy (Honohan, 2002).  Cicero 
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develops on Isocratean rhetoric about nation and nationalism through understanding how 
moderation and regulation are central to the republic, and he understands how the nation 
is a physical manifestation of a phenomenological context in which laws guide our 
freedom and provide justice.  Like Isocrates, Cicero is the quintessential pragmatist; both 
men seem to be engaging the resources that are available to them to create a political 
community that seems even more accessible and possible for the quotidian citizen.   
Plato’s Statesman: Cicero’s Guiding Document 
Although this connection to Isocrates is clear and important, I would be remiss 
not to acknowledge Plato’s direct influence on Cicero’s system of state, particularly in his 
work The Statesman.  Plato, and Aristotle to a certain extent, provide philosophical 
ground for Cicero’s understanding on the influence and utility of rhetoric on the republic.  
(Wheeler [1952] points out that Cicero’s work is often attributed to Plato’s work on the 
state, but any reference to Aristotle’s Politics in reference to the republic is most likely 
“not causal but coincidental” [p. 51]).  Cicero’s core ideas also seem to emanate from the 
philosophical and rhetorical influence Plato and Aristotle had on ancient Western 
thought, particularly regarding our ability to reason for the sake of social and political 
development (How, 1930).  Cicero integrates Platonic and Aristotelian contemplative 
thought into his own work by effectively applying them into the Roman context of action 
(How, 1930).   Seminal works such as the Republic and Laws are not “philosophical 
fiction but [are] real and historical” because they described what was actually emerging 
in the Roman republic at the time (How, 1930, p. 26).   
There are several core ideals such as moderation in rule, the interaction of rule of 
law with the chosen leader, rule of a few over the rule of many, and the power of rhetoric 
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in the role of the state, that Cicero seems to borrow from Plato for use in the Roman 
world (Wheeler, 1952); however, How (1930) points out that the “differences [in Cicero] 
are as clear as, and more profound than, the resemblances” (p. 26). Plato believes, in an 
uncharacteristically Aristotelian sense, that the state cannot function or succeed without 
looking toward moderation in how one rules and in how society behaves.  “…[A] view to 
the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the 
doctrine which we are maintaining” (Plato, The Statesman, 2008, p. 89). 
The rule of law is also given to us as an a priori, but for Plato, the rule of law 
alone does not suffice because it is itself rhetorical—it does not “comprehend what is 
noblest and just for all” (Plato, The Statesman, 2008, p.104) and therefore must be 
administered by wise men who understand this and can respond to the temporal quality of 
the law.  The rule of law and the statesman have a complex, symbiotic relationship—one 
cannot function without the other.  Law would have no legitimacy without the guidance 
and wisdom of the endowed ruler who possesses the true art of leadership; the law is 
necessary, but cannot create any form of good rule without a leader who possesses 
knowledge of the “art” of rule itself (Plato, The Statesman, 2008, p.104).   
Plato believes in the divinity of law, its a priori nature, but also understands its 
imperfections when engaging human complexity.  God’s law has been given to us, but 
God is displeased with our ability to apply it well; he has handed it over to the earthly 
domain in order for us to apply it justly and fairly (Plato, 1998). Thus, the philosopher 
king’s duty is to moderate the law and apply the art of leadership to human behavior for 
the benefit of society.   
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Although a proponent of the philosopher king, one endowed with the abilities to 
rule moderately through law, Plato prefers the rule of a few (an aristocracy or oligarchy) 
over the rule of many (democracy); mobs can easily turn the state into a anarchistic 
tyranny (Plato, The Statesman). Cicero’s ideal state rests in an aristocracy that rules under 
a mixed constitution.  In The Republic Cicero also believes that pure democracy can be 
detrimental to a successful state, but that the rule of one individual will quite easily spiral 
into an opportunity for despotism.  For Plato, the king can negotiate those a priori laws 
that are complicated by humans en masse.   
For Plato, rhetoric plays an important role in the development and maintenance of 
a just state, but he does not believe it to be the art by which a state is formed and 
maintained.  Plato very clearly states that rhetoric is quite different from politics 
(“Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being a different species, yet 
ministering to it” (The Statesman, p. 217)), where Cicero and the Romans believe that 
rhetoric and politics are one in the same art.  Walzer (2007) points out that Roman 
rhetoric was civic rhetoric in that it was “taught in the context of telos,” not merely as a 
technical practice, but as a form of citizen education for the good of the civitas (p. 271).  
Cicero’s De Oratore points to the character of oratory as such: 
It may, indeed, occur to an objector that oratory ought to be compared with other 
pursuits such as deal with more abstruse subjects and imply a wide acquaintance 
with literature, rather than with the excellence of a general or the practical 
wisdom of the good statesman; but let him only turn to such other branches of 
study, and observe how numerous are the distinguished names in each, and he 
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will realize what a great paucity of orators there is, and always has been. (Cicero, 
1904, p. 4) 
Cicero cannot emphasize the importance of rhetoric and oratory enough; oratory forms 
the foundation on which all other disciplines are grounded and provides the channels 
through which knowledge and moral conversations are disseminated. Most importantly, 
rhetoric and oratory are essential to the creation and function of a just republic.  
On the other hand, for Plato, politics and the affairs of the state are arts of their 
own, and rhetoric is not an essential element for creating a just state.  Rhetoric, when not 
Sophistic, can act as a guide aiding “the pilot” (p. 195)—a recurring metaphor in the 
Statesman— of the great ship of the state to steer toward moderation and justice.  
Sophistic rhetoric will persuade citizens to disregard the rule of law, but an ethical 
rhetoric can point citizens to desirable ends (Plato, 1998, p. 111).  Politics take a 
hierarchical precedence over rhetoric since politics is the art that helps us decide whether 
we should engage rhetoric as a tactical measure; the art of politics creates the 
epistemological field in which rhetoric functions. “And the science which determines 
whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to 
persuade? Of course” (Plato, 1998, p.119).  Although rhetoric is not a requirement for 
effective politics, by fluidly and artfully combining the arts of politics and rhetoric, the 
ruler can “weave” (Plato’s metaphor) the various abilities of the masses to form a state 
that benefits all of its citizens.  The art of politics, not the persuasive abilities of rhetoric, 
actually grants the a priori ability to choose the capable politician/leader:   
Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be 
formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided; but will 
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begin by testing human nature in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to 
proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes – she will herself give 
orders, and maintain authority…(Plato, 1998, p. 127) 
It is important for us to extrapolate these various themes from Plato’s work on the 
Statesman in order to gain a full understanding of Cicero’s influences from the Greek 
world.  This project contends that Isocrates has a strong linkage to Ciceronian thought 
through the ways in which the polis and republic, and therefore the nation, were 
conceived in antiquity.  However, Plato, particularly regarding his requirements for an 
ideal state, had a strong impact on the way Cicero thought about the republic.  By 
combining the technical and political aspects of Platonic thought on the state and 
Isocratic principles for civic rhetoric and social engagement, Cicero recasts a version of 
the republic through Roman ideals that serves as a transition to later understandings of 
the nation in general. 
Civic Republicanism: Early Notions of a Nation? 
The next phase of our discussion involves a pragmatic move toward viewing 
rhetoric as an essential element in the development of the nation.  Cicero is often 
considered the last great republican statesman of antiquity: “Through his modification of 
Stoicism, Cicero erected the basic conceptual framework of the ‘law of nations’ within 
which, or against which, all subsequent international law and normative international 
relations theory has defined itself” (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 51).  Cicero was 
“one of the national heroes of old Rome” and was the first to be called the “Father of His 
Country” (Rolfe, 1963, pp. 108; 110) because of his unwavering support of a republic 
that not only cared for its citizens, but also encouraged participation by its citizens.  
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Cicero’s influence reached far in terms of distance and time, as he heavily influenced 
modern politicians in post-Enlightenment England and France, particularly in Republican 
France during their struggle for liberty and civic participation (Rolfe, 1963).  
Coined the “Prince of Eloquence,” (Wood, 1988, p.3), Cicero is one of a few rhetoricians 
considered an ancient “antecedent” to the conception and development of the idea of 
civic republicanism in contemporary times (Honahan, 2002, p. 41). Even Parenti (2003) 
who writes an unusually scathing account of Cicero’s controversial role in Roman 
society, criticized for his ideas and methods behind the creation and maintenance of the 
republic, still acknowledges Cicero as an exemplary orator.   
Today there is a movement towards reinvigorating the merits of civic 
republicanism in the contemporary world (Digeser, 2004, Honohan, 2002, Maynor, 2003, 
Nederman, 2000). Communitarian scholars like Taylor and MacIntyre contend “that 
liberal theory and practice yield an impoverished and distorted conception of human 
community and public life” (Nederman, 2000, p. 17), where the foundations of civic 
republicanism are reflected in important indicators such as civic participation and the 
primacy of human interdependence (Honohan, 2002).  This theme of a common center is 
the main focus of modern republican thought, and hence often considered a “conservative 
mentality” politically and intellectually (Wood, 1988, p. 206).  Aristotle and Cicero can 
be viewed as civic republicans in the sense that they view this notion of 
interconnectedness, particularly as a political construct, necessary for the foundation of 
the nation, which takes on a very different character and function of other communal 
associations in society (Honohan, 2002, p. 15).   
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It is evident from these considerations, then, that a city-state is among the things 
that exist by nature, that a human being is by nature a political animal, and that 
anyone who is without a city-state, not by luck but by nature, is either a poor 
specimen or else superhuman.  Like the one Homer condemns, he too is ‘clanless, 
lawless, and homeless.’ For someone with such a nature is at the same time eager 
for war, like an isolated piece in a board game…Hence that the city-state is a 
natural and prior in nature to the individual is clear.  For if an individual is not 
self-sufficient when separated, he will be like all other parts in relation to the 
whole.   Anyone who cannot form a community with others, or who does not need 
to because he is self-sufficient, is not part of a city-state – he is either a beast or 
god.  Hence, though an impulse toward this sort of community exists by nature in 
everyone, whoever first established one was responsible for the greatest of goods. 
(Aristotle, Politics, 1998, pp. 4-5) 
Thus, it is with Aristotle that we begin to see that the concept of community is a priori to 
our existence and that belonging to a community is essential for human life; we are 
savages without the support, and acceptance, of community. This idea that a man without 
a land is a man without a home comes into focus in the Greek polis. 
Cicero contributes to the conversation about civic republicanism in a much 
different way than many of its contemporary proponents, especially concerning ideas of 
national defense and the necessity of war—two very important discussions tied to the 
notion of contemporary nationalism.  “For Cicero, the pursuit of peace, rather than war, 
and statesmanship, rather than military command, are the prime tokens of patriotism and 
exemplars or republican virtue” (Nederman, 2000, p. 19).  Cicero saw the need for just 
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war when the security and integrity of the republic were threatened from the outside, but 
overall his republican system of government and the concept of nation called for the need 
to consider alternatives to war and foster peace and civic participation in the public 
sphere (Nederman, 2000; von Heyking, 2007). Laws that are led and enforced by learned 
leaders create an environment that encourages civic participation that is energized by a 
clear understanding of the state—that entity which promotes and provides protection, 
particularly in moments of strife (Cicero, The Laws, 1998, p. 150).  Civic republicanism 
is an understanding of the state through its purest communal roots; those interconnected 
communities of active citizens are not left to their own devices, but rather thrive in a 
context that is framed by good laws and leaders who understand the laws (Honohan, 
2002).  The state then becomes the existential-phenomenological manifestation where 
justice is not only recognized, but also applied to quotidian life.  Civic republicanism, 
then, may be considered an early form of nation:  It provides the ground on which a state 
must form and function, guided by principles of law, leadership and justice (for which 
both Plato and Aristotle planted the seeds).  Cicero builds on these principles to drive a 
theory of civic republicanism that breathes life into the idea of the republic through 
Roman paideia, to use the Greek term. 
Res Publica as Nation 
Although Cicero elucidates the notion that rhetoric and the idea of republic are 
inextricably linked in his orations, letters, and dialogues, two of his most important 
works, the Republic and the Laws clearly outline his program for a public entity that can 
thrive and serve its citizens ethically and responsibly.  As we have explored earlier, 
Cicero’s rhetorical approach to understanding statehood and his state in particular 
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attempted to create a cultural framework that resonated in the hearts and minds of its 
citizens.  However, we must understand the foundations of republic and the indicators 
that elevate it from purely a technical system of state to a cultural construct, a Greek 
paideia, for the Roman populus.   
The most basic understanding of Cicero’s Republic is contained in the meaning of 
the word itself.  Res publica literally translates from the Latin to “public thing” or “public 
business.”  Cicero saw the republic as a function of its citizenry, a field for public 
participation, under the guidance of a learned ruling class (Fott, 2014; Powell & Rudd, 
1998).  “Part Aristotle, part Cicero, part Machiavelli, civic humanism conceives of man 
as a political being whose realization of self occurs only through participation in public 
life, through active citizenship in a republic. The virtuous man is concerned primarily 
with the public good, res publica, or commonwealth, not with private or selfish ends” 
(Kramnick, 1982, p. 630).  As far as we can tell, Cicero was the first to have phrased the 
idea of a public state in these terms.  “And who are ‘the people?’ ‘The people’ is a union 
of a number of men, acknowledging each other’s common rights, and pursuing in 
common their advantage or ‘interest.’  Res publica then is a community, and the business 
of such a union of men, no more, and no less” (Lacey & Wilson, 1970, p. 1).  Res publica 
is a complex statement about communal relationships, and therefore rather difficult to 
translate directly; this is clearly indicated by the ways in which the title of Cicero’s work 
itself has been translated, as Res publica is sometimes referred to as a republic, a state, or 
a commonwealth.  All of these factors encompass various aspects of Cicero’s republic, 
but none truly grasp the essence of his system completely (Lacey & Wilson, 1970). 
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For the purposes of this project, it is important to explore the specific 
characteristics of a republic as well as the question of why Cicero’s republic fits into our 
understanding of a nation.  Wood (1988) contends that Cicero’s state is “non-ethical and 
secular,” and that there is “the separation of the state from both government and society, 
all of which have a beginning in the thought of Cicero” (1988, p.125).  Civitas is the 
technical term regarding the complex system that regulates the states, while res publica is 
based in common interest and rights (1988, p. 128).  Civitas tends to be somewhat less 
normative and emotive term than res publica,” but that patria (fatherland, in a sense) is 
the most emotive of all  (p. 126; p. 139).   In other words, the more we move down the 
hierarchy of social constructs, the more pragmatic and technical they become; patria is an 
existential-phenomenological construct that lives in the hearts and minds of its citizens, 
while res publica and civitas are the technical constructs that inform the patria through 
systems of justice and common humanity (Wood, 1988).  These two statements, however, 
seem to confound the function of Cicero’s Republic.  On one hand, we have an entity that 
is non-ethical and secular, but on the other hand we are asked to view the res publica as a 
philosophical construct grounded in common humanity and justice that then shapes the 
way the civitas functions.  In other words, the res publica conjures up notions of the 
“material world,” the actual social mechanism that invokes the emotions and actions of 
his fellow citizens to form a functional state (Dugan, 2007, p. 19). 
Cicero’s focus on an Aristotelian style of moderation within the state is 
noteworthy as well.  In The Republic, Cicero (1998) makes it very clear that temperance, 
particularly the temperance of a leader, helps to construct a practical collective 
experience that produces the characteristics of a solid republic; “excessive license” 
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promotes an environment of anarchy that quickly devolves into tyranny (Cicero, 1998, p. 
31). In other words, clear and distinct boundaries between the leadership and citizenry 
create the necessary phenomenological distance that makes the construction and function 
of the state possible and accessible.  Mob rule will undoubtedly bring about destruction, 
but knowledgeable and ethical leaders are able to impart justice through the law that is 
supported by a constitution.  A true state is grounded in philosophy from which emerges 
a strong practical approach that forms and manages that state.   
Thus, the Republic provides a pragmatic context for moral excellence in which 
citizens can improve their lives.  Philosophy’s practical home is located within the state.   
[The] most important field of [moral] practice, moreover, is in the government of 
the state…For nothing is laid down by philosophers—nothing right and honorable 
at any rate—which has not been brought into being and established by those who 
have drawn up laws for states...We are led by a powerful urge to increase the 
wealth of the human race; we are keen to make men’s lives richer and safer by our 
policies and efforts; we are spurred on by nature herself to fulfill this purpose. 
(Cicero, 1998, p.4) 
The state is a function of rhetoric, the practical philosophy that helps citizens make sense 
of their world and provides refuge in a constantly contingent world.   There is no greater 
activity closer to the divine than the creation of a state (Cicero, 1998); the creation of a 
state is a practical moral act that not only helps us form communities but allows us to 
understand our situatedness in those communities (Cicero, 1998, pp. 17, 19). The nation 
is ethical, rhetorical action as it provides the natural existential-phenomenological context 
for its citizens; however, we only arrive at this pragmatic entity through grounded 
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philosophical thought from which the creation of laws and natural leadership emerge.  In 
short, the state is teleological, providing a vision for what is possible: “…[F]or it is the 
crowning achievement of political wisdom…to divine the course of public affairs, with 
all its twists and turns.  Then, when you know what direction things are taking, you can 
hold them back or else be ready to meet them” (Cicero, 1998, p.49).  Within such 
rhetorical constructs public and personal liberty is a reality. 
Cicero’s Rhetorical Contribution to the “Imagined Community” 
Although ancient rhetoric can be viewed as a technical art, applying the necessary 
rhetorical mechanisms for successful persuasion, such as the case with Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric (1984) and Cicero’s De Inventione (1949), we can also readily regard rhetoric as 
a mode of communication and way of life that shaped the cultural mindset. Dugan (2007) 
argues that Cicero’s rhetorical approach is not only technical, but sets up a cultural 
framework for his place and time; it plays directly into the public imagination of the 
republic in the Roman historical moment.  Cicero’s works are “culturally significant,” not 
only technical: “Rhetoric is treated as a cultural construct embedded in society” (Dugan, 
2007, p. 16), as rhetoricians like Cicero were conveying the “Roman cultural 
unconscious” (Dugan, 2007, p. 18). We can see this framing in Cicero’s treatment of his 
notion of the res publica; not only did he provide guidelines for what ideals should be 
applied for successful governance, but the very notion of his republic reflected what was 
occurring in that historical moment while he was attempting to transform it from within. 
Powell and Rudd (1998) elude to this quality in the republic by addressing Cicero’s focus 
on the profession of the politician and ultimately how it affected the common citizen: 
“Cicero was concerned not just to encourage political participation, but to present politics 
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as a branch of knowledge which needed to be studied and mastered, and which aimed at 
the greatest good not of the politicians themselves but of the governed” (p. xxii, emphasis 
added).   
Cicero was writing these seminal works at a time when the Roman Republic was 
in major distress, wrought with corruption, and on its way toward the new Empire 
(Cowell, 1968; Hamilton, 1932).  His emphasis on civic republicanism was an attempt 
not only to strengthen his state, but also to work this idea quite deliberately into the 
public consciousness to shift the cultural framework and the actual structure of his state at 
the time.  He does this by engaging justice as the foundation on which the cultural and 
political landscape in the Roman world could be transformed.  In short, rhetoric and 
jurisprudence needed each other in this growing populace; Cicero’s emphasis on law and 
justice is enveloped in rhetoric and pulls everyday citizens into republican life.   
Rhetoric had an influence on matters of the republic not only at the elite levels but 
on that of the commoners as well (Alexander, 2007).  When Cicero was writing his 
masterpiece of political theory and statehood, the moral character at the time of Cicero 
preceded by Cato was in ruins and much of Cicero’s ideal emerged out of a politically 
vital but socially doubtful moment (Cowell, 1967; Hamilton, 1932).  De Republica is 
more and more an idea that was a reflection of the concern of the republic’s demise 
(Cowell, 1967).  Although De Republica outlines specific guidelines for the success of a 
just and moral state, at a more global level it creates a cultural framework for society; 
Cicero’s republic is an “imagined community” not in the sense that it is only a pure ideal, 
but in the Andersonian sense that it can truly exist in the hearts and minds of its citizens 
when communicated effectively (Anderson, 2006).  In the Roman world, rhetoric is the 
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tool and method of communication through which this “imagining” occurs.  One way in 
which we can explore this notion of rhetoric as a method of cultural significance is to 
delve a little more deeply into some of Cicero’s writing focused specifically on rhetoric 
itself.  We can see that even in some of his earlier writings on the art of oration and its 
function as a public good, the question of state is at the center.   
 De Oratore (On Oratory) does not only provide the function and utility of oration 
in Roman society, but integrates the function of rhetoric into more global concerns for the 
state in general.  In De Oratore, Cicero underscores the two major questions before the 
republic: “The reform of judicia, and the extension of the civitas to all the Italian 
yeomen” (Moor, 1904, p. viii).  For good oratory one needs knowledge of moral 
philosophy and law – the former allows the orator to persuade well (Moor, 1904), but 
without law and reason there is no justice to guide us. “….[M]y deliberate opinion is, that 
the controlling influence and wisdom of the consummate orator is the main security, not 
merely for his own personal reputation, but for the safety of countless individuals, and the 
welfare of the country at large ” (Cicero, 1904, p. 13, emphasis added).  As we can see in 
De Oratore, Cicero viewed rhetoric as one of the most important, if not the most 
important, methods for creation and maintenance of a just republic.  Rhetoric was the 
available means of public communication and persuasion in Roman society, and through 
both word and deed, leaders could convey the importance of reason, law and justice 
within that entity which could protect and provide for its citizens.  In Ciceronian terms, 
then, rhetoric is necessary for the development of a national consciousness.  
On Duties (1855) advances Cicero’s program for pragmatic morality.  Leaders 
and citizens alike contribute to society through active citizenship; as members of an 
 86 
organized state, we are behooved to act not in our own interests but in the interests of the 
republic for the good of all that surrounds us.  Like many of Cicero’s other discussions, 
both reason and justice compel duties—we serve to benefit every level of society.  We 
are justified when defending our country, but at the same time, we must regard others 
around us by acting in moderation and beneficence. Cicero’s penchant for the Stoic 
cosmopolitanism and his love of country contradict, yet somehow support, each other 
when thinking about nation particularly in postmodern terms.  There is a fine line 
between what we hold as our own, and what all of mankind is meant to share.  The nation 
is the social construct in which we carry out our duty to engage in an active political life 
that is enforced by justice and ethics.  Regardless of the evils that pervade political 
activity, Cicero believes that its benefits far outweigh the costs.  As animals with reason 
and language, it is our obligation to serve and protect the community of which we are a 
part.  
But (as has been strikingly said by Plato) we are not born of ourselves alone, and 
our country claims her share, and our friends their share of us; and, as the Stoics 
hold, all the that the earth produces is created for the use of man, so men are 
created for the sake of men, that they may mutually do good to one 
another…(Cicero, On Duties, 1855, pp. 14-15) 
Mutual, communal action is natural—our duty to every level of society from country to 
family is implanted in us to serve and protect the common good.  The res publica is the 
practical manifestation of our duty to ourselves and our fellow citizens, but ultimately the 
res publica conceived as nation is a nation among nations, participating in the larger 
context of an international web of associations.  For Cicero, the state creates a society 
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that realizes full human potential in the world; it provides a tangible context and acts as a 
guide for its citizens to act justly in communion with their fellow human beings.  
Through the law, the state provides protection for personal property, both tangible 
property and intangible human properties such as human rights and freedom.  The state is 
a moral entity because it is the work of the gods; it is the pinnacle of human community 
and is tantamount to the survival and success of the human race.  “All that is distinctively 
human, according to Cicero, depends on the existence and well-being of the state…The 
state provides an environment conducive to the flourishing of culture and it highest 
manifestation, philosophy.  With the state, philosophy would not have been born, and 
without philosophy’s guidance the state is like a rudderless ship (Wood, 1988, p. 120-
121).” 
Wood (1988) contends that Cicero was among the first to define the state in a 
concise manner, but was more concerned about the non-moral, technical aspects of the 
state as opposed to something that would shape the human soul. Thus far, we see that 
although Cicero did in fact create a technical program for the state, the underlying 
intention was that these guidelines would allow us to form an understanding of the state 
that was pleasing to the gods by protecting fellow humans through acts of justice and 
providing a space for meaningful conversation about our relationships with our fellow 
citizens and those beyond our “borders.”   For these reasons, perhaps Wood fails to see 
the rhetorical forces behind Cicero’s work, as his rhetoric contextualizes the goals of his 
technical guidelines for the republic.  It is difficult to see that Cicero’s work, which is 
deeply grounded on justice and reason, is “non-moral.” 
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Again, we see that Anderson’s notion of the nation as an imagined community 
continues to assist us with even ancient conceptions of the nation.  It is important to point 
out, however, that Cicero’s Republic may be “imagined” in a theoretically rich, 
Andersonian sense as it forms common ground; it is not “imaginary” in the sense that it is 
overly ideal and unattainable (Wood, 1988, p. 139).  Rather, Cicero’s Republic is a real, 
tangible system grounded in significant Roman ideals.  The imagined community is 
constituted through human language and communication and the distribution of that 
communication to the community. Cicero’s writings on the republic not only convey the 
ideal political community, but they delineate an imagined community because they 
capture the pulse of the historical moment and speak directly to the problems that 
everyday citizens are facing in the late republic.  Cicero’s idea of the republic is an early 
rendering of the nation as he attempts to prefigure an identity for the citizens of Rome 
that is tied to place politically, culturally, and juridically while engaging rhetoric as the 
available means of persuasion and the most accessible form of public communication. 
Cicero engaged rhetorical methods and principles which he had outlined for Roman 
citizens, as in De Inventione, to convey a message of statehood that would resonate in the 
minds and hearts of its citizens throughout a burgeoning, yet troubled, society, and create 
a shared meaning for nationhood and citizenship within that nation.   
The Centrality of Natural Law 
Such a discussion leads us to Cicero’s notion of nature and natural law.  Rhetoric 
and, therefore, the state are not exclusively social constructs, originating from the 
complex relationships with community; rather, they are products of natural law, a 
common center that derives from the divine.  “[I]n all times and nations this universal law 
 89 
must forever reign, eternal and imperishable.  It is the sovereign master and emperor of 
all beings.  God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer” (Cicero, On the 
Commonwealth, 1929, p. 270).  Laws that result in justice are not human, earthly laws but 
rather a result of the laws that the gods have handed down to us, which then become 
human constructs (Cicero, 1929, p. 254). Natural law ensures that the law is in fact 
centered on a common good that emerges through the way we view and enact justice, and 
therefore allows us to form common goals and aspirations within a political structure 
regardless of the diversity that exists. We can see this influence as referred to in Plato’s 
Statesman: Humankind cannot precisely understand how the law guides us, nor does the 
law understand human nature, but it strives to infiltrate our political associations and 
control our ways.  Plato and Cicero agree that the wise ruler, the philosopher king for 
Plato and educated royalty for Cicero, must mediate the function of the law with human 
action as well as its converse.  We can see both of these ideas emerge in Plato’s 
Statesman (2008, p. 104) and Cicero’s Republic (1998, pp. 4; 14), respectively.  Cicero 
(1998), although he ultimately admits that Plato’s design for the state was more idealistic 
than practical (in Cicero’s words, “desirable” rather than “feasible” (p.51)), he follows 
those same principles as a foundation for his vision of a functioning, just republic.   
The state, then, is a teleological manifestation of nature, or natural law in 
particular, which is the ground on which the development of functional communities 
emerges.  At its very core, reason—rational reflection, or phronesis in the Greek 
lexicon—is the channel through which natural law reaches the wise rulers and is applied 
to the state (Cicero, 1998).  Laws emerge from reason.  Of course, reason itself 
“moderates” communication in the Aristotelian sense, which Cicero then carries into his 
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own goals for a realistic republic.  However, we do not necessarily observe Isocrates 
engaging reason as a starting point in the same way, but rather focusing on phronesis to 
accomplish his task (Schwarze, 1999). We see all of these influences in Cicero. In On 
Law, Cicero describes the importance of reason and how this hierarchy of virtue allows 
us to arrive at the functional state, the necessary structure for human community and 
communication.  Reason, which is inherent in nature, results in law, which Cicero 
believes to be the highest form of human reason.  “For law is the force of nature, the 
intelligence and reason of a wise man, and the criterion of justice and injustice” (Cicero, 
The Laws, 1998, p. 103).   Law, and therefore justice, is the manifestation of practical 
reason. Cicero explains the Roman diversion from the Greek in the way the cultures 
viewed the law—the Greek word for law, nomos, was defined as something that was 
bestowed upon the polis that focused on ideas of “fairness,” while the Roman word, lex, 
was not simply something that was granted to the Romans, but rather a matter of “choice” 
in the ways in which they behaved for the good of the republic (Cicero, The Laws, 1998, 
p. 103).  Cicero agrees that both elements are central to the law, but we see the penchant 
for Roman action over the Greek contemplation. “…Cicero distinctly claims to speak 
with authority on the ground that he combined both theory and practice, thus excelling 
his predecessors, who…were either mere theorists or, if practical, devoid of skill in 
exposition” (How, 1930, p. 25). Reason is the pure essence of all that regulates human 
interaction; without reason we will not arrive at laws that promulgate justice.  More 
importantly, the crucible of republic provides the existential-phenomenological space for 
reason and justice to emerge. 
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“…[T]here is nothing better than reason, and reason is present in both man and 
God.  But those who share reason also share right reason; and since that is law, we 
men must also be thought of as partners and with the gods in laws.  Furthermore, 
those who share law share justice.  Now those who share all things must be 
regarding as belonging to the same state; and much the more so if they obey the 
same powers and authorities.  And they do in fact obey this celestial system, the 
divine mind, and the all-powerful god.  Hence this whole universe must be 
thought of as a single community shared by gods and men. (Cicero, The Laws, 
1998, p. 105, emphasis added) 
It is interesting to note Cicero’s expansion of the concept of the republic in this regard.  A 
community is a product of shared laws and justice; however, he does not see law and 
justice as specific to a particular state, but rather universal laws that encompass the whole 
of humanity. For that reason, community extends beyond the political structure of the 
state to the larger, universal community.  As we will explore later, such a focus on the 
whole of humanity plays directly into Cicero’s understanding of the larger human 
community as influenced by the Stoics, and the balance between the need for a republic 
and this human community at large.   
For Cicero, then, the state is grounded on the notion of what we, as citizens, all 
agree to be just and how that justice is preserved: “For what is a state other than an equal 
partnership in justice?” (Cicero, The Republic, 1998, p. 22-23).  Agreement within the 
state, which is regulated by justice, is akin to the natural harmony within music—the 
bonds of difference that work in concert to keep the state functioning well.  “What, in the 
case of singing, musicians call harmony is, in the state, concord; it constitutes the tightest 
 92 
and most effective bond of security; and such concord cannot exist at all without justice” 
(Cicero, The Republic, 1998, p. 58).  Natural law and reason all result in how justice is 
perceived and practiced; if justice is not guided by the law, and natural law in Cicero’s 
case, then it is selfish kind of justice that does not consider the Other in its application.  
For Cicero, the law ensures that justice is oriented toward the Other, which in turn helps 
to create the true essence of the purpose of a republic; that is, a space in which we agree 
upon the tenets of justice, but also where justice is applied with our fellow citizen in mind 
(Wood, 1988).   
The Dream of Scipio is perhaps Cicero’s most prominent chapter of the Republic 
because of the effective use of narrative and metaphor that grounds his major ideas of the 
republic in a cohesive, and memorable, narrative for the Romans. Scipio’s dream is 
otherworldly, as Scipio, a great leader descended from great leaders, is flying through the 
cosmos with the gods (1998, The Republic, Book IV).  Such a perspective on the world 
not only demonstrates the importance of a nation in the minds of the gods, but it 
emphasizes Cicero’s main ideas about the significance, origin and structure of a republic.  
From the cosmos, the earth is miniscule and society even smaller; even in their seemingly 
insignificant presence, well-ordered societies please the gods, and the leaders in those 
societies, who are chosen by the gods, are granted a direct link to divinity (p. 88).  From 
this perspective Scipio sees a nation for what it really is: A significant, but small element 
in a much larger system deemed invaluable by nature (the gods).  Should these societies 
be well-ordered and led by those naturally chosen to carry out the function of a state, the 
gods will grant their blessings upon the nation (Barham, 1841): “I want you to know this: 
for everyone who has saved and served his country and helped it grow, a sure place is set 
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aside in heaven where he may enjoy of life of eternal bliss” (Cicero, The Republic, 1998, 
p. 88).  From the gods’ perspective, the nation is the most manageable and accessible 
form of the divine for earthly citizens, and therefore is the work of the gods: “To that 
supreme god who rules the universe, nothing (or at least nothing that happens on earth) is 
more welcoming than those companies and communities of people linked together by 
justice that are called states.  Their rulers and saviors set out from this place [the cosmos], 
and to this they return” (Cicero, The Republic, 1998, p. 88).  
Cicero’s rhetorical technique of setting Scipio’s dream in a somewhat fantastical, 
out-of-this-world context connects the practical function of the state, and the effective 
ruling of the republic, to the cosmos and the larger, a priori context. The mind, or what 
some might consider more accurately the soul, is an a priori creation of the divine. Cicero 
believes that God has granted us life and formed our souls to be stewards of the earth; the 
republic is the organizing entity that allows us to carry out that responsibility (Cicero, 
The Republic, 1998, p. 89). We must act according to the requirements within a republic 
to attain an understanding of our origin while creating an acceptable structure that pleases 
the gods.  The human soul is eternal, and the republic allows for the earthly existence of 
the eternal soul.  A nation is not formed out of a vacuum, but rather the earthly 
manifestation of a sort of divine ordering of our world.  Scipio learns from his forefather 
Africanus that all things good derive from an “Eternal Being,” and when not derived 
from such a source “all nature must perish” (Cicero, On the Commonwealth, 1929, pp. 
310-311). In this life, altruistic political activity that is focused on those with whom we 
share our world is rewarded in the afterlife.   
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Cicero’s application of the law to justice, and the communication of these ideas to 
fellow citizens, is yet another example of how Cicero and the Romans “imagined” their 
community and developed their notion of the republic.  Law and justice are not possible 
without citizens sharing these ideas and applying them to everyday life in order to form a 
just and ethical republic.  Works such as Cicero’s Republic and Laws were foundational 
pieces that reinforced the Roman pragmatic ideal into the minds of its citizens to form a 
more desirable space for nation, the space where an understanding of common justice 
was made possible and a space where its citizens granted the privilege of protection and 
freedom.     
Cicero’s Cosmopolitanism 
Given the above elements of Ciceronian thought, we can invoke such ideas of the 
republic as foundations of what we understand to be a contemporary concept of the 
nation.  Although not directly “national” in our contemporary understanding, they are 
important ancient antecedents to the ways in which we view the nation and nationalism.  
As mentioned earlier, I understand the concept of nation to be a communicative, 
discursive public phenomenon that allows private citizens to engage issues of belonging 
and identity rhetorically within strongly defined political, social, economic and 
communicative boundaries.  Although bound to physical characteristics in our current 
understanding, the nation seems to be defined more by imagined, existential-
phenomenological horizons that offer guidelines for interaction with cultural, political, 
social and economic selves and others.  In this regard, physical boundaries become less 
stringent, more contingent and permeable.  Nationalism, then, is the intellectual and 
emotional manifestation of that reality in the hearts and minds of that nation’s citizens 
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and interlocutors.  These existential-phenomenological horizons explored by Cicero, and 
to some extent, Isocrates earlier, are driven by the law and thus justice as a common, 
moral center that allows citizens to make sense of the political, social, economic, and 
cultural world around them.  Nations allow citizens to “moderate” the world around 
them, as they make social, cultural and political issues manageable and accessible for the 
masses.  Of course, the nation, or the republic in Cicero’s terms, is not possible without a 
knowledgeable leader who respects the presence of the law derived from the a priori 
conditions that guide the ways in which we act and interact to form the common ground 
for justice and, eventually, peace. 
 Cicero was considered a patriot to the Roman Republic, but, like Aristotle, he 
understood that moderation was necessary to live a chaotic political, social world (Rolfe, 
1963).   As a cosmopolitan Stoic, Cicero, particularly in On Duties, vacillates between 
the greatness of the Roman citizen while acknowledging the need to incorporate others 
into the political community (Pangle, 1998).  Patriotism is an important aspect of life in 
the republic, but must be balanced so as to not degenerate into forms of nationalism that 
are damaging and disregard the existence of other surrounding communities. Rolfe 
explains that in even Cicero’s world that was less connected than in the contemporary 
world, recognizing others outside of one system played an important role in patriotism. 
“Still, love of country when it does not degenerate into chauvinism and national 
selfishness, is the mark that distinguishes a good citizen from a bad, and this quality 
Cicero possessed to an unusual degree and put it on record” (Rolfe, 1963, p.167). 
We cannot deny his love of country, his need to regulate the masses while 
encouraging active participation, and the ability to extol human freedom within the 
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construct of the republic.  Freedom and justice are possible only within an organized, 
concerted effort to “herd” citizens (to use Plato’s extended metaphor in the Statesman 
(2008), p. 99) and provide resources that create an environment where freedom is made 
possible through justice.  The republic was the highly organized manifestation of a 
community that provided that manageable context. 
At the heart of this complex and highly nuanced rhetorical project is an appeal to 
certain transnational rules of conduct embodied in the Stoic notion of “natural law” and 
the kindred conception of the “law of nations” (ius gentium) (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 
1999, p. 52).  The Stoics evidently promulgated the first widely influential cosmopolitan 
ethical ideal, rejecting the need for allegiances to country and political affiliations: “All 
good men, whatever their social or geographic position may be, are equally citizens of the 
larger polis which embraces the entire cosmos: they are in fact…citizens of the world” 
(Hadas, 1943, p. 108-109).  Reinvigorating Stoic principles, to a certain extent, Cicero is 
seen as an important advocate of a Roman form of cosmopolitanism. Law, not power, is 
the guiding principle through which all human relations are governed, and pave the way 
for how citizens not only interact within their own political entities but within the 
enlarged space of the human race as a whole (Hadas, 1943).  Substantive relations 
between citizens grounded in justice emanates to the larger whole of the world beyond 
one’s borders. Cicero’s focus on natural law is quite different from that of the Stoics—a 
contemplative life is truly perfection, but because we can never reach perfection, action is 
the way to live on earth (Pangle, 1998).  True commitment and participation in political 
life brings us close to the gods since the active life reserves a contemplative life in the 
afterlife.  The Stoics are starkly conservative where Cicero liberalizes their ideals to be 
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more engaged common, everyday life (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999).  Cicero’s 
cosmopolitan ideals that focused on common humanity are based in duties, qualified by 
stages of commitment to nation, family and then all of humanity.   
It is important to note that Cicero’s cosmopolitanism is grounded in Stoic ideals, 
as he believes in a community of citizens, but not in the same nation-less sense the Stoics 
believed.  Because of this relationship to the Stoics, we tend to idealize Cicero when it 
comes to our contemporary understanding of cosmopolitanism. At its very core it speaks 
to a common world of citizens, but not the Stoic intercultural, international community 
that transcends borders; rather, it is a practical, utilitarian form of cosmopolitanism that 
focused on community and is realized through law, justice, moral order and the affairs of 
the republic.   
Today…some scholars have concluded that Cicero’s humanitas and societas 
generis humani (society of mankind)—both a Stoic derivation—have more to do 
with a common culture, a community of interests, or shared values originate in 
reason and speech than with an inner or emotional feeling of universal love or 
kindness.  Human solidarity, then, for Cicero, despite his sometimes misleading 
rhetoric of spiritual brotherhood and fraternal intimacy, implies not so much a 
loving sympathy or compassion for other as it does the kind of relations and 
shared interests existing in a community of citizens, with all the inequalities 
entailed by such a traditional social order. (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999, p. 52) 
We can see how Cicero’s understanding of the republic is not a selfish one, but a 
practical application of what we could coin “othering.” Cicero’s “othering” of citizenship 
is a recurring theme that also leads some scholars to discuss his work as an early 
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cosmopolitan (Pangle and Ahrensdorf, 1999). We live in communion with our fellow 
citizens, and the nation exists not only to share what we hold in common with our fellow 
citizens, but also to regard those outside of ourselves as essential elements of the nation.  
The structure and space that the republic creates allows for citizens to live together in a 
practical manner with those who may be different from them.   For Cicero, citizenship 
itself is the pragmatic manifestation of the republic, where the citizens create the 
possibility of the republic and, by the same token, the republic grants the space for 
participation and protection. “Cicero had a clear conception of the rights and duties of 
citizenship and the dynamic relationship between citizenship and the health of the 
republic.  A citizen of Rome was entitled to expect his government to grant him libertas 
and justice, on the one hand, and on the other, he was obliged to consider and treat all 
Roman citizens as his equals under the law and as his kin” (Digeser, 2004, p.8).  Reason, 
law and justice created the requisite rhetorical space where citizenship was formed—a 
space for citizen participation and interaction. In Ciceronian terms, Roman citizenship 
was a powerful concept in that it not only acted as an identifier for its people, but also 
granted the portable “protection from arbitrary treatment” that could “command 
respect”(Digeser, 2004, p. 6).  Roman citizenship protected its citizens well beyond its 
political and existential-phenomenological borders.  In terms of our study, Roman 
citizenship is the practical manifestation of an “imagined community” through the ways 
in which reason is understood, the law is shared, and justice is conceived. 
Cicero provides insight into this idea in the way he prioritizes allegiances and 
commitments to our more immediate communal units while recognizing how 
contributions affect the larger context, the nation.  This systemization of citizenship is an 
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early attempt to justify a concept of postmodern nationalism that recognizes the need for 
national entities while acknowledging their impermanence, permeability and 
interconnectedness.  Additionally, Cicero exhibits elements of cosmopolitanism in the 
ways he treated ideas of interconnectedness and interdependency in an expanded 
community. 
Cicero’s Influence on Christian Rhetoric: Transitions to Modernity 
 
Cicero makes the pragmatic move from Plato’s and Aristotle’s forms of state that 
provide a context for the development of human souls and facilitating moral virtue 
(Wood, 1988).  However, in Ciceronian thought, much of what we have seen in this study 
has everything to do with creating a pragmatic social entity for protecting, providing, and 
promulgating an environment for peaceful, virtuous action in society.  Like Isocrates, 
Cicero is a civic rhetorician concerned with the practical applications of the more global 
issues of justice and citizenship grounded in a common center.  
 Although Cicero was not completely revived in a scholarly context until the 
Middle Ages, Christian rhetoricians such as Lactantius and St. Augustine of Hippo 
recognized his impact on political thought, and exploited his political/rhetorical theory in 
different ways. Lactantius (1964) offered the first type of Christian overlay to Ciceronian 
thought (Digeser, 2004), and Augustine expanded on Ciceronian concepts of public 
virtue, but also challenged his notion of shared justice within the commonwealth (St. 
Augustine, Book II, Ch. 21).   Although the scope of this project does not allow for a full 
exposition of Lactantian and Augustinian thought, it is important to touch on their 
timeless contributions as key transitions from the ancient world to more contemporary 
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renderings of Ciceronian thought, particularly as it pertains to our thinking about the 
structure of the nation.   
A Christian humanist follower of Ciceronian rhetoric, Lactantius promoted the re-
imagination of the republic at a tumultuous time for Christians in the forth century 
Roman Empire; Lactantius’ most important work, the Divine Institutes, serves as a De 
Officiis for the “new” commonwealth (McDonald, 1964, p. 5). Most notably, he carried 
the idea of natural law in the Christian context of the state, which was a new 
understanding of natural law in Christianity (Digeser, 2004).   
The writings of Lactantius, therefore, were composed in one of the most eventful 
epochs of ecclesiastical history.  The Church, after suffering the most severe of 
despotic persecution, was suddenly received under state protection and began to 
enjoy, not merely tranquility and legal status, but even a considerable portion of 
political influence.  The fourth century saw the great fusion of Christian Church 
with the Roman state and Hellenistic culture, the fusion which was to spell out 
Western civilization and determine its achievements. (McDonald, 1964, p. x)   
Thus, we can trace Lactantius’ intellectual lineage from figures like Cicero and, as a 
result of our study, Isocrates.  For these reasons, Lactantius has been coined the 
“Christian Cicero” (MacDonald, 1964; Digeser, 2000). 
The existence and immediacy of God was central to Lactantius’ Christian 
understanding of reason, law, and justice within the state; where Cicero recognized the 
presence of the a priori understanding of law and the cosmological realm of the gods, 
Christianity recognized the existence of a monotheistic realm from which our a priori 
understandings originated.  Lactantius, a rhetorician, engages Cicero as his rhetorical 
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guide, and argues that wisdom is a gift from God; philosophy alone cannot be the 
provider of truth without the presence of God.  In the true tradition of rhetoric then, 
philosophy has no real effect on us if it is not employed ethically, practically and 
meaningfully.  God has given us knowledge, but waxing philosophically will do us no 
good; rather, we must engage it practically.  “If the precepts of philosophy are to be 
learned, then, surely, they are to be learned for this reason, that we may live rightly and 
wisely; but, if we are to live civilly (or as to become private citizens), then philosophy is 
not wisdom since it is better to live civilly than philosophically” (Lactantius, 1964, pp. 
199-200).   Lactantius (1964), like Cicero, also deals with questions of justice, and 
explores whether justice is the highest virtue or the origin of virtue itself (pp. 338-339).  
Pure justice is realized through the worship of one God; Jesus was sent to guide us back 
to the true form of justice to listen to the divine wisdom, the natural law, which has been 
granted to us.  “But God, the most indulgent parent that He is, when the end of time was 
drawing near, sent a messenger to lead back that old age and the justice that had been 
routed, so that the human race would not be thrown about by great and everlasting errors” 
(Lactantius, 1964, p. 343).  Lactantius connects the notion of a return to Cicero’s concept 
of the republic to a divine state, one that includes the idea of one God, exemplified by 
Jesus Christ. “[F]or the Son of God [was] to descend upon the earth in order to erect a 
temple for God and teach justice; but He was to come, however not in the strength or 
heavenly power of an angel, but in the form and mortal condition of man” (p. Lactantius, 
1964, p. 263). Justice, and therefore an understanding of our origin of wisdom, had gone 
astray and God sent his only Son to our earthly dwelling to emphasize the centrality of 
justice and divine wisdom; more importantly, Jesus was the embodiment of practical 
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reason and justice.  This form of justice is the foundation on which the Christian world, 
the Roman Empire in this case, moved into subsequent historical moments  (particularly 
as we will see in St. Augustine’s account of justice).  God, and his only Son Jesus, then 
becomes the center of everything, including the conditions of our human community as 
composed by the nation.  Although Lactantius is a follower and student of Cicero, his 
focus is on divine providence; he attempts to “synthesize” religion and philosophy to 
legitimize the role of Christianity in the face of those who were attempting to dismantle it 
(McDonald, 1964, p. xx).   
In the Roman world, membership in the republic also implied allegiance to one’s 
spiritual connection.  “One’s citizenship determined not only the law to which one was 
subject, but also, in part, the god to whom one was bound.  Thus, the grant of Roman 
citizenship to all the empires’ free inhabitants had profound implications for Christians, 
who recognized this intimate connection between cult and citizenship” (Digeser, 2004, 
p.16).  Here, we see the precursor to our modern preoccupation between the concept of 
state and religion, where the two concepts are often linked within the existential-
phenomenological structure of the nation.  Even through Cicero we see the importance of 
acknowledging spiritual guidance, but Lactantius who is writing in the throes of the 
Roman Empire, attempts to revitalize republican thinking using Christianity as its 
lifeblood.  “A return to res publica, then, would – as in Cicero – return the populace to a 
condition of libertas in which deliberative reason could prevail.  Accordingly, even 
polytheists would have their full citizen rights in Lactantius’ res publica” (Digeser, 2004, 
p. 18). When deliberative reason prevails, communal and political participation ensue and 
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a republic, particularly in the Ciceronian sense, becomes the juridical construct where 
common ground is formed.  
Justice, and therefore, public deed, continue to be the centerpiece of social life 
even 300 years after Cicero’s death.  The Christian moment provides Lactantius with the 
tools to suggest modes of living the good life in community with others.  Although much 
less known as his predecessors like Cicero and other contemporaries, Lactantius shows 
how Ciceronian republican thought, and practice to some extent, continued to thrive well 
into the rule of the Roman Empire (Digeser, 2004). 
One hundred years later, St. Augustine, one of the most important figures in 
Christian rhetoric, would emerge to discuss similar issues, enhancing a Christian 
understanding of the foundations for citizen action within a republican context.  
Augustine challenges Cicero’s notion of justice while providing both an expansion and a 
critique of the Roman world (von Heyking, 2001).  Essentially, St. Augustine rejected the 
notion that a true Ciceronian republic could exist for two reasons:  On a basic level, a true 
republic could not have existed without the existence of Christianity, and that the notion 
of a justice held in common was unattainable, because of this lack of Christianity. 
For I intend in the appropriate place, to examine Cicero himself in which…he laid 
down in brief what constitutes a “commonwealth” and what constitutes a 
“community”…I shall do my best to demonstrate the that commonwealth never 
existed, because there never was real justice in the community…But true justice is 
found only in that commonwealth whose found and rule is Christ…we may say 
that at least there is true justice in that City of which the holy Scripture says, 
“Glorious things are said about you, City of God.” (St. Augustine, 1984, p. 75)   
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Christian principles called for a new understanding of shared justice; for Augustine, 
justice was not simply a product of the law, guided by natural law, and reason, but a 
virtue conditioned by the proper ordering of “loves.” Augustine’s access to Christianity 
allows him to create this notion of what our place is in the world and how we must focus 
our attention and love in order to recognize what is deserving of love, and how those 
things are to be loved (Naugle, 1993).  In language of the Greeks, love must be kairotic, a 
fitting response, to all that surrounds us.  Once these loves are “rightly ordered” and 
responsive “kairotically,” happiness and positive conditions of life can be achieved in the 
City of God (Augustine, 1984), and such an order would result in actions of justice that 
create a earthly community of citizens that serves its members.  The greatest “right” love 
is the true love of God.  From that, rightly-ordered earthly love follows.   
But if the Creator is truly loved, that is, if he himself is loved, and not something 
else in his stead, then he cannot be wrongly loved.  We must, in fact, observe the 
right order even in our love for the very love with which we love what is 
deserving of love, so that there may be in us the virtue which is the condition of 
the good life.  Hence, as it seems to me, a brief and true definition of virtue is 
‘rightly ordered love.’ (Augustine, 1984, p. 637)   
Augustine’s understanding of Love expands Cicero’s notion of common justice.  God is 
Love, and without virtuous love that begins in God and is acted out among his earthly 
subjects, can we even achieve the remote possibility of justice and therefore the just 
nation?  Justice is realized in the Heavenly City of God, it is unattainable in any earthly 
city (Gregory, 2008).  Because the ordering of loves is a human choice (Naugle, 1993), 
justice is always in question; the human factor, regardless of law and reason, will always 
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be subjected to the perils of earthly domain, and justice becomes more difficult to attain.  
How could society be bound by an unachievable common justice?  It is Love that takes 
its place, but Love can also be employed wrongly resulting in vice and sin.  The complex 
relationship between love and sin is a human construct, which often results in political 
injustice and the disregard for human dignity.  “…[S]in is a species within [Augustine’s] 
internally diverse conception of love.  Vice always lurks among the virtues. Love, like 
cholesterol, can be healthy or deadly” (Gregory, 2008, p. 33).  Accordingly, it seems that 
Cicero influenced Augustinian thought on a number of levels.  Most importantly, 
Augustine paid much attention to Ciceronian social thought and offered a transformed 
version of Cicero’s res publica, challenging the notion of common justice and assigning 
it to the role of love and choice.   
…[I]f one should say, ‘A people is the association of multitude of rational beings 
united by a common agreement on the objects of their love,’ then it follows that to 
observe the character of a particular people we must examine the objects of its 
love.  And yet, whatever those objects, if it is the association of a multitude not of 
animals but of rational beings, and is united by a common agreement about the 
objects of its love, then there is no absurdity in applying to it the title of a 
‘people’.  And obviously, the better the objects of this agreement, the better the 
people; the worse the objects of this love, the worse the people. (Augustine, 1984, 
p. 890) 
Augustine’s “rightly ordered loves” pervades his analysis of Roman society, 
particularly in terms of Cicero’s understanding of the res publica.  One could argue that if 
Cicero had access to the same Christian theology and philosophy as Augustine, the result 
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may have been very similar.  We see Cicero referring to the gods regularly, an 
otherworldliness that guides reason, law, action and justice.  The a priori understanding 
of the world, on which Augustine builds his monotheistic philosophy and rhetoric, was 
the ground on which Cicero formulated his notion of res publica and the conditions under 
which public virtue and justice emerged.    
Lactantius, who seems to be a direct intellectual descendant of Ciceronian rhetoric 
(MacDonald, 1964; Digeser, 2000), and later Augustine (Eskridge, 1912), are important 
links to Cicero and subsequent moments in which these religious, social and political 
issues are discussed within the context of rhetoric.  Christians and non-Christians alike 
seem to build on Ciceronian thought, particularly when it comes to “communities of 
interest” and the foundations on which communities are “imagined” in the hearts, minds, 
and worlds of its citizens.   
Implications 
 
Cicero’s works on the republic in particular are seminal to our thinking about the 
concepts of nation and nationalism, especially through our rhetorical/communicative 
lens.  Cicero is a frequent reference in terms of political science and rhetoric, but rarely a 
point of reference when thinking about the concepts of nation and nationalism 
themselves.  Like Isocrates, who was coined the Father of Nationalism, Cicero inherited 
the title of Father of his Country precisely because of his work on the republic, the 
rhetorical context he attempted to create for his fellow citizens, and the goals of justice 
and peace he wished to espouse throughout his work.  It is appropriate to explore 
Ciceronian rhetoric particularly when it comes to discussing origins of nation-state theory 
and the concept of the “imagined community” in the context of dialogic theory.  Isocrates 
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and Cicero play a foundational role in the ways they related individuals and communities 
to their larger political and social context through rhetoric, but they also seem to address 
existential-ontological issues as well.  For Cicero, the state offered ground for the 
technical aspects that made the nation possible, as the manifestation of humans living 
together in community—not only a phenomenological entity, but also an epistemological, 
existential, and ontological construct that encouraged dialogue to produce shared 
meaning among publics. 
So, why consider Cicero as an essential antecedent to our thinking about the 
social construct of the nation? Like Isocrates, Cicero attempts to expose a field of 
existence where his fellow citizens can live productively and ethically.  Cicero’s res 
publica is both a practical construct of what happens in society everyday, and a cultural 
manifestation of the historical moment.  Pre-Christian Rome still understood that life was 
subject to the gods, and the state satisfied the need to construct a system that pleased 
them.  The former characteristics of Cicero’s Republic are deeply pragmatic, the latter 
perhaps more controversially idealistic.  However, for the purposes of our inquiry, 
Cicero’s work foregrounds essential issues that situate the idea of the nation throughout 
history framed by a dialogic form of rhetoric.  There is a multitude of scholarship that 
would point us in similar directions to discover various foundations and understandings 
of the nation-state, but a rhetorical/communication perspective of the nation and 
nationalism would not be complete without exploring the foundational work of Cicero.  
Because of his prominent position in Roman society, and his effectiveness and influence 
as a successful orator, Cicero’s ideas have remained a centerpiece of Roman thought, and 
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have been passed down through the centuries to help us understand why the Roman 
Republic is an essential piece of the historical puzzle.  
 From this intellectual lineage we see that Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates and Cicero all 
occupy themselves with timeless questions of human community and the manifestation of 
that community in the formal structure of the state.  Those who are considered to be 
“civic” rhetoricians like Isocrates and Cicero offer a particular perspective of nationalism 
as they not only grapple with the important questions raised by their predecessors, but 
they engage the questions that confront human action, and lead us to not only 
philosophical renderings of the human community and the nation, but also the quotidian 
concerns for citizens and their role in the nation itself.  Nationalism, in this sense, is not 
an emotional sentiment, but rather the apex of Roman pragmatism about how the 
structure of the state is a part of our everyday lives and how it responds to the historical 
moment.  
 As we continue to explore this notion of a contemporary understanding of a 
nation and nationalism, Cicero not only teaches us about the foundations of a formal, 
thriving community, but he directs us to the need to respond to our historical moment by 
constructing entities that constantly refer back to laws of nature and the a priori 
understanding of the world, while rhetorically and dialogically engaging the dialectic 
nature of community in all its complexity.  Cicero’s political and personal demise did not 
allow for the full realization and application of these rich principles in the end, but his 
foundational ideas endure as seminal works when engaging rhetoric, dialogic 
communication and political science.   
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 The next step in this analysis will be to understand the modern conception of the 
nation and the rhetorical interruptions that encouraged a shift in our understanding about 
nation and nationalism from the ancient to the modern.  The Enlightenment provides 
some substantive knowledge about how philosophical thought influenced social and 
political thought, grounding the nation in these ancient principles of the state while 
shifting commonly held notions about how society and communities were structured and 
organized in relation to each other.  Kant, among other notable luminaries, offers the 
groundwork for modern notions of state and nation.  One might argue that the ways in 
which we perceive and communicate the modern shift of the nation from ancient and 
Christian renderings is in fact seismic. 
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Chapter 4 
Modernity’s Rhetorical Shift:  
 
The Enlightenment and Kant’s Philosophical Influence on the Nation 
 
“As the custodian of reason, philosophy conceives modernity as a child of the 
Enlightenment.” (Habermas, 2001, p. 133) 
 “Without Country you have neither name, token, voice, nor rights, no admission as 
brothers into the fellowship of the peoples.  You are the bastards of humanity.” (Mazzini, 
1995, p. 93) 
Thus far we have explored the ancient philosophical and rhetorical antecedents to 
ideas of the nation and how they are a response to both divine law and communal life. 
The nation has endured as a field in which communication organizes social, political and 
economic life simultaneously while serving as the catalyst for the emergence of these 
phenomena.  In this chapter, we will attempt to understand the concept of nation and its 
philosophical underpinnings in the context of modernity, more specifically how Kant’s 
philosophy may have influenced the role and nature of the nation in modernity, and how 
contemporary scholars understand the origin of the nation and nationalism.  We will see 
how certain scholars of nationalism like Kedourie (1993), Gellner (1983; 1994), and 
Smith (1992, 1998, 2008, 2010) interpret the origins of nationalism differently and how 
they contest the concept’s genesis as a result of varying social and communicative 
phenomena. Most importantly, I will explore how these scholars disagree about the role 
of Kant’s philosophical influence on the development of the modern nation.  However, 
before we delve into these conversations about the origin of the nation and the role of 
Kantian philosophy, I will focus on significant philosophical voices like those of Hobbes 
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(1968), Ferguson (1995), Mazzini (1995) and Renan (1995), who have situated the nation 
through particular metaphors that seem to respond to Enlightenment ideals. Furthermore, 
I will continue to keep the notion of “imagined communities” present as a retrodictive 
existential-phenomenological construct for exploring such origins. 
In following with the theme of the nation as a communicative phenomenon, we 
should consider some of the theories that have characterized nation and nationalism as an 
imagined, discursive, existential-phenomenological construct.  Some of the most 
significant works of philosophy, politics, art, music and science throughout history have 
emerged out of a commitment to (or one’s displeasure with) one’s nation-state: 
“Nationalism has emotional power because it makes us who we are, because it inspires 
artists and composers, because it gives us a link with history (and thus with immortality)” 
(Calhoun, 1997, p. 2). The power of the nation has moved individuals and groups to some 
of the most enduring thoughts and actions throughout history.  Nevertheless, nationalism 
seems to be engrained as an unreflective act in the everyday, or what Billig (1995) coins 
as “banal nationalism:” a nationalism that is subtly influential through the everyday 
nationalistic symbolic messages that reinforce our commitment to our nation and 
everything for which it stands (i.e. the pledge of recited in U.S. schools each day, or a 
nation’s flag passively displayed in a corporation’s lobby) (p. 6).  “Daily, the nation is 
indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry.  Nationalism, far from being an 
intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition” (Billig, 1995, p. 6).  
The question is: What are some of the philosophical and historical indicators that have 
formed our modern unreflective understanding of the nation and how has this unreflective 
understanding influenced us to communicate the concept so forcefully (through 
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diplomacy and war), and how has it shaped the ways in which we communicate socially 
and interpersonally on a daily basis?  
Through our previous analysis, we can see nationalistic tendencies manifest as 
early as the Ancient World in understanding conflicts between the Hellenistic “nation” 
and Persia or even within the Roman Empire, but some scholars believe our 
contemporary understanding of nations and nationalism emerge as a result of the 
Enlightenment, when the “rational man” was encouraged to seek other forms of identity 
outside of the realm of religion and dynastic realms (Anderson, 2006; Calhoun, 1997).   
Marx, in particular, has influenced our analysis of the modern nation-state, but countless 
scholars, politicians and social commentators have contributed to a robust conversation 
about what national identity and the “imagined” nation mean throughout history.  Before 
we embark on a journey to understand the modern shift to our current understanding of 
the nation, it is important to understand how current renderings of the nation have been 
explained from those thoroughly engaging it.  We see that “space” articulated by the 
ancients and pre-modern thinkers persists but takes on a new character that seems to 
recenter human epistemology, sentiment and emotion.  The existential-phenomenological 
home becomes apparent.  
Modern Metaphors of the Nation 
Hobbes’ Leviathan (1968) set the stage for these conversations about the interplay 
of social consciousness and the formation of the nation.   Functioning from a mechanistic 
approach, which favored a sovereign form of governmental control, Hobbes established 
the foundations from which community and civil society emerge, but are eventually 
subsumed into the monolith of the nation, or what he coined the Leviathan.  Individuals 
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within society agree to a Covenant — a social contract, a central guiding principle, which 
allows them to function under the rule of government and therefore live under protection 
and well-organized systems. 
This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is real Unitie of them all, in one and the 
same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as 
if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of 
Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, 
that thou give up thy right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.  
This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a Common-Wealth, in 
latine Civitas.  This is the Generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak 
more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, 
our peace and defence. (Hobbes, 1968, p. 227)   
One interpretation of Hobbes, however, is that society is in constant tension between 
individual sacrifice and community; he conceives everything in conflict to be a result of 
competition, but to limit competition we sign a social contract with the sovereign 
government because in the long term it benefits our own self- interests (Hobbes, 1968).  
Atack (2012) tells us the in Hobbes’ Leviathan the social contract is derived through 
individuals relinquishing their individual rights and forming a collective for the good of 
the state; this “real unity” grants the states its ultimate sovereignty and power (pp. 42-43). 
Hobbes’ construct is an interesting contrast to the various “spiritual” conceptions 
of nationalism offered by scholars such as Eliade (1959) and Mazzini (1995), yet 
continues to follow the Ciceronian view of natural law, to some extent.  For Hobbes, the 
nation-state is an artificial manifestation of natural occurrences.   “For by Art is created 
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the great Leviathan called the Commonwealth, or State, (in latine Civitas) which is but 
Artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Natural, for whose 
protection and defense it was intended, and in which the Sovereignty is the Artificial 
Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body….” (Hobbes, 1968, p. 81).   His 
mechanistic viewpoint offers a discrete sense of nation building while emphasizing the 
need for individual action within civil society.  Again, we see nation advanced as an 
“artificial,” or man-made manifestation of natural law.  In Hobbes’ analysis, then, the 
machinations of the Leviathan thus create a powerful structure under which we not only 
agree to function, but under which we wrap our allegiances and identities.  Not only is the 
nation an influential spiritual occurrence, it is an effective mechanical social structure 
that literally transmutes these natural occurrences into concrete, tangible events that help 
us make sense of the world around us.   As we will see, Hobbesian thought is not only 
influenced by ancient philosophy but it seems to be a precursor to the influential 
Enlightenment/Industrial political thought, perhaps influencing the nation-state and its 
organizing power in modernity (Pagden, 2013).  
Similarly, Adam Ferguson (1995) recognizes the power of individual action 
within society while engaging the Aristotelian inclination toward communal life. Unlike 
Hobbes, Ferguson’s civil society does not embody a unidirectional construct that requires 
us to surrender our individual self-determination in such a dramatic manner.  He views 
this naturally occurring phenomenon of human interaction in the form of civil society 
where men band together to function in societal context, but not necessarily within a 
national structure per se.  Ferguson’s concept of civil society seems to extend itself to our 
modern conception of the nation as he recognizes why the rational man joins together to 
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respond to social forces: “The state of nature is a state of war or of amity, and men are 
made to unite from a principle of affection, or from a principle of fear, as if most suitable 
to the system of different writers” (Ferguson, 1995, p. 21).  Through our contemporary 
understanding, we view the nation as the structure under which we come together to ward 
off threat or welcome accord. For Ferguson, civil society is a necessary foundation for 
national thought, but civil society can exist without the nation. For Hobbes, there is no 
distinction between the state and civil society (Pagdon, 2013); civil exists for the nation 
and the nation eventually subsumes and consequentially transforms civil society. This is 
an important contrast for the purpose of our study since the concept of civil society seems 
to speak directly to the issue of nationalism in the context of postmodernity.  Although 
civil society and nations are products of Enlightenment thought and a modern move 
toward social organization, civil society’s diverse and less formally organized character 
tends to reflect the multiplicity and fluidity of postmodern thought — that is, “Pluralism 
and polycentricity are the hallmarks of civil society…[C]ivil society is fairly well 
synonymous with what Cicero would have called res publica, i.e. a free society in its 
entirety, or again, a society organized in a particular way, viz., in away designed to 
promote the freedom of all its members” (Madison, 2001, p. 220).   Given this discussion, 
it is important to acknowledge that civil society is an inherently rhetorical phenomenon 
(Hauser & Grim, 2004, p. 9). In civil society, individual interests often will diverge and 
conflict, but it can also serve as a communicative space for productive discourse and 
eventual mutual cooperation (Hauser & Grim, 2004).  Such a characterization of civil 
society helps us see its relevance and applicability for contemporary understandings of 
the nation and its constitutive role for the construction of political, economic, social and 
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cultural spaces.  It has also been seen as yet another indication of the transitional moment 
of the modern nation-state within an international context, or what I characterize as 
postmodern nationalism (Bell, 1989).   
Nineteenth century political theorist Ernest Renan (1995) attempts to define the 
essence of a nation as an imagined, existential-phenomenological entity. Although he 
recognizes the human tendency to accept race, language, religion, community and 
geography as essential factors in national formation, he ultimately rejects them, leaving 
us to find other reasons for the emergence of national sentiment.  He concludes that a 
nation is, in fact, the culmination of collective memory (or lack thereof) and moral 
consciousness.  Renan offers a substantive approach to nationalistic origins and 
encourages us to ponder why a nation is ultimately a powerful phenomenon on which we 
structure our thoughts and actions as political and cultural beings.  
The nation is a soul, a spiritual principle.  Two things, which are really only one, 
go to make up this soul or spiritual principle.  One of these things lies in the past, 
the other in the present.  The one is the possession in common of a heritage of 
memories; and the other is actual agreement, the desire to live together, and the 
will to continue to make the most of the joint inheritance. (Renan, 1995, p. 153)  
By shunning the “transcendentalists” he refuses to accept the amorphous, ungrounded 
nature of national thought, but rather sees that spiritual, moral consciousness legitimizes 
the very existence of nations.  For Renan, nations are organic entities always subject to 
change and transformation, according to the moral collective consciousness of a 
community of memory.  In short, memories are steeped in historicity (Arnett & Arneson, 
1999) and play a rhetorical role in how a national consciousness plays out at any point in 
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time.  Most importantly, Renan agrees with Kantian analyses, as we will see later, as he 
advocates that a uniform global political structure would ultimately result in despotism, 
and that the natural state of the world should be organized into national entities that 
regulate the ways in which we structure moral consciousness and interact with the Other. 
Renan’s use of collective memory (or better stated, a collective amnesia) within a 
spiritual framework also strongly suggests an existential-phenomenological approach to 
analyzing national structures. “To forget and —I will venture to say—to get one’s history 
wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation; and thus the advance of historical 
studies is often a danger to nationality…Now it is the essence of a nation that all 
individuals should have much in common, and further that they should all have forgotten 
much” (Renan, 1995, p. 145).  Here, Renan espouses that nations are collectively formed 
around common goals and aspirations; the less fragmentation within a society the more of 
a potential for a cohesive nation.  To challenge Renan, however, it is difficult to say that 
citizens are not products of their history; rather, a nation is composed of citizens who are 
in fact products of their unreflective history. Most citizens may be aware of their historic 
past, but do not actively reflect on their historic origins; their common belief in the 
unspoken philosophical foundations and principles join them together in a national 
collective; in addition to Renan, Billig’s (1995) and Deutsch (1966) have commented on 
similar issues of the lack of conscious reflection about the nation.  Again, Renan’s focus 
on consciousness and shared experience is at the core of his understanding:  “That moral 
consciousness which we call a nation is created by a great assemblage of men with warm 
hearts and healthy minds: And as long as this moral consciousness can prove its strength 
by the sacrifices demanded from the individual for the benefit of the community, it is 
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justifiable and has the right to exist” (Renan, 1995, p. 154).  These philosophical 
foundations of a nation do not emerge from a vacuum, but are rather steeped deeply 
within unquestioned meaning and existence.  It seems that nations are direct results of 
history, but more importantly, well-orchestrated systems of unreflective collective belief.    
From a similar perspective, nations are a form of “sacred space” protected by a moral 
consciousness at a particular historical moment (Eliade, 1959).  The issue, however, is 
how and why this concept of such sacred space is so resistant to the change of which 
Renan speaks.  Collective memory seems to be an essential force behind this seemingly 
impermeable sacred space.   
As Tuan (1977) explains, one’s homeland is often viewed as the center of one’s 
cosmos. All life and activity originate from this point of reference while all else extends 
from this point.  “The stars are perceived to move around one’s abode; home is the focal 
point of one’s cosmic structure…Should destruction occur we may reasonably conclude 
that the people would be thoroughly demoralized, since the ruin of their settlement 
implies the ruin of their cosmos” (p.149).  He insists however, that this type of place is 
not based on place itself but on human beings who are literally at the center, and can 
easily move this “anthropomorphic center” to another place to become the center of their 
cosmos (p. 150).  Tuan believes that the power of such a place is enacted by religion “the 
guarding spirits and gods” and the beliefs, commitment and memory that these belief 
systems invoke in its human subjects (1977).  Memory is an essential element when 
comprehending the power of place phenomenologically (Tuan, 1977). 
Although Eliade’s (1959) use of sacred space was originally appropriated for 
religious contexts, we could apply such a concept to nationalism theory as the nation 
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flourished when religious life became more and more divorced from the public realm and 
encouraged the public to seek alternative belief systems that could provide an existential- 
phenomenological “home.”  Eliade’s concept of sacred space has also been employed by 
scholars such as Jacobsen (1996) to discuss the idea of a nation’s impenetrable borders as 
a result of immigration policy.  The power of the nation can have such a profound effect 
on the way people think about themselves as individuals and within groups in relation to 
others that it creates what can only be understood as sacred demarcations.  For Eliade 
(1959), we must exist in something, and “it is for that reason that religious man has 
always sought to fix his abode at the ‘center of the world.’ If the world is to be lived in, it 
must be founded – and no world can come to birth in the chaos of the homogeneity and 
relativity of profane space.  The discovery or projection of a fixed point—a center—is 
equivalent to the creation of the world” (p. 22). Even within extreme cultural variation, 
like the Ancients, Eliade finds that we always tend to situate our world “at the center” (p. 
42). 
Although modernist in his approach given his orientation toward a universalist, 
centrifugal mode of thinking, Eliade’s (1959) metaphor is helpful when thinking about 
the structuration of the nation as an abode for humanity.  As we join together in 
community, “settling in a territory is equivalent to founding a world” (p. 47).  Eliade’s 
analysis is certainly applicable to the concept of the nation as he creates substantive 
philosophical ground for an ontological space that ultimately emerges from a “center.”  
Although the creation of a “center” is the work of the gods, it lives in human beings 
through religion, politics, communication, in the lived experience of the church, temple 
or mosque, local communities and neighborhoods, and the nation-state.  The notion that 
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we are communal creatures who live in space and time is essential for understanding the 
powerful, often readily accepted idea of the nation. Human interaction converts such 
places into spaces (Appadurai, 1996; Tuan, 1977).  However, I would advance that 
understanding the nation as a product of centripetal thinking leads us to engage 
nationalism as unreflective quotidian experience that forms our social, cultural and 
economic consciousness and eventually encourages us to behave and interact with the 
Other in particular ways (Billig, 1995). 
This idea of this existential-phenomenological center, a centrifugal force, is 
reiterated in the work of notable historical figures such as Giuseppe Mazzini, a prominent 
figure in the reunification (il Risorgimento) of Italy in the 19th century.  He underscores 
this idea when attempting to convince the Italian citizen-to-be that the nation is a human 
necessity as it provides the political, cultural and economic space that individuals, a 
province, or the world cannot provide on their own (Mazzini, 1995).  Mazzini makes the 
case for a societal shift in order to cure the ills of the discontent (the provincial 
fragmentation of Italy) and by improving the well-being of others by uniting the nation of 
Italy from its many provinces—remnants of the medieval city-state structure.  Mazzini is 
attempting to uncover social structures that can educate and protect all citizens, and 
which can assist them in resolving conflicts and misunderstanding.  Most importantly, 
however, he defines the nation as a conglomeration of duties that ultimately serve the 
greater good.  The nation acts as a practical and unencumbered entity that allows us to act 
responsibly and serve our fellow countrymen and humanity in general.  It is our duty to 
serve humanity, which prepares us for God.  “We seek the reign of God upon earth as in 
heaven, or better, that the earth shall be a preparation for heaven, and society an endeavor 
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towards a progressive approach to the Divine idea” (Mazzini, 1995, p. 91).  The nation is 
the philosophical and practical space in which individuals perform duties and leads them 
to the Absolute.   
It seems then that, for Mazzini, the nation is a mechanism that can help 
individuals negotiate the larger issues of the world—it is neither too close to us nor is it 
too far from us, but rather attainable and accessible.  Mazzini thinks of Country as an 
organizing principle that can help men carry out their duties and contribute to 
Humanity—God is too vast and the individual is too small, but a nation can liaise 
between the two and relieve some the tension that exists within the vastness of Humanity 
(Mazzini, 1995).  
The individual is too weak, and Humanity too vast.  My God, prays the Breton 
mariner as he puts out to sea, protect me, my ship is so little, and Thy ocean so 
great! As this prayer sums up the condition of each of you, if no means if found of 
multiplying your forces and your powers of action indefinitely.  But God gave 
you this means when he gave you a Country, when, like a wiser overseer of 
labour, who distributes the different parts of the work according to the capacity of 
the workmen, he divided Humanity into distinct groups upon the face of our 
globe, and thus planted the seeds of nations. (Mazzini, 1995, p. 92)  
Thus, we may be existentially lost if it were not for the safe abode of the nation.  Nations 
remedy the discomfort and confusion that ensue in a complex world; they provide a home 
and fulfill a particular function in the larger context of social relations.  
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For Mazzini, it is the Italian citizen’s moral duty to support the idea of one single 
nation that could protect and provide for the Italian people; to suggest otherwise would be 
detrimental to a people seeking political identity in the contemporary world.  Culture, 
along with more tangible demarcations of geography and language, is the driving force 
that brings a people together, but ultimately for Mazzini they are not enough; the 
pragmatic structure of the nation will satisfy this higher need (Mazzini, 1995). 
“Il Risorgimento” is an example of how cultural, linguistic and social forces 
contribute to the manifestation of not only a physical national space, but also to a national 
identity. Mazzini (and Renan, for that matter) is influenced by Cicero’s notion of the res 
publica, as nationalism is based on human action, which offers us the possibility of 
citizenship—a sense of belonging to a structure that serves us as long as we agree to 
serve.   In a Ciceronian sense, Mazzini believes that fulfilling our duties to society retains 
our rights as citizens; these rights are enclosed within the protection of the nation 
(Mazzini, 1995).   Just as the United States Constitution ensures “inalienable rights and 
the pursuit of happiness” within its political boundaries, Mazzini asserts that citizens’ 
rights are protected by the nation.   
Through this metaphor of moral duty, Mazzini sees a co-dependent relationship 
between the nation and its citizens; we must actively contribute and perform our “duties” 
as citizens in order to form our nation and for the nation to reciprocate and provide its 
protections and political stability. “Without Country you have neither name, token, voice, 
nor rights, no admission into the fellowship of the Peoples.  You are the bastards of 
Humanity” (Mazzini, 1995, p.93).   Mazzini’s approach to nationalism is steeped in 
rhetorical principles; word is transformed into action, and the rhetorical, imaginative 
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construct of the nation is formed through citizenship and duty, while the imaginative 
construct informs duty.  Nationalism is the spiritual, existential-phenomenological 
experience that others emphasize, but is impossible without men taking definitive 
collective action toward a common good.  The good, which points us to God and 
Humanity, exists in the Nation.  “A Country is a fellowship of free and equal men bound 
together in a brotherly concord of labor towards a single end.  You must make it and 
maintain it such.  A Country is not an aggregation, it is an association” (Mazzini, 1995, 
p.95).  Mazzini, however, sought to accomplish this duty through “brute force” (Mazzini, 
1995, p. 89) to form a united Italy that would respond to the nationalistic needs at the 
forefront, but this force would not be made possible without the rhetorical context that 
was formed by Mazzini and his colleagues, Garibaldi and Cavour.   
Isocratic and Ciceronian concepts of “center” and natural law seem to influence 
the conservative approach to understanding the nation as an existential-phenomenological 
construct emerging from a particular “center,” as mentioned in the first chapters of this 
project.  In other words, the existential-phenomenological manifestation of the nation is 
made possible through functional a priori characteristics that provide the necessary 
guidance for the creation of a nation through history, culture (paideia), and the marriage 
of the two.   Again, we see how ancient social and political thought provided a solid 
foundation, and even a point of reference, for other concepts that would emerge during 
subsequent periods of history, particularly as it pertains to ideas of social contracts and 
the construction of civil society. 
Although these are just a few characterizations of the idea of a nation, they 
represent a significant recurring theme throughout various historical moments.  So, why 
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does Anderson view nationalism as loosely defined, lacking adequate philosophical 
ground if we can point to these various thinkers and philosophies when discussing 
nationalism and the nation-state both in antiquity and in modernity?  Perhaps it is the 
inherent dialectical tension and overarching competing narratives that exist within the 
concept itself.  As we see, many argue that we need nations to organize our cultures and 
politics, provide a space for our collective memories, create a sense of place and 
belonging, and offer space to imagine particular metanarratives: the important 
communicative concept that there exists an overarching story, wrought with complexity 
and nuance, that guides our social, political, economic and personal lives (Arnett and 
Arneson, 1999), but at the expense of misinterpreting and misunderstanding a larger, 
more complex world.   
Modernity as a Centripetal Force 
All of these ideas continue to point to the idea that nations are products of human 
communication and the nation acts as a persuasive mechanism for providing an 
existential-phenomenological home and identity for its members who create contracts 
with the nation to serve in return for protection and solace.  In our contemporary world, 
we are often perplexed by individuals who seem to lack real or imagined citizenship — 
those who lack a home, or through Arnett’s (1994) concept, are “existentially homeless.” 
Deutsch (1969) alludes to the powerful rhetorical manifestation of nationality as the 
following:  
The nationalist… is a person dedicated to his own nation. He devotes most of his 
attention to it and gives preference to his countrymen.  He is afraid of the rest of 
the world because his early experience taught him that the rest of the world is 
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uncertain, dangerous, and rather incomprehensible.  He fears his environment, and 
he fears the foreigner; his attention and preference are centered on the in-group as 
if he is an intense nationalist, he’s often using his ability to perceive the outside 
world at the same time that he zealously strives to promote national power.  If he 
has his way, his nation ends up resembling the nightmare of the Detroit 
automobile designer: a car with an even more powerful engine than ever and a 
shrinking windshield guided by even weaker headlights.  It would be an excellent 
design for committing individual or national suicide. (p. 32) 
Deutsch (1969) presents us with an important paradox: the tension between the positive 
organizing power of the nation and the unfortunate narrowing phenomenon of what 
nationalism can do to the human mind and, ultimately, community.  Although a nation 
fulfills a variety of human needs, from the physical to the emotional, and provides us 
with the practical services that make everyday life more navigable and secure such as the 
economic, legal, juridical, and cultural, it may come at the cost of isolationism and a 
failure to understand the needs of our neighbors or those who are not “native” to our 
nations (p. 33).  
Buber (2005), in his contributions to the Jewish-Palestinian problem, espouses 
this idea almost 50 years earlier. Buber, like many of these aforementioned scholars, 
views nationalism as a necessary spiritual force that organizes and gives credence to 
certain political goals; however, he sees a strong human tendency for the 
misappropriation of such powerful ideas.  Nationalism does not mean that individuals and 
society as a whole must only look within for answers; instead, the nationalism that 
actually creates the possibility of difference based on physical borders and human 
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sentiment concomitantly allows us to exist in a world of discrete difference.  We must 
gaze within to see clearly beyond the confines of our existential-phenomenological home, 
but we should not remain only within.  An isolated form of nationalism only results in 
what Buber calls “false nationalism” and misleading ideologies (Buber, 2005, p. 52).  We 
will explore the tenets for Buber’s philosophical contributions to ideas of nation in more 
detail later. 
Many of the aforementioned conceptions of the nation are often considered to be 
direct descendants of Enlightenment thinking, led by Kantian philosophy, as Kant’s 
system is often viewed as the basis for modern understandings of nation and nationalism 
(Kedourie, 1993).  However, given our discussion of Isocrates and Cicero, it is clear to 
see how their philosophical systems guided by concepts of culture, common center, 
natural law and rationality all contribute to understanding the nation as an organizing 
structure that provides a common point of reference for complex social phenomena.  So 
important is Kantian thought that influential scholars such as Kedourie (1993) believe 
that it provided ground for national movements such as the French Revolution and Italian 
Reunification.  The remainder of this chapter will explore the influence of Kant’s 
philosophy on the aforementioned philosophers, and the scholarly conversation that has 
emerged around understandings of nationalism in modernity. 
The Enlightenment: Kant’s Contribution to the Idea of Nation 
In the spirit of this project, I have attempted to show various salient historical 
moments in which nationalism was at the center of the metanarrative and how a 
rhetorical, existential-phenomenological focus can help us unravel the challenges and 
issues connected to ideas of nation and nationalism.  Enter Kant.  Kedourie (1993) 
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contends that political events as well as philosophical thought during the Enlightenment 
were transforming the idea of the nation, as both had a great effect on the political, social 
and economic structure of the world as we understand it today.  Kantian philosophy 
provides a significant rhetorical interruption in the way that the world has thought about 
several epistemological questions, including those of national structures (Kedourie, 
1993).  Kant becomes a central figure in the conversation about nationalism because of 
the manner in which he views the existence of natural law, human liberty and their affect 
on human society.  Kant essentially disagrees with Luther in that morality must originate 
from God, because a focus on morality and freedom from God would not afford us true 
freedom.  For Kant, the individual, under guidance from God, was at the center of power 
and determination — a major shift away from the faithful stance of Martin Luther and 
Augustine centuries before. 
For Kant, the categorical imperative, obedience to which makes us free, is not a 
divine command.  It is a command which wells up within the soul, freely 
recognized and freely accepted.  Just as the natural world cannot be the source of 
moral value, so neither can the will of God.  If the will of God is the ground of the 
categorical imperative, the man’s actions are dictated by an external command, 
freedom disappears, and morality becomes meaningless. This then is Kant’s ‘new 
formula’ that the good will, which is the free will, is also the autonomous will.  
...For Kant’s doctrine makes the individual, in a way never envisaged by the 
French Revolutionaries or their intellectual precursors, the very center, the arbiter, 
the sovereign of the universe. (Kedourie, 1993, pp. 16-17) 
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Thus, the shift occurs, and Kant’s rhetorical stance more than ever affects the ways in 
which society, and national structures, are formed, maintained and contested.  Kant’s 
understanding that human morality originates within the individual is then translated into 
the national context.  A nation is a collection of individual wills where the love of nation 
resides in the souls of those individuals; it is not an external political entity that imposes 
itself upon its citizens.  As we will see throughout his seminal works, Kant’s system is 
primarily based upon individual liberty, morality and pure reason; these all work together 
to ensure one’s freedom in the context of the political formation of the nation. Kant’s 
system of political morality plants the seeds for various post-Kantian Enlightenment 
thinkers who cultivate these seeds to define the nation and nationalism as we mostly 
understand it today.  
To dissect Kant’s understanding of the nation and the modern Enlightenment 
foundations of the nation-state and nationalism, we will focus on three essential Kantian 
texts as they refer to individual freedom, the individual’s situatedness in the nation, and 
the moral system that ultimately forms the idea of a nation: Lectures on Ethics (1775-80), 
the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and Perpetual Peace (1795). We will deal with these 
texts chronologically as they might offer a glimpse into the intellectual progression of 
Kant’s arguments as they pertain to the impetus and structure of the nation-state. 
Lectures on Ethics.  Very early in his Ethics, Kant justifies the existence of the 
state and the presence of the individual within the state.  He states that ethics based on 
“outer grounds” rests on two elements: education and government (Kant, 1963, p. 12).  
As two very essential components of nation, his system of ethics is already guided by 
principles that emerge from the nation.  For Kant, ethics is the pinnacle of practical 
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philosophy, which is lived out in communal structures.  However, Kant’s most notable 
concept of the “categorical imperative” shapes the ways in which philosophers and 
statesmen start to reconceptualize contemporary iterations of nation.  Kedourie (1993) 
credits modern Enlightenment ideals of the nation to Kant, with the categorical 
imperative as its foundation.  Philosophy played a powerful role on the political events of 
the time, influencing the transformation of nations through the social, political and 
economic structures that legitimized them. Kant plays a central role in understanding not 
only important political and social structures, but also the essential role of the individual 
within these particular structures.  Within Kantian ideals, individuals play a pivotal role 
in the way their societies are structured. Free will and self-determination become the 
central elements for the ways in which individuals influence the direction of the state, 
which in turn, provide an organizing social structure for the way they live.   
The free man asserts himself against the world; by the strength of his soul he 
bends it to his will, for conviction can move mountains; and his head is bloody 
but unbowed.  The characteristic euphory is the product of self-determination… 
Nationalism, which is itself, as will be seen, largely a doctrine of national self-
determination, found here the great source of its vitality, and it has therefore been 
necessary to examine how self-determination came to have this central 
importance in ethical and political teachings. (Kedourie, 1993, p.23) 
Kant’s practical philosophy and system of ethics provides the basis for free will and self-
determination.  Morality does not rest with God, nor is it God’s responsibility; rather, it 
rests with the individual and how that individual chooses to engage the a priori guidance 
God has provided to him.  “Principum morale est intellectual internum” – basic moral 
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principles are products of internal intellectual morality (Kant 1963, p. 14); however, these 
internal intellectual principles are guided by universal, natural laws handed down by God.  
When individual morality and the universal a priori come into harmony with each other, 
human morality is at its zenith and works toward a universal good.  Reminiscent of 
Cicero’s conception of natural law and human law, Kant argues that ethics must 
harmonize with the Divine in order to reach the highest law and morality.  “It is only in 
the observance of the divine laws that ethics and law coincide.  Insofar as God is 
concerned both are compulsory; for God can compel us to ethical as well as logical 
action, but He demands that we should act not from compulsion but from duty…A moral 
law states categorically what ought to be done, whether it pleases us or not; its origins, 
therefore, are purely within how humans choose to interpret and act on divine guidance” 
(Kant pp. 35-37).  Moral law is not a product of interpretation, rather a product of free 
will that is enacted regardless of the end (Kant, 1963).   
 This argument in particular is very important as it contests Hume’s notion of 
ethics and human behavior purely as a product of experience and sensation.  Kant 
believes that the categorical nature of moral law cannot be a result of experience, but 
rather originates in an intellectual a priori approach, which is universal to all humanity 
(Kant, 1963). “Thou shall not kill” is not based on experience, the law exists as an a 
priori imperative designed by the Divine. In the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume 
intricately dissects human nature by attempting to understand how humans make 
decisions and come to particular conclusions regarding human experience, behavior and 
choices.  Hume and Kant are at odds regarding the origin of moral law and the ways in 
which we, as its human actors, arrive at certain conclusions.  Hume states,  
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Most of the philosophers of antiquity, who treated of human nature, have shewn 
more of a delicacy of sentiment, a just sense of morals, or a greatness of soul, than 
a depth of reasoning and reflection. They content themselves with representing the 
common sense of mankind in the strongest of lights, and with the best turn of 
thought and expression, without following out the chain of propositions, or form 
the several truths into a regular science.  But ‘tis at least worth while to try if the 
science of man will not admit of the same accuracy which several part of natural 
philosophy are found susceptible of…The sole end of logic is to explain the 
principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; 
morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as 
united in society, and dependent on each other. (Hume, 2000, p. 407) 
Kant contests this notion; he states that moral law is not a “feeling” and could never be 
based only on intellect and sensation; rather, it is categorical and precise (Kant, 1963).  
“The ethical principle is, therefore, sheerly intellectual principle of the pure reason” 
(Kant, 1963, p. 39). Theories of modern nationalism as advanced by scholars such as 
Kedourie (1980; 1993) and Gellner (1983; 1994) also diverge according to the Kantian 
and Humean schools of thought, which we will explore more in depth later.  Although we 
must acknowledge this intellectual lineage and rhetorical dialectic in order to understand 
the concept of nationalism in modernity, this project focuses more directly on Kantian 
ideals of nation for two reasons:  Its affinity to ancient ideals of natural law, pure reason 
and human action as well as the genesis of discourse about cosmopolitanism, which leads 
us through our conversation of the nation in modernity and postmodernity. 
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 In sum, Kant’s Ethics provides ground from which we can begin to understand the 
modern version of the nation and our contemporary understanding of how nation and 
nationalism are structured today.  However, before we move into further explanations of 
nationalism in modernity, we must consider Kant’s philosophy in the context of his other 
works that paved the way for modern nationalism emerging out of ideals of free will and 
self-determination.   
Critique of Pure Reason.  Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1990) begins to establish 
the principles set forth in his Lectures on Ethics.  Similar to his system of ethics and 
morality, Kant places humanity, as opposed to an external rational order that was very 
much advanced by proponents of the Enlightenment, at the center of his philosophy.  He 
elevated the need for transcendental idealism and metaphysics at a time when the real 
physical world was considered the only proof of humanity and existence, and develops an 
alternative theory beyond the readily accepted theories of rationalism, empiricism and 
pure transcendentalism.   Such an approach seemed to affect the ways in which we think 
about communicative action within the nation and it philosophical foundations into 
modernity. 
Kant’s argument centers on the question of how we come to understand the world.  Is 
the world revealed through our experiences alone or does the world have the potential to 
reveal itself to us?  Although Kant attempts to construct a theory that argues against pure 
empiricism, where experience is central to understanding our world, he accepts its place 
and power in human epistemology.  However, he also wants to advance the importance of 
understanding the need for a priori knowledge that comes to us through concepts that are 
outside of our experience – space and time.  His modern a priori approach favors the 
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metaphysical realm where first theoretical principles often trump the physical world and 
position knowledge outside of experience.  Through such an approach Kant is able to 
raise such an ideal of the transcendental a priori to a universal principle that governs 
human epistemology.   
There is no way than through intuition or conceptions, as such; and these are 
given either an a priori or a posteriori.  The latter, namely, empirical conceptions, 
together with the empirical intuition on which they are founded, cannot afford any 
synthetical proposition, except such as it itself also empirical, that is a proposition 
of experience.  But an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities of 
necessity and absolute universality, which, nevertheless, are the characteristics of 
all geometrical propositions.  As to the first and only means to arrive at such 
cognitions, namely, through mere conceptions or intuitions a priori, it is quite 
clear that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical 
ones can be obtained. (Kant, 1990, p.18)   
Again, Kant responds to Hume’s (2000) experiential, cause-effect claim that all 
knowledge derives from experience.  Kant, instead, seeks to raise our awareness 
regarding existence and that experience rather conforms to knowledge.  In the end, Kant 
attempts to challenge the close-ended Empiricists (such as Hume and Locke) and tempers 
the scientific revolution from completely disregarding God, Pure Reason and the 
Transcendental Ideal.  He restores the universal “a priori” during the Enlightenment when 
experience ruled supreme.  Ultimately, his solution lies in the ancient Greek ideal, 
phronesis or practical reason, where human liberty, God and immortality exist 
concurrently.  By searching for a bond between earthly materialism and idealism, Kant 
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engages in a praxis that allows us to transcend and understand the a priori.  Kant forces us 
to consider alternatives to human understanding and makes us realize that morality comes 
through not only theory or practice, but rather a powerful union of the two: praxis.  As a 
descendant of Greek and Roman ideals, morality is embodied in practical reason.   
Although Kant claims to explore another alternative to traditional approaches, he still 
must rely on those existing claims to build his argument.  Kant ends up relying on a 
Platonic universal a priori to structure his claims for transcendental idealism, which does 
not necessarily offer us a new alternative to understand human knowledge and 
experience. Kant allowed the debate of experience and reason over universal a priori to 
continue into modernity and create formidable ground for a justification of 
communication and rhetoric as useful methods of understanding our world, and for the 
sake of our argument, the ways in which we structure society and the contexts in which 
we organize our lives, most notably the nation in political, economic and cultural 
contexts.   
Kant is an essential figure in helping us understand the continuing arguments about 
human knowledge and whether it originates in experience, the scientific methods, and 
empiricism or if they it resides in a larger Truth that is lived through practical reason.  
First and foremost, however, is Kant’s emphasis on praxis and how we can use theory 
together with practice to create substantive and realistic versions of life.  The 
quintessential embodiment of this praxis is experienced in our social lives, which are 
governed by the nation-state—the political structure that dictates laws, justice, economy, 
and communication.  
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Kedourie explains that Kant, particularly in the Critique of Pure Reason, sought a 
solution to the problem of empiricism and morality.  This reasoning eventually led to an 
understanding of the roots of free will and subsequently the role of self-determination in 
communal life.  Universal laws derived from a priori are then found within human nature, 
not solely through experience and appearances.  Man is free when he is guided by 
internal a priori, moral laws and not by external, a posteriori experience; by moving 
inward Man is free and, therefore, virtuous (Kedourie, 1993, p. 15).  
The conception of morality and free will places the individual at the center of the 
narrative that unfolds in communal life.  Individuals are empowered through universal a 
priori guidance who allow them freedom and the ability to act morally and good.  This 
autonomy leads to self-determination, and for Kant, “Self-determination thus becomes 
the supreme political good” (Kedourie, 1993, p. 22).   Kedourie (1993) attributes the 
strong, deterministic political movements that formed the states of the modern era, such 
as the French Revolutionaries and the leaders of Italian Reunification, to this form of 
self-determination derived from Kant’s system of ethics and morality.  “…[T]he 
influence of Kant’s thought was decisive; the solutions he provided for the problems of 
philosophy, and the difficulties which these solutions raised in turn, left a lasting, 
unmistakable imprint of subsequent speculation” (Kedourie, 1993, p. 24).  Thus, for 
some, Kant is credited with transforming the structure of modern thinking in a way that 
empowers individuals to follow certain “pure” principles while exercising their rights to 
freedom and the ability to organize their public lives in the ways in which benefitted 
them the most.  
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Although Kant does not directly address concerns for the structure of the nation, 
his philosophy and defense of pure reason in the face of pure empiricism leads the way to 
thinking about how humans choose to organize themselves in society.  Pure reason led to 
a morality that afforded individuals the autonomy to choose what was appropriate and 
beneficial to all.  Later, Kant begins to discuss his vision of a world that would be 
rendered as possibly one of the first defenses of a cosmopolitan world.  Perhaps Kant 
began to see both the possibilities and limitations of a world comprised of self-
determined individuals in need of narrow communal structures. 
Perpetual Peace.  If individuals are free to determine their destiny, and this 
destiny can be realized within the structure of the state, then it would align that this 
“state” could include everyone that strives for this existence.  In other words, for Kant 
(2003), peace is realized in a cosmo-political version of divided states.  I refer to this 
concept as hyphenated for the very reason that we must heed the rhetorical influence of 
both the cosmopolitan nature of society while bracketing the need for understanding the 
political as a separate but related concept.  Although the origin of “cosmopolitan” derives 
from the terms “cosmos” and “polis,” their meanings are frequently disguised in this oft-
misunderstood concept.  By the same token, although Kant’s political philosophy has 
been discussed in terms of cosmopolitanism, we must be careful to directly closely align 
the two closely as it may be more of an imposition of the current modern understanding 
of cosmopolitanism and not the actual complex system of cooperating nations that would 
ultimately create what he coined “perpetual peace.”   
For Kant, peace, a state grounded in the universal a priori principle of goodness, 
is a natural phenomenon, while evil, war and conflict are not.  Peace is not some bogus 
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ideal, but rather a real, pragmatic phenomenon that is fueled by moral action where 
politics becomes the structure of that moral action, which ultimately culminates in the 
republic.  Politicians and philosophers must work together to preserve peace, and politics 
and morality must be united to create peace. Moral politicians are those who choose 
politics consistent with morality; the political moralist is one who forges morality in such 
a way that it conforms to the statesman’s advantage (Kant, 2003). 
Kant does not oppose the idea of a republican state, as advanced my many of his 
predecessors and peers, nor does he balk at the need for aggression when absolutely 
necessary; however, he realizes that peace is practically possible through the cooperation 
of states on a higher, more coordinated level.  
A state is not, like the ground which it occupies, a piece of property 
(patrimonium).  It is a society of men whom no one else has any right to 
command or to dispose except the state itself. It is a trunk with its own roots. But 
to incorporate it into another state, like a graft, is to destroy its existence as a 
moral person, reducing it to a thing; such incorporation thus contradicts the idea 
of the original contract with which no right over a people can be conceived. 
(Kant, 2003, p. 4) 
A world state, then, is not wise; rather, it is the powerful connection between states, 
expressed in his proposal for a league of nations that ultimately addresses the need for 
peace. 
The law, and ultimately republican constitutions carried out by representative 
democracies (not pure democracies, which Kant considers despotic) are the true vehicles 
for peace and cooperation.  Constitutions not only implore citizens to function within the 
 138 
law, they encourage citizens to author the law themselves to create civil order. Perpetual 
peace is a priori through what Kant refers to as natura daedala rerum (nature, the great 
artist); the law enables such a priori approaches to social life to emerge naturally (2003).   
Kant sees the cooperation of the moral and political only possible through the 
engagement of collective pure reason.  Without a sense of reason, the free association of 
world leaders that preserve peace becomes impossible. “That is, they must not be 
deduced from volition as the supreme yet empirical principle of political wisdom, but 
rather from the pure concept of the duty of the right, from the ought whose principle is 
given a priori by pure reason, regardless of what the physical consequences may be” 
(Kant, 2003, p. 45). Pure reason culminates in the “public-ness” of morality, which enacts 
the practice and enforcement of reasonable morality by engaging a check and balance for 
all to consider.    
Kant’s approach to peace is grounded in reason and pragmatism.  He sees the 
natural states of the world as a peaceful association of humans that behave morally as 
guided by man-made legal imperatives.  He recognizes the instability of man while 
acknowledging the natural occurrence of peace simply because man has been forced to 
share this globe together.  In other words, peace is a natural phenomenon until humans 
become part of the equation. It is not clear through Kant’s argument, however, if peace is 
truly a natural occurrence since it requires the interaction of humans in communion with 
one another.  He wants to achieve the possibility of a cosmopolitan world where humans 
think and behave according to collective pure reason, but understands that humans are 
corrupted through the various political structures that have emerged and govern our 
behaviors and interactions with one another.  “Since the narrower or wider community of 
 139 
the people of earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt 
throughout the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or 
exaggerated notion.  It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international 
law, indispensible for the maintenance of public human rights and hence also of perpetual 
peace” (Kant, 2003, p. 23). 
Most importantly, he constructs a paradigm for the true nature of peace and its 
earthly necessities.  Juridical and political structures that are truly grounded in morality 
and pure reason will help forge international political relations that constantly recognize 
peace as a moral duty.  Ultimately, however, behavior must be fueled by moral action.  
Constitutions have no meaning or value in a state where moral action is not paramount.   
By considering moral action as the basis for legal action, we are forced to entertain the 
notion of immoral agents that rule states and blemish possibilities for perpetual peace.  
One subcategory under such a rubric includes the movement of people across national 
borders, namely issues of immigration, national membership or citizenship.  Conflict, 
which is originated through inhospitable approaches, counteracts the natural phenomenon 
of peace.  Rather, the free movement of people around the world is a significant indicator 
(and ultimate test) of peace.   
We can see, even in actual states, which are far from perfectly organized, that in 
their foreign relations they approach that which the idea of right prescribes.  This 
is also in spite of the fact that the intrinsic element of morality is certainly not the 
cause of it. (A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, but 
conversely a good moral condition of a people is to be expected only under a 
good constitution).  Instead of genuine morality, the mechanism of nature brings it 
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to pass through selfish inclinations, which naturally conflict outwardly but which 
can be used by reason as a means for its own end, the sovereignty of law, and, as 
concerns the state, for promoting and securing internal and external peace.  (Kant, 
2003, p. 31) 
Nussbaum (1997) explains that much of Kant’s philosophy on perpetual peace and 
cosmopolitanism were based on the teachings of ancient philosophers such as the Stoics, 
Cicero and Marcus Aurelius.  The Stoics focus on pure reason paved the way for 
thinkers, such as Kant, who based their philosophies on a priori principles, and provided 
a context for cosmopolitan thinking.  The Stoics considered politics as a divisive force 
that legitimized the alienation of other groups outside of one’s political and social 
context. They believed that we should be more inclined to engage in “empathetic 
understanding,” even with our enemies, to foster an environment of cooperation focused 
on a common telos. The Stoics were practitioners of empathy who believed that, in the 
words of Marcus Aurelius, we should “enter into the mind of the other,” to accomplish 
our goals and create productive communities of interest (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 33). 
Kant’s philosophy of peace and his insistence on the need for international 
cooperation becomes one of his core beliefs, which provides a foundation for scholars 
and practitioners of peace and conflict studies.  However, Kant reconceptualizes 
cosmopolitanism in the context of modern social structures and sees the need to 
understand the intricate balance between individual self-determination and public action.  
The negotiating mechanism between these two opposing forces is Kant’s concept of pure 
reason, and how it can assist us in justifying how peace is an a priori phenomenon only to 
be threatened by “unnatural” and “unreasonable” human action.  Such an approach to 
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peace that ultimately avoids cultural and political conflict is grounded in moral human 
beings who create juridical and political structures that perpetuate peace in quotidian, 
pragmatic ways. 
Although some scholars such as Gellner (1983) emphatically oppose Kedourie’s 
characterization of the philosophical foundations of the nation and nationalism in 
modernity, Kant’s concepts of the categorical imperative, self-determination, and 
cosmopolitanism frequently emerge in discussions about the nation and the history of 
contemporary nationalism.  Although this debate is important and productive, Kant seems 
to remain a pivotal voice in the ways in which the modern nation is characterized through 
his foundational ideas of the self-determined individual in society, the guidance that is 
provided to these individuals through a priori pure reason, and the communicative nature 
of nations for healthy international cooperation.  
Origins of Nation: The Philosophical Debate  
 So far we have explored these core Kantian concepts to provide a philosophical 
foundation and hermeneutic entrance for a modernist understanding of nationalistic 
structures.  Nonetheless, there has been significant scholarly debate about Kant’s actual 
influence on such thinking and how it has influenced the shaping and organizing 
principles of the modern world.  As mentioned earlier, Kedourie (1993) has viewed Kant 
at the significant rhetorical interruptive power in the shaping of modern nationalistic 
structures, and Kedourie himself shifted the contemporary conversation of nationalism by 
beginning what some have called the “modernist school of nationalism” (Thompson and 
Fevre, 2001, p. 305).  Ernest Gellner (1994), on the other hand, has challenged Kedourie 
and introduced other possible alternatives for the origins of modern nationalistic thinking. 
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Some scholars suggest that Kedourie’s focus on conceptual philosophical origins rather 
than historical accounts of the nation disconnects the issue from real world issues and 
provides no solid ground from which we can begin to understand the problems associated 
with nationalism in the contemporary world.  Kedourie’s connection to Kant “not only 
suffers from ‘conceptual determinism’ but from considering German nationalism as the 
historical manspring for all nationalisms” (Englander, 1978, p. 39).  However, Kedourie 
(1989) defends such a characterization of this misleading assumption:  
The idea of the individual as the fundamental, primordial element in society and 
politics can be said to be a European seventeenth-century invention.  This 
individual—along with his fellow individuals—is a sovereign king, to use 
Locke’s description.  It cannot, however, be supposed that this individual 
emerged fully fledged from the minds of philosophers.  Rather, before and along 
with the theorizing of this individual, we see in Western society the spread — 
whatever its reason—of an ideal in which men and women increasingly look 
upon themselves as foci of independent judgment, final arbiters from whose 
verdicts there is no further appeal, alike in their preferences and aversions, and in 
their notions of right and wrong. The theorizing of this ideal issues in the 
philosophical abstraction know as the individual – and on this abstraction 
Liberalism is erected. (Kedourie, 1989, p. 266)   
For Kedourie, then, Kant and other Enlightenment scholars constructed epistemological 
and ontological approaches to ways in which the individual began to emerge in social 
settings.   From the interaction and communication of these self-determined individuals 
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sprang a new conceptual framework from which the home (oikos), community, society, 
justice, education, politics, economics and the nation were re-enacted.   
  Gellner’s (1983) critique of Kant vis a vis Kedourie is a significant argument in 
understanding theories of the nation. We explore Gellner’s approach not only to offer an 
alternative line of thinking for theories of nationalism, but also to understand the 
rhetorical discord behind ideas of nationalism and what seems to be a constant inherent 
internal conflict within the concept itself, a position with which various scholars 
mentioned previously concur.   
Before we delve into the philosophical disagreements proposed by Gellner 
(1983), we should understand his basic understanding of nationalism. First and foremost, 
Gellner recognizes the necessary symbiotic relationship between the state and nation; for 
him, the natural ordering principles of the state are necessary prerequisites for nations, 
and therefore nationalism.  Gellner takes the stance that nations cannot exist without the 
state, whereas others thinkers that we have mentioned earlier have seen the nation as the 
driving force for creating the actual state.  He defers to Weber’s definition of the state, 
where the state is the legitimization of violence and order (p. 3).  “The ‘state’ is that 
institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order 
(whatever else they may also be concerned with).  The state exists where specialized 
order-enforcing agencies, such a police forces and courts, have separated out from the 
rest of social life. They are the state” (p. 4).   
Apart from this technical description of the state, Gellner (1983) recognizes the 
existential-phenomenological and emotional power the nation has conjured in the modern 
mind.  The frequently uttered phrases about “men without nations” come to mind when 
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considering Gellner’s characterization of the nation.  The need for humanity to be 
enveloped by national structures is most likely not a natural occurrence: “Having a nation 
is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such” (p. 6). 
Human history, and thus the development of the concept of nation, is divided into 
three rather distinct periods: pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial (Gellner, 1983).  The 
state has no real foundation and organization within the pre-agrarian cultures, but it began 
to emerge with agrarian societies, and more importantly and unavoidably in the Industrial 
Age, where a need for order and legitimate violence were necessary requirements within 
the web of chaotic relations (Gellner, 1983).  It is important to recognize that Gellner is 
not simply tying the advent of the nation to the rise of industrialization; rather, he sees 
unequal distribution of modernization and industrialization as the catalyst of nation-
building and nationalism by providing a common existential-phenomenological center 
and perhaps a replacement for religion at a time when the complexity of social life was 
overwhelming and disparate. “Thus, in the agrarian world high culture coexists with the 
low cultures, and needs a church (or at least a clerkly guild) to sustain it.  In the industrial 
world high culture prevails, but they need a state not a church, and they need a state each.  
That is one way of summing up the emergence of the nationalist age” (Gellner, 1983, pp. 
72-73.   
The Industrial Age provided the practical ground from which scholars like Hume 
and Kant could present their arguments about rationality and experience, where human 
relations in the world and across state structures, and therefore cultural identities, were 
more complicated and textured by communication at macro, international levels as well 
as more micro, interpersonal levels.  Industrialization demanded a reshaping of the 
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narrative that contextualized not only structures of law, government, and order, but also 
the role of the individual within this shift in narrative. Industrialization introduced an 
enlarged mentality that expanded the world on every level: “[Industrialization] was a 
totally new vision. The old worlds were, on the one hand, each of them, a cosmos: 
purposive, hierarchical, ‘meaningful’, and on the other hand, not quite unified, consisting 
of sub-worlds each with its own idiom and logic, not subsumable under a single overall 
orderliness. The new world was on the one hand, morally inert, and on the other, unitary” 
(Gellner, 1983, p.23).  The philosophy of the moment, as shaped by individuals such as 
Kant and Hume, grounded a rhetoric that could offer a new vision which organized the 
macrostructures in the world, but also, for the purposes of our argument, affected the way 
in which “petits recits” (or micronarratives) (Lyotard, 1979, p. 60) and interpersonal 
relations would eventually morph to accommodate this “web of affiliations” (to borrow 
Simmel’s term, 1955). 
For Gellner (1983), there are clear antagonistic forces that helped create 
nationalism: When society begins to experience economic, educational and social 
inequality and cleavages, culture begins to align with polity to form a nation based on 
ethnicity for its members.  There is a way to exclude or include others when necessary, 
and an identity is formed (Gellner, 1983).  Two essential forces contribute to nationalism 
– communication and mobility (Gellner, 1983).  The ease of communication, like the 
discovery of writing in the agrarian world and the advent of the printing press during the 
Industrial Age, quite readily helped those with common cultures and causes to band 
together, as in an Andersonian imagined community, while mobility delineated very clear 
existential-phenomenological lines of belonging to culture and polity.   
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Constant occupational changes, reinforced the concern that most jobs with 
communication, the manipulation of meaning rather than the manipulation of 
things, makes for at least a certain kind of social equality of diminished social 
distance, and the need for a standardized, effectively shared medium of 
communication.  These factors underlie both modern egalitarianism and 
nationalism. (Gellner, 1983, p. 112)   
Again, we see the power to communicate to the masses affected identity as it relates to 
governance and culture—how individuals and groups begin to create meaning and form 
narratives around messages affects the ways in which societies choose to organize 
themselves and create formal structures that organize communal life.   
 It was not philosophical influence that formed nationalistic structures; rather, it 
was modernity itself – the process of social, economic and technological modernization 
and industrialization that beckoned the need for national sentiment.  Gellner (1994) 
insists that citizens really had no choice in the matter; industrialization imposed a great 
deal of influence on the ways citizens viewed the structure and sentiment toward the 
organizing body of the state. Kant’s analysis was only a product of what modernization 
initiated (Gellner, 1994). 
Within industrialization, there is more communicative power across a wide range, 
which plays into the Andersonian sense of imagined community.  Gellner (1994) does not 
see print capitalism as espoused by Anderson (2006), in particular, as part and parcel of 
the emergence of nationalism, only the ability to communicate across the masses and 
across distances is necessary and sufficient for the formation of nationalism. One might 
surmise that Gellner, like McLuhan (1989) that more technologically advanced forms of 
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communication such as the Internet, voice and video communication as well as modern 
forms of transportation all contribute to our ability to accomplish this.  
The guiding question continues to be one of origin, and Kant provides the 
philosophical foundations for understanding Gellner’s (1994) explanation.  Gellner, 
however, challenges Kedourie’s notion that Kant’s philosophy is one that provides 
answers.  Gellner is strongly opposed to Kedourie’s recognition of Kant as a 
philosophical founder of nationalism.  He vehemently argues against the idea that Kant’s 
ideals of self-determination and individual autonomy have anything to do with the notion 
of nationalistic thinking; rather, nations emerged in direct opposition to Kant’s ideals 
(Gellner, 1983).  “Kant’s main problem was the validation (and circumscription) of both 
our scientific and our moral knowledge.  The main philosophic device he employs for the 
attainment of this end is the contention that our guiding cognitive and moral principles 
are self generated, and inescapably so.  As there is no final authority or validation to 
found outside, it must be inside” (Gellner, 1983, p. 130).  Rather, Kant invoked his 
concepts of a priori morality and self-determination as an answer to a rather complicated 
question.  Gellner insists that Kant’s theory of individual autonomy and its effects on 
communal life deliberately ignore the power of culture in the national context.  Ignoring 
the effect of the Industrial Revolution on nation-building and reducing society to mere 
recipients of dominating philosophical ideas, as Kedourie suggests, does not tell the true 
story of nationalism’s genesis.  However, O’Leary (1997) suggests that Gellner’s 
interpretation of nationalism’s relationship to industrialization may be overly functional 
and attribute much more emphasis to modernization than is really the case.  Gellner’s 
theory was considered to be “unashamedly functionalist,” focusing more on economic 
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origins while organizing human and material culture (O’Leary, 1997, pp. 203, 215).  As a 
result, Gellner’s theory tends to be quite “apolitical,” discounting the need to 
acknowledge the political aspects as opposed to the cultural and materialist aspects 
(O’Leary, 1997, p. 215).  “So the economy needs both the new type of central culture and 
the central state; the culture needs the state; and the state probably needs the homogenous 
cultural branding of its flock…In brief, the mutual relationship of a modern culture and 
state is something quite new, and springs, inevitably, from the requirements of modern 
economy” (Gellner, 1983, p. 140).  O’Leary also believes that Gellner’s model for types 
of nationalism only addresses societies which are mostly considered homogenous or, at 
the most, bi-cultural; his theory doesn’t address multiculturalism, an essential element of 
society in contemporary society (O’Leary, 1998).  Because of Gellner’s discrete 
treatment of culture and the ability to identify nations and nationalism through 
individuals, some scholars have suggested that his theory tends to describe “nationalities” 
as opposed to “nationalism” (Englander, 1978, p. 37).   
Transitions to a Postmodern Hermeneutic of the Nation 
As we have seen, scholars such as Gellner and Anderson who have delved deep 
into the subject of nationalism cannot avoid acknowledging the presence and power of 
human communication and the role it plays in the rise and transition of nationalist ideals. 
Smith (1995) also offers a detailed analysis of the formation of the nation and the 
direction in which social, political, economic and communicative forces are driving it. 
Smith’s cogent analysis of the development of nationalism is helpful in determining some 
of its significant moments, but it is clear that his definition of nationalism falls within the 
realm of “false nationalism” (Buber, 2005) perspectives.  This bias presupposes the need 
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to shift from contemporary structures of nationalism into the inevitable transition to 
postmodernism.  Smith declares,” [O]ur world has become a single place” (1995, p. 1), 
and the need for a postmodern theory of nationalism is essential for responding to the 
current historical moment.  More importantly, Smith, unlike most contemporary scholars 
of nationalism, recognizes the influence of premodern thought on the development of 
nationalism through social history and its direct relationship to postmodern renderings of 
the nation.  Yet again, we see the deep connection of premodern ideals to postmodern 
characteristics (Smith, 2008, p. 32).  
The story we tell about the dating and shaping of nations must begin in 
antiquity…The first glimmerings of such national communities could be found in 
ancient Egypt, and more obviously in Christian Armenia and post-Exilic Judea; 
while in the ancient Greek world, Athens, the largest polis – and in Aristotle’s 
eyes and ethnos (nation) – displayed at least some of the processes of national 
community. (Smith, 2008, p. 34)  
Smith harkens back to our analysis of Isocrates and Cicero and their contributions, 
particularly those of culture (paideia) and natural law, to the conceptions of nationalism 
throughout history.   
Smith (1995) explains that nationalism scholarship tends to refer to three distinct 
schools of thought: the first recognizes the nation and nationalism as organic responses to 
the historical moment; the second tends to be more Kedourian or Gellnerian, where 
nations and nationalism are direct results of modernization and industrialization; and the 
third sees nationalism as a constant centerpiece of human society that persists while all 
other aspects “pass away” (pp. 3-4).  Until recently, the first school of thought has been 
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discussed much less frequently than the other two schools of thought, but contemporary 
thought seems to be hovering within what Smith coins “the First School.”  The first 
school of thought also seems to address nation and nationalism within a communicative 
structure that recognizes historicity and the needs of the human community within a 
particular historical moment.   Smith (1995) argues that, if interpreted under the rubric of 
the first school of thought, our contemporary understanding of nationalism does not 
indeed respond to the needs of the current moment; rather, we are embedded in the realm 
of the other schools of thought.  
In fact, we are already witnessing the breakdown of the 'homogenous nation' in 
many societies, whose cultures and narratives of national identity are becoming 
increasingly hybridized and ambivalent, and the emergence, some would say re-
reemergence, of looser polyethnic societies.  A 'post-modern' era, like its ‘pre-
modern' counterpart, has little place for politicized ethnicity or for nationalism as 
an autonomous political force. (pp. 3-4)  
Smith provides an important transition in our discussion about the character of the nation 
and nationalism in postmodernity.  Not only does Smith recognize the importance of the 
ancients in shaping our historical and metaphorical renderings of nation, he sees the 
nation as an ontological phenomenon that must respond to the needs of the human 
community at any particular point in time.  As scholars such as Lyotard (1984) 
acknowledge the breakdown of metanarratives and a departure from the epistemology of 
modernity, so too must the nation reconceptualize its structure and role to respond most 
effectively to the needs of the contemporary world.  We can only accomplish such a task 
under the guidance of all of those who have come before such as the ancients and the 
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Enlightenment philosophers to arrive at a constructive hermeneutic approach on 
contemporary nationalism.   
Implications 
This chapter has explored the various renderings of the nation and nationalism in 
modernity through existential-phenomenological, philosophical, sociological and 
economic perspectives, which reflect the diversity as well as the internal discord within 
the concept itself.  In short, there seems to be very little agreement among scholars about 
the origins and emergence of modern nationalism.  Scholars do not seem be able to agree 
on the historical point at which and the philosophical concepts through which nationalism 
emerged.  This project takes the stance that the nation is essentially a product of ancient 
philosophy, politics and rhetoric like that of Smith (1983, 1998, 2010).  Kedourie and 
Gellner see nationalism as a product of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, 
major interruptions which identify movements of modernity.   
 The diversity of the origins of nationalism seems to be limitless. Whether it is 
considering its ancient antecedents, attributing it to philosophical or economic roots, or 
understanding its existential-phenomenological power, it is clear that nationalism has 
entered the world stage from a variety of ideological perspectives. In this chapter, we 
began to move into modernity’s version of nationalism through hermeneutic devices such 
as sacred space, collective memory (or, better stated, collective amnesia), duty to one’s 
own citizenship and citizenry, and the influence of a social contract and civil society on 
the macrostructures of society and its contribution to the creation of the nation and 
nationalism.  
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 This project has focused on the influence and power of Kant’s contribution to the 
idea of the nation through concepts such as the categorical imperative and self-
determination, as well as the historical events such as the vast Industrial Revolution that 
spread across the Western world and influenced the Western trope on countless levels.  I 
chose to focus on these two particular events as they allow us to frame the argument 
about nationalism through a communicative lens, offering a focus on the ways in which 
society chose a rhetorical stance to help them negotiate a complicated social world.  
Although many scholars, such as Gellner, may not agree about Kant’s influence and 
others may not agree with Gellner’s overly mechanistic, economic perspective of the 
Industrial Revolution, they are two significant worldviews that frame our understanding 
of nationalism as an existential-phenomenological, communicative construct.   
Kedourie and Gellner provide significant theories of nationalism within the 
framework of modernity, but postmodern life seems to texture the metanarrative of 
nationalism differently, incorporating the philosophical, political, social, economic, and 
for all intents and purposes, communicative ground to fuel human action.  Englander 
(1978) states:   
It is the history of individuals reflecting on, and judging, the situations that 
confront them; a history of individuals molding traditional terms to fit their own 
frame of reference, rather than passively receiving them; it is a history, not of 
supraindividual forces, as in Gellner, nor of abstract ideas, as in Kedourie, but of 
human action. (p. 45)  
The function of this particular study is to uncover some of the philosophical and 
rhetorical antecedents helpful for understanding nationalism; the constraints and focus of 
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this project to do not allow for an exhaustive anthology of the multitude of theories and 
approaches about the nation that have been expounded by timeless scholars such as Marx 
and Engels (2004), Rousseau (1973), and Fichte (2013), to name just a few.  However, 
the scholars that I have chosen offer a compelling tale of nationalism’s philosophical 
origins and how these hermeneutic approaches help us evaluate the presence of 
nationalism in our communicative lives.  
 Our next task will be to engage previous scholarship on nationalism, which 
includes the ancients, and move the discussion about the current nature of nationalism in 
postmodernity to contemporary issues, recognizing how human communication again is 
placed at the center of this discussion. Most importantly, postmodernity recalls the need 
for what the ancients called phronesis, or practical reason, and the need for rhetorical 
approaches in contingent circumstances textured by multiple voices and perspectives in 
an ever-growing diverse paideia. However, it is important to realize that we may not be 
able to move into such a discussion without acknowledging the foundational role of 
modernity, which I have addressed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
The Postmodern Nation:  
Applying Martin Buber’s Dialogic Theory 
“In a new day of mankind, the early dawn of which we believe we have already 
perceived, nationalism will become more loving and more attached to the life of 
individuals, will fashion it more richly and freely, will be the most private and hidden 
essence of mankind” (Kohn, 1980, p. 30).   
Postmodernity provides a fitting, yet complex, framework for the concept of 
nationalism in the contemporary world, textured as it is with diversity and with the ever-
increasing connections and ability to communicate more directly across this diversity.  Of 
course, from a global perspective, it is not that diversity never existed or that diversity is 
more evident in postmodernity, but rather how opportunities for cross-fertilization and 
interconnectivity seem to be acknowledged more than ever before.  Given our analysis of 
nationalism theory thus far, it is clear that the way in which human communication is 
structured, disseminated and utilized transforms the concept of nationalism. My next task 
is to move from our historical and metaphorical discussion of nationalism with its 
contributions to communicative, social, political, and economic thought and move toward 
an understanding of nationalism within the postmodern realm by understanding the 
historical-structural shift of postmodernity, the shift in the structural and existential-
phenomenological nature of communication, and how all of this responds to our current 
communicative moment.   
In a letter to Martin Buber, his friend and colleague, Hans Kohn (1980), a well-
known scholar of nationalism, outlines a brief history of nationalism and expresses his 
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vision of a transitional moment in the idea of nationalism in the early 20th century (p. 27).  
Immediately after the First World War, Kohn saw a shift in the way individuals viewed 
nationalism’s role in their personal, political and economic lives. For Kohn, The Great 
War was the pivotal moment in which nationalism would meet its inevitable demise. In 
hindsight, we can see that this transition was in fact delayed and more drawn out than he 
had surmised, but there still seemed to be an unavoidable next phase for nationalism’s 
fate.  The focus on the individual in 19th century thought and social behavior seemed to 
be collapsing on itself, creating a social and political tension that called for a new era of 
the nation, perhaps no longer structured and validated by the state as it had been as a 
result of Enlightenment thought (Kohn, 1980).  
At the beginning of the twenties in our century, one can see this reformation of 
nationalism almost everywhere.  It is the sense of a new, powerful, connected life, 
the certainty of standing in tradition and yet being touched by totally new winds, 
the yearning for a new strong faith, that holds all these movements together.  At 
the same time there is a conscious seeking for an ethical anchoring of nationalism.  
…Nationalism is becoming a question of personal ethics, personal shaping life; it 
is becoming questionable. It is faced with new problems. Things close to it are 
now remote.  Certitudes are questionable, and people are trying to interpret 
uncertainties from the breadth and depth of solitude… Among the Jews, Martin 
Buber gave form and expression to this movement. (Kohn, 1980, pp. 27-28, 
emphasis added)   
Kohn’s comments seem to be situated within the realm of communication ethics; the 
monolithic modern nation seems to be transforming under postmodern dialogic, 
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interpersonal pressures that no longer can contain individuals within clearly defined 
political, cultural, economic and communicative boundaries.  The nature of human 
connection can no longer sustain a rigid structure of the nation in modernity.   
As we will see, Kohn’s predictions echo Buber’s philosophical approach for the 
existence of man, and whose concerns eventually are ideated in his hopes for the Jewish 
state in the early 20th century. We will see how Buber’s philosophy of dialogue reflects 
the concerns of nationalism at the time, as expressed by Kohn, and how they can provide 
a lens through which we understand nationalism not so much in the 20th century, but as 
we transition into the 21st century and beyond. Concerns for the individual’s 
embeddedness in community as well as the relationship that emerges “between” 
individuals have a lasting effect on the shifting idea of the nation and the individual’s role 
within the nation.   In other words, “dialogue,” particularly in the Buberian sense, 
becomes an essential concept for framing the nation and nationalism in a new form.   
At the moment we see the characteristics of a postmodern nation emerging 
through various media, particularly through the ease of communication technologies, but 
also through the movement of people and the ability to interact on a more interpersonal 
level, or “second person” level (Verlinden, 2010), shifting the ways in which humans 
think about the world around them and their particular place in the world. A theory of 
postmodern nationalism can help us answer these two worldviews by applying our 
understanding of communication theory and the influence of communication on a number 
of levels, whether they are interpersonal, inter-group, intercultural, or international. Most 
importantly, we will see that, with the power to communicate across vast spaces and 
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cultural divides, the nation and nationalism can take on dialogic characteristics. Dialogic 
theory can provide substantive ground for texturing the concept of the postmodern nation.   
By invoking dialogic scholar Martin Buber, I will attempt to construct a theory of 
what I call “dialogic nationalism” that takes into consideration not only communication at 
a more macro level and across borders, but also the importance of interpersonal, 
intercultural interactions between peoples who communicate across their national borders 
and national identities every day. Our “imagined communities” have become even more 
imagined and are no longer relegated only to print capitalism as indicated in Anderson’s 
(2006) seminal work, as technology and dialogue together form a bond that allows us the 
imagine communities that are less rigid and seemingly more natural to the human 
communicative process — all while creating more complexity and contingency than ever 
before. Cosmopolitanism provides a glimpse into understanding a more interconnected 
world, but it does not provide the practical answers that a theory of dialogic nationalism, 
an intermediary solution, might. Dialogic nationalism does not discount the power of 
institutions within the state and nation, but rather acknowledges their existence as a 
vehicle toward increasing communication across cultures and borders. There is a 
continued sense of public participation as advanced by the Greeks and Romans. 
Habermas’ Critique of Postmodernity: The Postnational Constellation 
As illuminated at the very beginning of this project, Lyotard’s analysis of the 
dawn of postmodernity and the destruction of the metanarrative provides a framework for 
exploring the rhetorical/metaphorical history of nationalism. It also provides an opening 
where “dialogic nationalism” becomes a possibility. Given this discussion on the many 
characteristics of the nation, it may seem more appropriate to consider nationalism as a 
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major feature and phenomenon of modernity, always providing an existential- 
phenomenological center, a necessary point of reference, for its members to live within a 
Western notion of reason and security. Human discourse forces the nation to engage in 
constant transmutation over space and time. Therefore, a conversation about the 
contemporary nation is pointless without exploring its particular characteristics and how 
it is influenced within postmodernity. 
In his famous essay on the “Postnational Constellation,” Habermas (2001) offers a 
detailed analysis of the effects of communication on an ever increasingly globalized 
world at a systematic political and economic level. Since modernity, the self-determining 
nature of the nation-state has served as the social mechanism where democracy and 
individual freedom could flourish.  “…[T]he very success of the social democratic 
process, as one could call it, has nourished the vision of a society capable of conscious 
change through the will of its democratically united citizens” (Habermas, 2001, p. 60). 
Habermas, however, offers a rather grim outlook regarding the erosion of the nation-
state. The deconstruction of the nation, under the pressure of various postmodern 
narratives of globalization, results in the volatility of institutionalized systems of 
government and economic markets and a disjuncture between human life and 
institutionalized systems.  However, Habermas realizes that these external forces of 
postmodernity and their effect on the nation as we understand it are inevitable; he 
attempts to construct an argument that addresses the concerns of the disintegrating 
modern nation and the inevitability of postmodern forces that challenge the existence of 
what he calls the postnational constellation.   
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Habermas understands that the debate about the changing world is a complex 
dialectic of a swinging pendulum between the nation-state within modernity and the 
postnational constellation in postmodernity.  This dialectic is also expressed in the fact 
that humans are constantly opening and closing their lifeworlds to external pressures.  We 
inevitably open and close our minds, expanding our horizons of understanding and 
opening ourselves to alternative ontological paths, only to engage in this process over and 
over again.  A dialectic of the private citizen’s identity tied to the nation gives way to 
what we generally consider static forces in the public sphere (Habermas, 2001).   
We need to distinguish between two different aspects here: on the one hand, the 
cognitive dissonances that lead to a hardening of national identities as different 
cultural forms of life come into collision; on the other hand, the hybrid 
differentiations that soften native cultures and comparatively homogenous forms 
of life in the wake of assimilation in a single material world culture. (Habermas, 
2001, pp. 72-73)   
The loss of a “democratic form of self-control” that is made possible within the modern 
nation is not only a result of larger political and economic pressures, but also the product 
of the communicative life of individuals within their lifeworlds. Although Habermas 
chooses to focus on the larger political and economic effects on postmodernity, it is clear 
that he sees the interpersonal, intercultural experience as a foundational factor in the 
movement to a postnational formulation of the world. “Reacting to the homogenizing 
pressure of a material world culture, new constellations often emerge which do not so 
much level out existing cultural differences as create a new multiplicity of hybridized 
forms… a process kept in motion through intercultural contacts and multiethnic 
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connections” (Habermas, 2001, p. 75). The dismantling of various forms of political and 
economic systems forces us to reconsider modern forms of the nation and to function 
with a newly organized, multidimensional sphere where alternative political voices are 
heard (p. 87).   
Habermas begins to investigate the formation of the European Union as well as 
the United Nations as the first postnational entities to systemize these multidimensional 
global political challenges. However, it is still clear that the world is still attempting to 
grasp what it means to develop political, economic and communication systems that 
address the dismantling of the nation as we know it. He suggests that the “rhetorical 
strategies” that address concerns of these multiple narratives are often supplanted by 
larger institutionalized structures of the state, but recognizes that the “discursive structure 
of opinion” has an effect on the “loosening of the conceptual ties between democratic 
legitimacy and the familiar forms of state organization” (Habermas, 2001, p. 111).  
Habermas’s analysis explores the relationship of the public sphere, systematized through 
government and public opinion, in addition to the pressure that individuals’ private 
voices have on the restricting of the existential lifeworlds of the nation.  Dialogic theory 
may serve as one window into understanding how individuals can affect the 
transformation of larger, seemingly monolithic political, economic and communicative 
structures while this transformation takes place. The dismantling of the modern of nation-
state presents a number of complex political and economic challenges that seem almost 
unforeseeable in an increasingly deterritorialized world; in the spirit of Habermasian 
philosophy, he emphasizes a need to focus on coordinated institutionalized public 
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structures as paramount to the successful functioning of society in this postnational 
constellation (Habermas, 2001, p. 88).   
Postnational entities are like the individual stars of a constellation that create 
dynamic meaning and telos with other stars; their meaning and purpose is less 
sophisticated when they live on their own, but teem with meaning when intricately 
coordinated with the other stars in the larger constellation. The postnational constellation 
cannot be a dysfunctional cacophony of multiple narratives, but rather a systematized 
network of coordinated action that responds to the needs of a multiplicity of voices. Like 
Giddens (2001), for Habermas, the modern nation may not be completely on its ways out; 
rather, the postnational constellation, like the possibility of dialogic nationalism, serves as 
a transitional moment that recognizes the benefits of self-determined nations grounded in 
modernity succumbing to the pressures of postmodern narrative confusion.   
Dialectical Voices of the Postmodern Nation 
Michael Ignatieff (1993) recognizes this tension and the need to transmute 
nationalism in the postmodern moment; we need nationalism, and alongside it 
provinciality, to interact dialectically within cosmopolitan norms in order to exist in an 
enlarged global context.  For Ignatieff, nationalism takes on new meaning in a post-
dynastic realm, for it must transform to accommodate real world problems today; but, in 
a Mazzinian sense, cosmopolitan, post-nationalist thinking can only occur in the crucible 
of national protection.  Such was the case in Bosnia, a region which he coins a “true 
cosmopolitan society;” Bosnians fell victim to extranational pressures because they did 
not have a state to protect them as a recognized ethnic group.  “[C]osmopolitans are not 
beyond the nation; and a cosmopolitan… post-nationalist spirit will always depend, in the 
 162 
end, on the capacity of nation-states to provide security and civility for their citizens (p. 
13). 
As mentioned earlier, Calhoun (1997), by way of Michel Foucault, explains 
nationalism as a “discursive phenomenon.”  Acts of human communication construct the 
“realized imaginative” boundaries that manifest in our private and public consciousness, 
and therefore our actions, beliefs, and ultimately our institutions. Although ideas of 
nationalism are real political and economic forces by many accounts, Calhoun frames 
them largely through existential-phenomenological means because they exist in the hearts 
and minds of those who are an integral part of the larger discourse, and therefore define 
the rhetorical nature of national identity.  We will lose sight of the power and complexity 
of nationalism if we treat any one element of nationalism as its “master variable” (p. 21). 
For Calhoun, treating nationalism as a coherent, well-articulated narrative reduces its 
textured complexity and therefore its rhetorical qualities. It is for this reason that 
nationalism’s power resides in acts of communication and rhetoric and responds to the 
narrative confusion of the postmodern communication context. We often see nationalism 
as a practical approach to the problems that the world presents to us—we form 
governments, institutions, economies and communication systems in the context of 
defined physical characteristics of what we view as a nation.  However, we see the reality 
of nationalism with greater clarity when we evaluate it as a social phenomenon that 
resides in the hearts and minds of its members; exploring its “discursive” qualities leads 
us to a postmodern understanding of national power as adequate to this historical 
moment.  “Nationalism is not just a doctrine, however, but a more basic way of talking, 
thinking and acting.  To limit nationalism simply to a political doctrine … is to narrow 
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our understanding of it too much. It doesn’t do justice to the extent to which nationalism 
and national identities shape our lives outside of explicitly political concerns – and 
especially outside competition over the structuring of state boundaries” (Calhoun, 1997, 
p. 11). 
Smith, unlike Gellner (1994) and Kedourie (1993) discussed in Chapter Four, 
recognizes the premodern roots of nationalism and rejects the notion that nationalism is 
simply a manifestation of modern thought; ultimately, he considers globalism a result of 
democratic ideals and the emergence of mass communication (Smith, 2008, p. 34).  
Smith also supports exploring the influences of postmodern thought on the nation and 
nationalism.  Scholars such Nussbaum (1996, 1997) and Appiah (2005, 2006) have 
contextualized the contemporary state of nationalism through theories of 
cosmopolitanism, while Smith recognizes this trend in cultural, political and economic 
globalization. However, Smith attributes the emergence of global cosmopolitanism to 
what we might call an Ellulian “techne” (1965), by granting power and access 
specifically to the technological aspects of communication that empower those with such 
expertise (Smith, 1995, p. 21). Globalization, therefore, is largely in the hands of the 
computer scientists and networking specialists as well as the creative minds of 
cyberspace and social media. He argues that such a focus on the technical form of 
cosmopolitanism does not only support the economic forms of globalization, but also 
contests the very nature of politics and culture (Smith, 1995). Current modes of 
technology provide the form and channels through which a new world communication 
order occurs both economically and culturally. Our attitudes and behaviors are influenced 
by the form and frequency of communication, which enables us to interact with others, 
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either directly or indirectly. This focus on culture can also be seen through Smith’s call to 
understand this cultural shift in the study of nations and nationalism through the lens of 
ethnicity and ethnic groups (Smith, 1992). Technology that has brought us together has 
provided a foundation to justify extreme nationalistic tendencies or more cosmopolitan 
worldviews. In other words, increased ability to engage in interpersonal and intergroup 
dialogue across cultures and national borders more than ever has influenced the 
conceptual shift of the nation and nationalism in either direction. One could only 
acknowledge our ability to interact with others through the Internet, modern 
transportation, and the opening of certain borders to business and education to understand 
the acute shift in nationalism inquiry. Global business practices, interethnic marriages 
and international student mobility are just a few examples of how modern technology has 
influenced the frequency and ability to communicate and transform our understanding of 
culture, nation and world.  Our mental and communicative constructs are subject to 
inevitable forces of interaction in both impersonal (business, corporate, internet) and 
interpersonal (travel, education, cultural exchange) realms.   
 Smith (1992) points out that there is an imminent decline in nationalism studies 
and the concept of the nation within the construct of classical modernism (p. 3).  The 
concepts of nation and nationalism have been subject to postmodern deconstruction 
through new approaches such as Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” as well as 
Hobsbawm’s (1983) concept of “invented traditions” (p. 3). Traditional historical 
analyses such as those of Kedourie and Gellner that I discussed in the previous chapter, 
although key to our discussion, have been supplanted and transformed to address the 
current state of nationalism studies – an academic response to that which is transpiring in 
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real life across the globe.  Gellner’s idea that the concept that nationalism may have 
actually invented those nations to which it was loyal may actually hold true, as the 
postmodern form of nationalism studies in communicative terms reflects the nature of 
national and cultural communication today.  A world with access to more dialogic 
settings of communication is a world influenced by multiple voices and disparate 
perspectives. The rather modern concept of the nation, emerging from a controlled, 
structured center, is challenged by a world that must inevitably face the multiple, 
contingent messages of the day.  Metanarratives are burst asunder to reveal a world 
where traditional understandings of nation no longer provide guidance to those who must 
function in a world with a constant, even overwhelming, flow of information and voices.   
Traditions, Culture, Civilization and Diaspora 
Studies since the emergence of postmodern thought have highlighted the 
transforming nature of nationalism and how it seems to be constituted in everyday life. 
Ideas such as Hobsbawm’s “invented traditions” (1983) and Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations” (1996) have attempted to recast the structuration of national and cultural 
thought by offering new ideas to the classical understanding of the nation and 
nationalism.  For Hobsbawm,  
“[I]nvented tradition” is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by 
overtly and tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically 
implies continuity with the past.  In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to 
establish continuity with a suitable historic past. (p. 1) 
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He suggests that where “genuine” traditions are strong and unwavering, there is no need 
to “revive or invent” new traditions to honor what already exists (p. 8).  Hobsbawm 
contends that nations are, in fact, new “exercises in social engineering” that actually 
require the invention of tradition and innovation to legitimize their existence and social 
function; this new idea of nation has, ostensibly, served as a catalyst for significant social 
phenomena that emerged in the 20th century, such as the struggle for territory and 
“national” recognition in Palestine (pp. 13-14).  Hobsbawm’s idea of nations as “invented 
traditions” debunks the claim that nations are rooted in “genuine” tradition and tied to 
deep historical continuity. Rather, nations are relatively new products that masquerade as 
the timeless social constructs embracing all that become part of them (p. 14).  
As a contemporary of Lyotard (1984), Hobsbawm sees the diversity and 
multiplicity in the ideas of the time. Through a postmodern lens, “invented traditions” are 
perhaps manifestations of the historical moment, lacking a metanarrative and relying on 
“inventions” for cultures and nations to create their own new stories.  Traditions, 
although often thought to be immutable and static, are frequently contested as constantly 
transforming and responsive to the moment. The tradition that we often regard as an 
artifact passed down from time immemorial is our own new version of that which came 
before us, one that responds to the current historical moment in all its contingency and 
diversity.  In a sense, the nation is an invented tradition, responding to the historical 
moment. 
Culture and tradition (like Greek paideia discussed earlier), as the central force 
behind the development of “nations,” continues to gain traction in discussions of 
nationalism (Huntington, 1996), but as seemingly unnatural entities artificially 
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constructed and legitimized through the social contract. In the contemporary world, 
people administer their lives within nations, but it seems that the way people conduct 
their daily lives rests on the idea of culture, or what Huntington (1996) refers to as 
“civilizations.” The post-Cold War, New World Order brought forth the reorganization of 
how we think about nation.  For Huntington, civilizations rather than nations constitute 
the major spheres of influence within the post-Cold War period, and at the core of these 
civilizations lies the power of culture. “In the post-Cold War world, the most important 
distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic.  They are cultural” 
(p. 21). Over the last 15 to 20 years, we can see clearly how the notion of nations, 
particularly the core characteristics of the national phenomenon, has transformed. What is 
important, however, is how we define this core element of culture. Culture must be 
understood in postmodern terms in order to locate its rhetorical, practical strength; we 
even hear the echoes of postmodernity through Huntington’s rather modern voice—that 
global politics are “multipolar and multicivilizational” (p. 21). Huntington deploys 
modern universal structures of “civilization” for a system that he attempts to frame as 
non-universal and contingent. Again, we find ourselves at a crossroads being asked to 
choose one of two paths of national identity, but in reality there may be a third path of 
compromise that will lead to a better understanding of its growing complexity.   
Huntington’s pivotal work in the field of international relations quickly becomes 
supplanted by the unfortunate events of September 11, 2001, where scholars like 
Huntington seem to respond to a call for national unity in opposition to those forces that 
threaten core “national” beliefs (Huntington, 2004). In Who We Are, Huntington (2004) 
characterizes national identity as a fixed concept, deriving its energy from internal unity 
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and continuity focused on a central core, evidently returning to his modern roots. Cultural 
diversity, immigration, cosmopolitanism and “subnationalism” all pose a threat to the 
power of nationalism and the individual’s place in it. Until September 11, 2001, 
Huntington characterized American national identity as disjointed and therefore lacking 
the necessary substance to bring its people together effectively. For Huntington, 
September 11 was a pivotal moment for American national identity; most Americans 
readily identified their place in the world as solely American, and most other identities 
with which they positioned themselves in society quickly faded into the background. 
Essentially, for Huntington, postmodern approaches to diversity and multiplicity are 
inauthentic claims about the nature of nationalism and its goals. Elitist cosmopolitan 
views of nationalism threatened the very core of national identity and did not speak to 
what the American public believed (Huntington, 2004, p.7).   
Even when giving strength to what he believes to be the damaging effects of 
multiculturalism and diversity to the American national identity, Huntington (2004) 
acknowledges that American national identity is a product of competing narratives and 
differing opinions. His overall theoretical framework for preserving national identity 
works against this acknowledgement:  
While the salience of national identity may vary sharply with the intensity of 
external threats [therefore questioning the value and substance of the national 
identity], the substance of national identity is shaped slowly and more 
fundamentally by a wide variety of long-term, often conflicting social, economic, 
and political trends.  The crucial issues concerning the substance of American 
identity on September 10 did not disappear the following day. (p. 9)   
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Diversity framed by democracy lives at the very core of the American national being, but 
continues to pose challenges of uncertainty and fluidity that are not characteristic of a 
solid national identity structured through modernity. Postmodern claims offer a context 
for the American national identity question, but for modernist thinkers such as 
Huntington, postmodernity still does not provide a necessary centripetal force that must 
guide competing narratives to create a cohesive and powerful nationalism.  Huntington’s 
arguments contribute greatly to the conversation on postmodern nationalism in the sense 
that these two competing narratives—one based on the diversity of culture, and the other 
based purely on an immutable, immobile central core—help us form a more sophisticated 
understanding through the lack of an overarching, unified metanarrative on nation and 
nationalism.  
Appadurai (1996) is advancing a postmodern approach to understand the 
transformational phenomenon on a grassroots level through rhetorical and narrative 
structures; he conceptualizes the current state of nationalism as what he calls the 
“postnational imaginary” (pp. 21-23). As is the central theme of this project, these types 
of postnational imaginaries are directly linked to the mobility of people and advancement 
of communication technology that allow for faster and more efficient exchange of ideas, 
opinions, and politics quite readily across national physical and ideological borders.  
These “diasporic public spheres” push the limits of the modern concept of nationalism 
and challenge what we already know and think about the nation (Appadurai, 1996, p.22). 
What has emerged historically is now under close scrutiny, recasting the nation into 
multiple, amorphous, complex narratives.   
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My general argument is there is a similar link to be found between the work of the 
imagination [Anderson] and the emergence of a postnational political world.  
Without the benefit of hindsight (which we do have with respect to the global 
journey of the idea of the nation), it is hard to make a clear case for the role of the 
imagination in a postnational order. But as mass mediation becomes increasingly 
dominated by electronic media (and thus delinked by the capacity to read and 
write), and as such media increasingly link producers and audiences across 
national boundaries, and as these audiences themselves start new conversations 
between those who move and those who stay, we find a growing number of 
diasporic public spheres. (Appadurai, 1996, p.22)   
Appadurai’s anthropological perspective analyzes the case of postnationalism through an 
intercultural communicative lens in that he acknowledges the importance of the mediated 
message in the ways we structure our national and cultural selves. What is notable is not 
so much the importance of the mass media itself, but the voices that create these 
narratives of possibility that are not confined to one’s own national, political, economic 
and cultural life.  Rather, the exposure that various messages and, therefore, people 
expand our horizons and encourage us to play with concepts that we may not normally 
engage. Interculturalism is inherently a natural part of our lives sometimes mediated 
through mass media, but more importantly originated and conceptualized by people 
affected by intercultural versions of life, or what Appadurai calls a “global and 
deterritorialized” human existence (p.55). 
The idea that the nation and culture are primordial by nature, as espoused in the 
Enlightenment, is readily debated in this postnational order, as it limits the 
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epistemological and communicative forms of contemporary life (Appadurai, 1996). 
Concepts such as imagination and invention, which have been discussed thus far, and 
dialogic communication, which will be invoked soon, are not inherently primordial and 
do not speak to the compartmentalized nature of primordialism; rather, they address 
issues of “being” and “interbeing” to transform our understandings of the world around 
us. Appadurai points out that the work on imagination (Anderson), along with others on 
ideology (Lefort, 1986) and hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), “began to show us a 
new way of seeing subaltern consciousness” (p. 145). The official word of the state, 
although still powerful, begins to be subverted in the language of postmodernity, offering 
access to alternative voices and intersubjectivity, much like the “invented traditions” that 
Hobsbawm (1983) advanced, or what Appadurai views as the “dialectics of implosion 
and explosion” (p. 157). However, Appadurai does not suggest that any of this has the 
ability to subvert what we currently understand as the nation in many respects; rather, a 
postnational context could mean that the existential-phenomenological essence of the 
nation may continue to exist in the hearts and minds of its citizens, but the territorial 
aspects the deeply associate with the nation may actually be on the decline (p. 169). 
The Global Village: An Early Understanding of the Postmodern Nation 
In their timeless work, The Global Village, McLuhan and Powers (1989) 
(henceforth McLuhan) offer an analysis of the nation and globalization through the 
development of various technologies and the ways in which these technologies affect our 
thinking and approaches to quotidian issues. They recognize a conceptual shift in the 
ways people understand the world around them and explore how this shift will ultimately 
connect us to each other differently than before. McLuhan believes that our 
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epistemological approach to the world around us is shifting from what is thought to be 
more what he views as linear, mechanistic, left-brain, visual thinking to more holistic, 
technological, right-brain, acoustic thinking due to the simultaneous, multiple messages 
we receive in an age of postmodern technology and multiple media.  In the famous 
statement, ”the medium is the message,” McLuhan comments on the importance of 
“ground” (the non-linear, multifaceted, acoustic form of the message) and how such 
ground forms the context, content, and channel for the message one wishes to convey (p. 
6).  
In the order of things, ground comes first.  The figures [the tangible, visual 
elements] arrive later.  Coming events cast their shadows before them.  The 
ground of any technology is both the situation that gives rise to it as well as the 
whole environment (medium) of services and disservices that the technology 
brings with it.  These are the side effects, and they impose themselves 
haphazardly as a new form of culture.  The medium is the message.  As an old 
ground is displaced by the content of the new situation, it becomes available to 
ordinary attention as figure. (p. 6)    
This technology that forms the context and content is an extension of our biologic selves 
in postmodernity (p. 87).   
McLuhan (1989) recognizes this shift in the manner in which we approach the 
world, and therefore view our place in the world among this great web of associations, 
constantly connecting us and embedding us in physical and social existences.  The way in 
which we utilize and engage technology has important implications on the ways we view 
ourselves in the world, particularly as we have been made to think of ourselves in the 
 173 
context of the nation and the world.  This epistemological shift to the holistic causes us to 
the recast our identities within the context of the nation and view the world more as a 
“global village” more than ever before (p. 95).  
McLuhan (1989) suggests that this access to electronic media and the possibility 
for limitless communication across individual, cultural and national boundaries causes a 
loss of individualism, that in turn causes us to cling to more “tribal loyalties” for a sense 
of belonging and comfort.  These tribal loyalties that are enacted may be misconstrued as 
national devotion and fervor, but McLuhan makes it clear that, as a result of the 
electronic age, these loyalties are more accurately tied to culture and multiple “centers” 
of thought and action.  Tribal loyalties are not discrete, boundary-driven connections, but 
rather fluid, acoustic forms of affiliation that foster belonging, but in a way that is quite 
different from that of Enlightenment influenced epistemologies (p.92; p. 118).  These 
ideas provoke pre-modern thinking discussed earlier, where culture (much like the Greek 
paideia), forms “centers” of identity and social context; they create the ground on which 
figures such as nations exists (or do not exist), and allow humans to communicate in 
ways which seem natural than the more linear, visual or mechanistic epistemological 
structures introduced in modernity.   
The nature of the satellite surround is that it has no center and no margin. 
‘Centers’ exist everywhere.  This is the way the Europeans understood the 
character of reality and culture in pre-Renaissance times; no national borders, 
simply centers of thought and influence; cities which were haunts of being, of 
ideas — the universe of Duns Scotus and Erasmus where nationalism did not yet 
exist.  In the age of the super satellite, large numbers of people will be unable to 
 174 
think merely of regional monopolies of information.  Satellites will be able to 
‘talk’ to each other and total coverage will lead to total, low cost communication.  
Slow information movement will be possible only under the greatest restrictions; 
espionage will, therefore, begin to disappear. (McLuhan, 1989, p.  118)  
One can see McLuhan’s foresight currently in development: the Internet is becoming 
more complex and faster, email, videoconferencing, social media like Facebook and 
Twitter allow us to transform the ways in which we communicate; information 
technology companies like Apple, Google and Yahoo, have become powerful centers for 
political, social and cultural communication; and, mobile handheld technologies that 
bring the world to our fingertips and allow us to communicate seamlessly, all resemble 
this “satellite” that McLuhan invokes.  Even his understanding of a dissolving privacy in 
the face of these complex technologies has become accurate as recent news emerges 
regarding the government’s ability to monitor and intercept individual Internet 
communications for the purpose of “national security.”  (Baker & Sanger, New York 
Times, June 7, 2013; Nagourney, New York Times, June 8, 2013).   McLuhan’s discussion 
seems to be inherently postmodern, recognizing how new communication technologies 
that connect individuals shift the ground on which we stand, ultimately participating in a 
variety of narratives that establish and transform our identities.   
It is difficult to discuss the nature of postmodern communication and 
epistemologies without mentioning the necessity and power of such technologies.  As a 
harbinger of communication, and therefore culture, in a postmodern age, McLuhan 
understood the future of the technologies that were available to him in the 1970s and 
1980s.  The limits of this project do not allow me to engage a detailed analysis of some of 
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the abovementioned technologies, but like McLuhan, I recognize their existence and 
power in order to arrive at a conceptual and practical understanding of how this global, 
postnational world is emerging, and what philosophical, ontological phenomena 
contribute to this new understanding of the communicative world.   
Grounding Buberian Dialogic Theory 
In more recent scholarship, the transformative nature of the modern nation-state 
as we know it is discussed through these concepts of imagination, invention, postnational 
order and the like, but the transition is relatively abrupt with few offering a transit ional 
phase between the nation in modernity to the nation in postmodernity. Both Appadurai 
(1996) and McLuhan (1989) offer an interpretive analysis for such a link between the 
traditional nation as we understand it in modernity and the nation as it may emerge in 
postmodernity.  Since the act of communication is at the core of the nation’s essence and 
existence, communication scholarship can offer a substantive approach to thinking about 
this transitional, rhetorical moment in the nation, particularly as it pertains to dialogic 
communication theory.    
Traditionally, dialogic communication is a form of communication theory that 
explains how meaning and relationships emerge interpersonally through existential-
phenomenological and ontological means.  Scholars such as Bahktin (1981), Levinas 
(2004), and Buber (1988,1996, 2002, 2005), among others, have all grappled with 
existential questions of ethics and being through the act of human dialogue and how it 
affects the ways in which we communicate, create meaning, structure thought and exist 
as human beings.   Although dialogic theory from this perspective has been readily 
appropriated to studies of interpersonal and intergroup communication, for the purposes 
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of this project I hope to ground the idea of postmodern nationalism, or postnationalism, in 
the idea of dialogic communication and what it can offer for this transitional moment in 
the nation—the transition grounded in Lyotard’s (1984) and Anderson’s (2006) 
scholarship and characterized more recently by Appadurai (1996) and McLuhan (1989).  
I turn to Martin Buber’s understanding of dialogue and its applications for two reasons:  
His detailed treatment of dialogic theory, as well as his commentary on nationalism in the 
20th century.  Buber’s ideas may open up particular lines of inquiry that emerge from our 
previous investigation of a communicative-rhetorical history of nationalism as well as 
this apparent transformation of the nation and nationalism.  
The application of dialogic theory to issues of global justice and how justice 
emerges in the nation, as well as in its political, social, economic institutions, is 
beginning to emerge as a mode of inquiry (Verlinden, 2010).  Scant scholarship has taken 
ideas of dialogics, particularly as they have emerged in Martin Buber’s work, and applied 
it to larger social issues as opposed to interpersonal, relational communication studies.  A 
literature search on the connections to dialogic theory and nationalism studies reveals 
very little; the scholarship is virtually non-existent.   
I hope to explore and provide an interpretive analysis of Buber’s works on 
dialogic theory (Between Man and Man, 2002; I and Thou, 1996; The Knowledge of 
Man, 1988, among others) as well as his various writings on nationalism specifically in 
response to the problem of the Jewish state in the early 20th century (Buber, 2005).  
Buber’s scholarship becomes an important element of this study, as it links the idea of 
dialogic communication to that of the nation.  Scholarship on Buber seems to divide his 
work into dialogic theory and his nationalism writings, but few seem to connect the two 
 177 
directly.  It is clear that Buber’s dialogic approach lives deeply in his views and actions 
regarding nationalism and the Zionist movement, but a more deliberate investigation of 
his work in both areas might allow us to develop a better understanding of what I mean 
by “dialogic nationalism.” 
Applying dialogic communication theory to the problem of postmodern 
nationalism might help us understand the nature of an increasingly technological world 
that seems to lend itself to more interpersonal forms of communication rather than more 
commonly applied political communication methods where individuals often seem to be 
removed as more distant, disengaged, passive agents in the communication and creation 
process.  Of course, political communication still plays a central role in understanding the 
problem of the nation, as is evident through our inquiry into Isocrates and Cicero.  
Nevertheless, the idea of interpersonal communication may play an even more prominent 
role as communication technology blurs the communicative, institutional, and political 
boundaries and ties people together through more direct forms of communication. 
Although we regard the ancients as foundational in helping to create an understanding of 
political communication and the human role in the nation, ancient political 
communication involved more direct, individual participation, more than those that 
immediately followed it. In a sense, the infinite web of “centers,” similarly professed by 
Isocrates and McLuhan, are now demanded by postmodernity since this immense 
network transcends traditional structures like the nation (albeit constructed on a large 
scale) and challenges the idea of international communication by perhaps replacing it 
with new forms of interpersonal communication.  
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Dialogic theory by way of both Buber and Levinas has also been applied to 
understanding our engagement of global justice issues (Verlinden, 2010). Dialogic theory 
provides a transition for two traditional approaches to social issues—the particular, 
partial, individually-centered approaches and the universal, impartial, collectively-
generated approaches (p. 83). Verlinden (2010) argues that these two rather discrete 
worldviews no longer provide a helpful answer to issues of global justice and how we as 
people-living-in-the-world respond to everyday problems, particularly those that affect us 
more indirectly and impersonally (p. 90).  By invoking the works of Buber and Levinas, 
Verlinden is able to arrive at a transitional point similar to that which I hope to explore 
for the discussion of transforming nationalism.  Buber’s concept of the “interhuman” 
points us in a moral, ethical direction that privileges the actual emergent relationship, the 
“between” that is essential to our existential being (Verlinden, p. 96; Buber’s works). 
Although not directly addressing issues of nationalism, Verlinden’s focus on global 
justice directs us to a conversation about the transitional moment in global 
communication for individuals who otherwise might feel that they are, or actually are, 
removed from issues that may not have a direct effect on their daily lives. Previously 
thought to be quite discrete and separated from global communication, dialogic theory 
can help bridge the gap between particularistic and universalistic approaches to social 
problems. Buber’s dialogic is not confined to the interpersonal; rather, it is a modality of 
turning toward existence, an embodied communicative approach that influences all other 
modes of communication whether they are interpersonal, intergroup, intercultural, or 
international, essentially because it is “interhuman.”  Verlinden helps us mend this gap by 
explaining that Buber’s I-Thou not only applies to “concrete individuals” but also to the 
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“we of community,” the dialogic structures of society; however, the structural nature of 
modern society complicates the essence of community as “an abstract organic structure” 
that eludes any sort of genuine and practical engagement (Verlinden, 2010, p. 97).  In 
Buber’s world, the “voice of the particular” must be heard above the various political 
institutions and conversations that take place in a national context.  In short, Buber’s 
dialogue is not only an ontological explanation of the interpersonal relationship, but it is a 
vehicle for allowing voices to connect to each other substantively on a much larger 
scale—socially and internationally.   
Buber’s use of dialogics is clear throughout his rhetoric of the nation as early as 
the 1920s.  His focus on dialogics offers us a foundation for understanding the 
transformative character of the nation, how it affects international communication and 
why the individual interlocutor plays such an elevated role in this transformation. 
However, we must understand Buber’s philosophical anthropology—a philosophy 
focused on the whole human being—and how it offered credence to the interpersonal 
relationship, the necessity of “turning towards” the Other, to offer his philosophy as an 
overlay to our discussion about postmodern nationalism.    
Anderson and Cissna (1997) situate Buber as an important, although perhaps less 
evident, contributor to the postmodern conversation on dialogue. They investigate how 
his philosophy helps us explore alternative philosophical standpoints for human 
communication at every level of interaction—‘the interpersonal, intergroup, inter-social, 
or intercultural, and international—what Buber coins “interhuman.” Buber’s 
anthropological philosophy is significant in the conversation about dialogic theory 
because it encourages us to explore “how to turn toward, address, and respect otherness” 
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(Cissna and Anderson, 1997, p. 109-110).  Arnett and Arneson (1999) point out that 
Buber sets himself apart from other dialogic theorists (like Rogers) in the way he views 
the self as deeply situated in the narratives of the historical moment. Buber recognized 
the embeddedness of these individuals in narratives and their existence as 
communicative, dialogic beings that emerge out of intersubjective consciousness —the 
“interhuman”—and the meaning that emerges “between” those persons engaged in 
dialogic communication. The self does not exist in a self-reliant vacuum for Buber, but 
rather a relational, ontological realm where meaning and responsibility emerge (Arnett & 
Arneson, 1999).  The concept of the “between” becomes a consistent metaphor in 
Buber’s work (Buber, 1996; 2002).  In a need to address “the between,” Buber addresses 
our disillusionment with institutions that are constructed to support human activity, and 
most importantly, human relations:  
When the automatized state yokes together totally uncongenial citizens without 
creating or promoting any fellowship, it is supposed to be replaced by a loving 
community.  And this loving community is supposed to come into being when 
people come together, prompted by free, exuberant feeling, and want to live 
together. But that is not how things are. True community does not come into 
being because people have feelings for each other (though that is required, too), 
but rather on two accounts: all of them have to stand in a living, reciprocal 
relationship to a single living center, and they have to stand in a living, reciprocal 
relationship to one another. The second event has its source in the first but is not 
immediately given with it. A living reciprocal relationship includes feelings but is 
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not derived from them. A community is built upon a living, reciprocal 
relationship, but the builder is the living, active center. (Buber, 1996, p. 94)   
Buber, then, distinguishes between emotions and the self, and that the human 
communicative relationship builds community through reciprocity. Strong, functional 
communities are the results of a dialogic relationship that emerges in the “between,” not 
an egotistical focus on developing one’s self without the guidance of the narrative, or 
what he refers to as the “center.” This distrust in institutions is a direct comment on the 
characterization of the nation in modernity and the dilemma of postmodern contingency, 
the lack of the metanarrative to which Lyotard refers. However, Buber recognizes that the 
reality of shifting meaning and multiple narratives which lack a guiding metanarrative 
does not have to mean that we are lost in a world of individualism and personal emotions; 
rather, community is still possible when finding a “center.”   
Buber attempts to describe the nature of the dialogic relationship through 
Christian, Hindu and Buddhist metaphors to demonstrate the how modernity has 
corrupted the concept of the self by detaching it from the dynamics of human 
relationship.  From a Christian perspective, the Holy Trinity is a prime example of pure 
dialogue. These seemingly separate entities become one in the purest forms of 
communication, but also take on different roles to create the dialectic of communication: 
The relationship of the Father to the Son is hierarchical, but complementary and 
necessary; the manifestation of the Spirit through the two is also different, but dynamic 
and necessary. Like dialogue, the concept of the Trinity is an elusive concept, difficult to 
grasp in human terms but real and possible. Any refocusing on the “I”—the self situated 
at the center of it all—loses the essence of what is meant to be as holistic and complete.  
 182 
“All modern attempts to reinterpret this primal actuality of dialogue and to make of it a 
relationship of the I to the self of something of that sort, as if it were a process confined 
to man’s self-sufficient inwardness, are vain and belong to the abysmal history of 
deactualization” (Buber, 1996, p. 133). Dialogic communication recalls the notion of 
religious tropes such as the Trinity and invokes a re-centering of the self and other as a 
complementary relationship, inextricably linked, as one turned toward the other 
completely and fully.  
Buber’s dialogic theory speaks about the “quality” of contact through 
instrumental and objective means (Stewart, Zediker, and Black, 2004, p. 33). Arnett 
(2004) explains that this “quality” in dialogic communication, particularly in the 
constructs developed by Buber and Levinas, is inherently ethical and elicits what he calls 
a “responsive ethical I” (2004, p. 87).  A “responsive ethical I” is one that understands 
that responsibility rests in our true dialogic relationships with the Other – relationships 
that acknowledge a “decentered self” who is committed to the Other and also responsive 
to the historical moment (p. 88).  The “I” cannot exist without the “Other,” as the “I” 
finds itself emerging out of responsiveness to the “Other” while recognizing the 
narratives that live around them and within which they dwell. However, life does not 
always present what is expected or desired, but is it is subject to contingency, uncertainty 
and the reality of everyday life—what Arnett and Arneson (1999) refer to as Buber’s 
“communicative poetics”  (pp. 140-142).  “For Buber, poetry is more concrete than a 
logical description of issues such a friendship, love, hope or loyalty.  Buber’s 
communicative poetry guides without dictating a linear series of expectations.  Following 
the horizon of Buber’s perspective, … a dialogic ethic ‘interprets otherwise,’ unable to 
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provide a graspable answer, pointing to ‘concrete’ life in which real meeting lives in 
fuzzy clarity, in a guided temporal response” (Arnett, 2004, p. 89).   
This “responsive ethical I” also leads us to engage dialogics in terms of 
community.  Arnett’s work on Buber and what dialogic theory means for community 
(Arnett, 1986) actually preceded his work on the “responsive ethical I” (Arnett, 2004), 
but it seems that this “I” is a requirement of dialogic communication and applies to the 
formation of healthy, productive communities. Communities are a result of this “fuzzy 
clarity” or communicative poetic because they emerge from what Arnett refers to as 
“dialogic tension.”  “In essence, the usage of the word community…is not rooted in a 
precise definition, but in an attitude sensitive to the dialogical tension between self, other, 
and the principles of a group or organization” (Arnett, 1986, p. 17). However, we must be 
careful not to conceptualize community as collectivism. Buber warns, “Modern 
collectivism is the last barrier raised by man against a meeting with himself” (Buber, 
2002, p. 239).  In other words, man is not dialogically joined with man in a collective; 
otherwise, he is embedding himself in a collective that masks his true relationship with 
the other and himself.  In community, there is a dialogic tie that recognizes and 
acknowledges the other as an embedded other and all that comes with her—uncertainty, 
tension, agreement, disagreement, and cooperation – a full menu of life’s experiences. 
However, living in community requires a thoughtful response to everyday 
communication, or what Buber called the “narrow ridge”—an alternative to the dualistic 
form of oppositional communication that we are often accustomed to, particularly in 
contemporary Western culture.  The “narrow ridge” depolarizes our communication 
recognized through multiple viewpoints, “as an alternative to absolute positions that 
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characterize communication in a polarized community” (Arnett, 1986, p.31).  The 
“narrow ridge” is also an ontological communicative space where contingency thrives as 
a positive element of human communication, where answers are reached and solutions 
are discovered.  A linear, rational methodology for problem-solving may not always be 
the solution; instead, through a constructive conversation of opposing viewpoints, 
answers emerge in the “between,” textured even more by the diacritic of what has been 
described as Buber’s “unity of contraries” (Arnett, 1986, p. 65; Arnett & Arneson, 1999, 
p. 142). It is important to note, however, that Buber referred to the “unity of contraries” 
when discussing mankind’s tendency to escape individual responsibility under the 
protection of the collective. Not until the individual was able to achieve a sense of unity 
would she be able to emerge from the collective to engage in dialogic communication 
and, therefore, the productive, meaningful construct of community.   
But unity itself, unity of the person, unity of the lived life, has to be emphasized 
again and again. The confusing contradictions cannot be remedied by the 
collectives, not one of which knows the taste of genuine unity and which if left to 
themselves would end up, like the scorpions imprisoned in a box, in a witty fable, 
by devouring one another. This mass of contradictions can be met and conquered 
only by the rebirth of personal unity, unity of being, unity of life, unity of action – 
unity of being, life and action together. This does not mean a static unity of the 
uniform, but the great dynamic of unity of the multiform in which multiformity is 
formed into unity of character. (Buber, 2002, p. 137-138)  
Buber sets himself apart from other philosophers of communication, and scholars of 
dialogue in particular, because he does not focus only on the existential-
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phenomenological qualities of the dialogic act. Rather, for Buber, the ontological 
qualities are deeply rooted in and between people and not Being alone. His theory is a 
practical approach to intersubjectively lived experiences that address quotidian problems. 
“Buber opted for real people, real problems, the calling of conscience in the existential 
moment…he doesn’t discuss being-in-the-world, but persons-in-the world” (Arnett, 
2004, p. 78). 
Applying Dialogic Theory to Nationalism 
Arnett (1986) explains that Buber’s dialogic theory has been often misinterpreted 
as “soft” and “expressionistic,” (p. 40), but he also points out, other scholars have 
understood Buber’s philosophy as one that stands its ground while being able to engage 
in productive dialogue (p. 40-41).  As a result, these concepts of Buber’s dialogic theory 
are relevant to our discussion of postmodern nationalism for a number of reasons. 
Traditionally evaluated as a relatively modern concept, nationalism has proven to be a 
somewhat contradictory, controversial subject structured within modern notions of 
boundary and organization, but appearing to have more rhetorical characteristics of 
uncertainty, contingency and fluidity. The postmodern moment, which has been outlined 
as one that lacks a central metanarrative but embraces multiple petite narratives, seems to 
lend itself to a rhetorical understanding of nationalism. As we have seen, dialogic theory 
fits well within this approach by offering not so much a structural approach, but rather a 
post-structural approach, or a dialectical guideline, for how nationalism emerges and why 
communication is at the center of it. Most relevant, however, is how dialogic theory 
becomes a useful and practical approach to nationalism because Buber, as a dialogic 
theorist, was also directly involved in activities of nationalism both academically and 
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politically.  We will see how dialogic theory appropriately textures the difficult 
conversation of Israel in the early 20th century, particularly how Buber stands his ground, 
but also employs dialogic theory to engage his colleagues and the opposition alike.   
Because this project has attempted to view the rhetoric as an essential tool in 
developing the concept of the nation and nationalism as early as the Ancients, it is 
important to valorize the dialogical approach in exploring postmodern nationalism to 
rhetoric as well. Czubaroff (2000) states, “Significant work remains to be done for those 
who wish to explore the relevance of dialogical tradition to rhetoric” (p. 183). Czubaroff 
believes that Buber’s theory makes a case for dialogic rhetoric because it shifts the 
influence of communication from “impositional, transactional, persuasive centers in the 
rhetor to an influence that is truly centered on the ‘between’” (p.181). This new rhetoric 
framed in dialogics is ontologically, historically and contextually bound and can have 
deep implications for community building, as posited by Arnett (1987). Czubaroff (2000) 
admits, however, that it is difficult to design dialogic research because dialogic theory is 
steeped in everyday lived experience and not subject to straightforward research 
methodologies that extrapolate particular experiences and permit clear structuration (p. 
182).   
The previous analysis suggests that communication studies becomes a necessary 
and appropriate field through which we can explore the development and nature of the 
nation and nationalism.  We can see that rhetoric and dialogic theory are certainly worthy 
of connection and development. Martin Buber’s works on dialogue and nationalism can 
provide an opening for exploring nationalism in terms of dialogic communication.   
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Although heavily involved in the Zionist movement of the early 20th century, 
Buber often offered dissenting views of Zionist policymaking and diplomatic relations 
regarding a new state for the Jewish people. He firmly stood his ground on his visions for 
nationalism in general, and the Jewish nation more specifically, while attempting to 
engage in dialogue with his colleagues on the subject of Zion and a binational agreement 
with Palestine. His dialogic orientation (even before his published philosophical works on 
dialogue) was fully and completely a part of his approach to the Jewish state and to the 
idea of nationalism in general. 
 Additionally, Buber’s dialogic theory is relevant to issues of nationalism in the 
sense that he employs the metaphor of “borders” to describe his concept of monologic 
versus dialogic communication. Where monologic (I-It) communication is a “reflexion” 
on the self (Buber, 2002), it invokes a “border” —a discrete separation and 
objectification—between the Self and the Other. Dialogic communication, on the other 
hand, is a mindful “turning toward the Other” (Buber, 2002, p. 25) that recognizes both 
distinction in the self that works from a particular standpoint while also turning toward 
the Other (Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, 2009)—there is an transformed connexion between I 
and Thou (You), that seems to be more holistic and dialectically united.  “[E]very It 
borders on other Its; It is only by virtue of bordering on others.  But where You is said 
there is no something.  You has no borders. Whoever says You does not have something; 
he has nothing.  But he stands in relation” (Buber, 1996, p. 55).   
This metaphor of “border” plays directly into Buber’s views on the nation and 
nationalism over the years. Nations and the concept of nationalism itself depend greatly 
on the existence of “borders” as well as the literal and figurative understandings of views 
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on nationalism. Dialogic concepts such as Buber’s concept of I and Thou provide ground 
for approaching practical solutions regarding the structure of a nation which, in turn, 
structures political, social and economic institutions that affect human relationships and 
potential.   
Buber might say the concepts of the nation and nationalism are formed during 
crucial moments of human solitude (what he calls “the ice of solitude”) or “existential 
homelessness,” where humans lack the security of abode and are forced into self-
reflection and desperately search for a home (Buber, 2002 p.151). For a moment we 
return to Kant’s contribution to the structure of the self, how it relates to the modern 
understanding of nationalism, and Buber’s reaction to Kantian ideals in view of the 
“interhuman” and its implications for communication and community. Buber explains 
that the Aristotelian world viewed Man as a part of a larger whole in the cosmos, a 
necessary, integrated cog in the complex, fluid wholeness of life.  “Man is comprehended 
in the world, the world in not comprehended in him” (Buber, 2002, p. 151).  Man is not a 
discrete object that conducts the world, but is an essential, integrated element that keeps 
the cosmos flowing and whole.  
The Aristotelian man wonders at man among the rest, but only as a part of a quite 
astonishing world.  The Augustinian man wonders at that in man which cannot be 
understood as part of the world, as a thing among things; and where that former 
wondering has already passed into methodological philosophizing, the 
Augustinian wondering manifests itself in true depth and uncanniness.  It is not 
philosophy, but it affects all future philosophy. (Buber, 2002, p. 153)   
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“The wholeness of Man,” then, actually becomes an important question to resolve 
following Augustine’s concept of Man, which affected much subsequent philosophical 
thought, and is expressed in Kant’s works (Buber, 2002). 
 Buber’s (2002) philosophical analysis of man’s place in the universe and his 
connectedness to the universe begins with Kant’s question of “What is Man?,” but 
harkens back to Aristotle and ends with Nietzsche and Feuerbach, while visiting with 
Aquinas, Cusa, Hegel and Marx along the way. The point here is that, like Kedourie 
(1993), who saw Kant as a pivotal figure in the understanding of the concept of 
nationalism, Buber believes that Kant’s work is foundational and essential for 
understanding the pure nature of Man. However, for Buber, Kant’s important questions, 
although attempting to find a philosophical home for Man, separates and alienates him 
from the wholeness of man. We see this same idea emerge in Kedourie’s work as it 
pertains to the conceptual evolution of nationalism through Kant’s principles of the 
categorical imperative and self-determination. Although such principles originate in a 
priori guidance with Man connected to a greater whole, his reason and actions toward the 
world are focused completely within an independent, autonomous self. There is a turning 
inward that neglects Man’s need to connect to the larger whole. If we understand the 
nation and nationalism as a practical concept that emerged out of Kantian thought, as 
espoused by Kedourie, then we might be perplexed by Buber’s comments.  How can 
concepts such as the nation and nationalism, which seem to be a necessary product of 
communication and community, be a product of Kantian individualistic, self-reflective 
thought? Buber believes that the questions focused on “What is Man?” never really quite 
reach an acceptable answer because they lack a necessary and sufficient element that all 
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of these philosophers have seemed to neglect along the way — community. Our 
interconnectedness and intersubjective existence cannot be ignored if we are to answer 
this question. Without community, I and Thou cannot emerge in areas beyond the 
communicative dyad; neither Man, nor any other philosophical field for that matter, can 
be realized and explored to its fullest (Buber, 2002, p.185).   
 Perhaps by utilizing Buber’s intellectual lineage and Kedourie’s understanding of 
the nation and nationalism, both centered on Kant, we can begin to understand why the 
concept of the post-Enlightenment nation does not seem to respond to the needs of 
humankind. Although seemingly based in community, its Enlightenment roots are 
grounded in ideas of self-determination and self-sufficiency and do not respond to the 
basic needs that are answered in terms of community and connectedness.  Kant’s 
understanding of cosmopolitanism and a perpetual peace were well intended, but 
alienating, isolationist structures. Although communities were brought together to form 
nations, nations were then structured under ideas of autonomy, individualism and, in turn, 
justified to act as individuals entities themselves, with no regard to concepts such as 
dialogic I-Thou relationships. The network of nations that can create a perpetual peace 
existed, but the boundaries and borders that define these nations blatantly ignore the 
dialogic connections that must exist for peace to exist in a cosmopolitan world. By man’s 
shifting his place in the world from the Aristotelian embeddedness to Kantian 
individuality, the purpose of community also shifted. The idea of nation may have existed 
in the Ancient world, but its focus, as we can see in Isocrates and Cicero, was formed 
around community.  According to this line of reasoning, the modern understanding of the 
nation was formed around individual identity.   
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European man became more and more isolated in the centuries between the 
Reformation and the [French] Revolution.  United Christendom did not merely 
break in two; it was rent by numberless cracks, and human beings no longer stood 
on the solid ground of connectedness.  The individual was deprived of the security 
of a closed cosmic system. He grew more and more specialized and at the same 
time isolated, and found himself faced with the dizzy infinity of the new world-
image.  In his desire for shelter he reached out for a community—structure which 
was just putting in an appearance, for nationality. The individual felt himself 
warmly and firmly received into a unit he thought indestructible because it was 
“natural,” sprung from and bound to the soil. (Buber, 2005, p. 47) 
Buber’s dialogic existence does not necessarily calls us back to the ancient understanding 
of Man’s embeddedness in community. Rather, it negotiates ancient and modern 
understandings of Man and how they have formed functional communities to create 
solutions that recognize Man’s connected individual existence that cannot thrive without 
I-Thou relationships lived out in community.  Buber’s anthropological philosophy 
grounds postmodern nationalism because it recognizes the natural connections that 
people have to each other regardless of the nation and culture in which they live. The 
narrative multiplicity of postmodernity seems to reflect a more fluid, a priori structure in 
which Man dwells, where dialogic communication as a tool is at the core of this structure.  
The idea of the nation in postmodernity is reflective of how Buber views 
individual agents in a communicative act. Nations are like the individuals in 
communicative acts, but in order to develop dialogic relationships that enhance life, they 
must engage in meaningful I-Thou relationships. As we are all now able to communicate 
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across national borders in an instant, the ways in which we engage others throughout the 
world interpersonally seems to transcend national borders on a daily basis. The ability to 
engage in such communication requires us to reconsider our place in our local 
community, our nation and the world.  The concentric circles of identity not only offer us 
a “home,” but they force us to reconsider our situatedness within our historical context.  
Just as the I-Thou relationship has no borders, our postmodern international and 
intercultural relationships—whether they are a product of international travel, face to face 
interpersonal communication or virtual, high-tech communication—push the boundary 
limits of nation and culture and encourage us to question our discrete place in the greater 
whole.   
Buber’s Nationalism 
Buber’s philosophy can be seen quite clearly through his writings on nationalism 
and the Jewish state in the early 20th century.  As an original member of the Zionist 
movement, he was often an iconoclastic voice in the struggle for a Jewish “home,” 
considering the various elements that surrounded the Jewish question and the necessity 
for productive relationships with those in close proximity.  One can see the origins of his 
thinking on dialogue through his struggles with Jewish nationalism and nationalism in 
general.   
Although brief, his address to the Twelfth Zionist Congress in 1921 on 
nationalism is essentially a plea to the Jewish people to consider the ethical implications 
of engaging in “false nationalism,” and regarding the nation as an end in itself (2005, p. 
54).  He regards the nation as a concept that has been broken since the Reformation when 
communities where increasingly isolated from each other and sought safety and solace in 
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the nation (Buber, 2005).  For Buber, nations are formed when communities become 
aware about how they differ from other communities and attempt define an identity based 
on this difference.  He defines a nation as such:  
So the term nation signifies the unit ‘people,’ from the point of view of conscious 
and active difference.  Historically speaking the consciousness is usually the 
result of some inner—social or political—transformation, through which the 
people comes to realize its own peculiar structure and actions, and set them offer 
from those of others…A nation is produced when it acquired status undergoes a 
decisive inner change which is accepted as such in the people’s self-
consciousness. To give an example: the great shift which made ancient Rome a 
republic made it a nation, too.  Not until Rome became a republic did it become a 
nation aware of its own peculiar strength, organization, and function, 
differentiating itself in these from the surrounding world. (Buber, 2005, p. 51) 
The spiritual connection to the nation, what we define as nationalism, is a symptom of an 
unhealthy nation, one of overemphasized awareness, unaware of its own disease (Buber, 
2005).  This tendency of the nation to focus only on itself, and as an end in itself, 
disregards the existence of other communities and peoples, and very clearly crosses over 
into what Buber believes is a “false” form of nation and nationalism (2005, p. 53). A 
nation’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of a “greater structure” that reigns over any 
sort of national supremacy, and believes itself to be the be-all-end-all in international and 
human relationships, will result in despotism and danger (2005, p. 54).  Such a national 
ideology is isolationist and egotistical and will cause great strife and eventually its own 
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demise.  For Buber, the occurrence of false nationalism was leading to a major shift in 
nationalism:  
In this day and age, when false nationalism is on the rise, we are witness to the 
beginning of a decline of the national ideology which flowered in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  It goes without saying that it is perfectly possible 
for this decline to go hand in hand with increasing success of nationalistic polit ics.  
But we live in the hour when nationalism is about to annul itself spiritually. 
(Buber, 2005, p. 54) 
The breakdown of the nation, in Buber’s eyes, is a reaction to the strong nationalistic 
forces that were actually attempting to fortify and validate its very existence.  Such a 
“false nationalism” is not a true reflection of human existence and our attempts to 
connect with each other; false nationalistic tendencies, therefore, will eventually work 
against any unnatural forces that do not allow us to form communities, wherever they 
may be. 
The existence of a “common center” is a recurring theme in our discussion about 
the formation of nations.  Buber’s acknowledges the existence of a “greater structure” 
that is more important than the nation itself; when a nation disregards the existence of 
this greater structure and refuses to heed its guidance, it will cause its own demise.  We 
are led to believe that this “greater structure” is God, who perhaps has created a greater 
functional structure, and is the greater structure itself, which forms a community of 
nations without domination and power.  For Buber, a nation and the spiritual connection 
to that nation can only exist morally and ethically with constant reliance on this greater 
structure, which in turn, forms a community of nations.   
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As a proponent of the Jewish nation, Buber warns against these pitfalls of false 
nationalism and reminds the Jewish people that their nation is created not only 
historically, but also through the eyes of a higher power, as a “community of faith” 
(Buber, 2005, p. 55).  The Jewish people must transcend this idea of, what Buber calls, 
the “formal nation” and understand that this community of faith will not allow it only to 
exist as a viable nation, but also as a nation that does not engage in false nationalism.  He 
implores that Judaism must rise above what we have known as a nation in modernity, and 
quite possibly imagine a community of faith if it is going to create a home for those who 
have been searching since the Diaspora.  Because the type of nation that Buber is 
suggesting is not a community as an end in itself, it will then be able to engage in 
“supranational responsibility” (Buber, 2005, p. 57).   
Buber (2005) begs the Zionists to move beyond what we have understood as a 
formal nation and begin to understand its overarching purpose and goal—to live in a 
interconnected world where nations are not final, but rather necessary tools that organize 
peoples, offering them existential-phenomenological homes that house their collective 
history, memory and cultures while helping them understand that they are products of a 
larger interconnected context.   Buber is not suggesting that nations are unnecessary, but 
that a nation’s focus and purpose must be transformed to accommodate the needs of the 
world.  The new Jewish State can act as an example of one as long as it does not 
prescribe to the ideas of nation from the past: “In our case, more than any other, the 
decision between life and death has assumed the form of deciding between legitimate and 
arbitrary nationalism” (2005, p. 57).   
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Such ideas can be understood in Buber’s discussions about the new Jewish state’s 
relationship with the Palestinian people.  Although often a dissenting voice of the Zionist 
movement in his approach to collaborating with the Arabs in Palestine (Mendes-Flohr, 
2005), Buber continued to advocate for a peaceful accord with the Jewish people in light 
of the Balfour Declaration which began the process of granting the Jewish people land 
under British rule in Palestine.  He adhered to his strict approach to nationalism that 
transcends common understandings and attempted to help the Zionists engage in 
legitimate nationalism that regarded all members of the region.  Again, we can see clearly 
his philosophical, dialogic stance in the face of national conflict.  He insists that the 
Jewish plan is not a plan “aimed against any other people,” but an effort to regain a long-
awaited home for the Jewish people (Buber, 2005, p. 61); however, this can only happen 
when genuine Buberian dialogue that creates an existential-phenomenological space of 
“common interests” and “mutual respect and goodwill” between the stakeholders that 
demand recognition in terms of a nation (Buber, 2005, p. 61).  “Only then will both 
peoples meet in a new and glorious historical encounter” (Buber, 2005, p. 61). 
Buber’s dialogic rhetoric is focused on the Other, and the new Jewish state’s 
responsibility to the Other.  That is, the need for the Zionist movement to not participate 
in any form of colonial hegemony toward the Arabs and to react to the Arab uprisings 
unlike any other national movement before.  Buber’s nationalism, fueled by religious 
supranational intentions and focused on a higher power that forces humans to engage in 
justice toward others framed by a dialogic viewpoint, leads him to this point: “But the 
human aspect of life begins the moment we say to ourselves: we will do not more 
 197 
injustice to other, than we are forced to do in order to exist.  Only by saying that do we 
begin to responsible for life” (2005, p. 86).  
 Most striking, of course, is Buber’s focus on the interpersonal and how it plays 
such an essential role in the development of this new type of nation in the face of distress 
and conflict.  Buber understands that the creation of Israel can be formed, in large part, 
through interpersonal/ intercultural encounters between men and women from each side 
unlike any other nation on earth at the time (2005, p. 85).  Justice will live in the 
relationships that individuals forge across religious, cultural, political and communal 
boundaries and create new “centers” that at as binding agents for multiple narratives.  As 
an alternative to false nationalism, Buber’s legitimate form of nationalism seems to 
manifest as a “dialogic nationalism” formed between Man and Man who live in their 
guiding narratives yet are willing to negotiate and transform those narratives to live in a 
supranational context.  “More than anywhere else in the world there is here a topos—a 
place where there is a concrete social transformation, not of institutions and 
organizations, but of interpersonal relations” (2005, p. 85, emphasis added).   
Buber’s Zion was rife with conflict in a pre-Israel world when he was writing his 
philosophy of the nation in the early 1920s.   One might even say that Buber missed the 
mark after witnessing the atrocities that affected not only the world, but the Jewish 
people in particular, not even 20 years later.  However, one might also regard Buber as 
ahead of his time when understanding his thoughts on the nation and nationalism as a 
progressive, even radical, voice in the face of recurring conflict that resembled national 
conflicts of the past.  He is a voice of hope, but also one of solid philosophical ground, 
forming a view of dialogue that was not applied to the problems of nationalism before.  
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Even after years of domination of the Jewish people in Europe and constant conflict with 
Arabs in Palestine, Buber wrote his most important works on dialogic communication 
and the need to turn toward the Other.  We can see clearly that Buber’s dialogic theory 
grew directly from his hopes and dreams of a new nation within the context of the 
Jewish-Arab relationship.  It is no coincidence that during the same period (in 1923) 
Buber would create I and Thou, his original work on dialogic theory.   
The above analysis is just a glimpse into Buber’s long and tumultuous 
relationship with Zionism.  However, the above discussion may point us toward a theory 
of dialogic nationalism framed by Buber’s conception of dialogic theory and his writings 
about the nation in general.  Grounded on a theological/religious/philosophical stance, 
Buber breathes life into debates about real world problems particularly as they pertain to 
the nation and nationalism.  Buber’s disdain for politics and the role it plays in the 
formation of the nation, asks us to focus on a morality that is centered on a higher guiding 
principle (much like Kant) in order to reach justice through peaceful coexistence with the 
Other.  Nationalism can, in fact, be grounded in interpersonal relationships when focused 
on a common cause and regard for justice.  Just as Buber’s theological question of “If not 
Me, then Who?,” Buber’s question about the formation of Israel and the Palestinian state 
also takes on a existential-phenomenological character by asking “If not Now, When?” 
(2005, pp.102;106).  
As we return to Kohn, Buber’s trusted colleague, quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, we can not help but think the he got it all wrong:  Did he not foresee the 
tragedies of World War II and the diabolical Hitler regime that annihilated millions in the 
name of nationalism? Or, the continuing challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that 
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has claimed countless lives as well?  Buber’s concept of “false nationalism,” on the other 
hand, may have in fact reluctantly admitted to their inevitable occurrence, but for Buber 
these events are products of old conceptions of nationalism and domination.   
The Closed-minded attitudes inform the dominant type of nationalism, which has 
gained so many adherents among us—the most worthless assimilation—it teaches 
that everyone must consider his own nation as absolute and all other nations as 
something relative; that one must evaluate one’s own nation on the basis of its 
greatest era, and all other nations on the basis of their lowest points.  If this idea 
continues to gain acceptance it will lead to worldwide disaster. (Buber, 2005, p. 
89)  
On the other hand, we might think that Kohn and Buber were philosophical visionaries 
who saw an inevitable metamorphosis of the nation.  Yes, this transition has taken much 
longer than perhaps hoped for, but the age is upon us, beckoning new relationships in the 
context of the nation, through every form of communication available to us. Dialogic 
theory, particularly as Buber has contextualized it, is one window through which we can 
explore the communicative nature of the nation in the postmodern moment.  The 
contingency of our lives and the narratives that guide them leave us to search for possible 
answers in a world that seems to be restructuring or reconstructing, rather than 
deconstructing, before our eyes.  The real and phenomenological boundaries and 
delineations are no longer static, but moveable and fluid.   
Buber begged his constituencies to regard the process of national formation as a 
delicate balance between forming a community of faith and culture and accepting those 
who do not share this faith and culture.  Although he considered it necessary for a nation 
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to be based on theological and ethical principles, he also recognized the need to 
acknowledge those who structured these principles differently.  Buber’s philosophical 
propensity toward dialogic thinking allowed him to see the possibilities for peace and co-
existence even in the face of distress.  Humans can authentically and genuinely 
communicate with each other when they are turned toward one another across the divide 
of difference.   Such interactions begin interpersonally but emanate into structures of the 
nation that, in turn, form our nationalism.  In a sense, Buber reminds us of the Ancients 
who were constantly attempting to form structures and an understanding of the function 
of the polis, never forgetting that the polis is a product of the people and communities of 
these people, and not vice-versa.  For all of these thinkers, a nation is possible through 
the existence of an existential common center as a guiding principle, even if there are 
many.   
Implications 
This preceding discussion seems to point to the fact that nature and character of 
nationalism is changing.  Nations still exist – their function and the way they define our 
lives continue to persist.  Is the nation, as it existed in modernity, on its way out? Does a 
postmodern nation encourage us to engage in relationships that are founded on multiple 
narratives of postmodernity? It seems that the extent to which nations are bounded and 
static in modernity is transforming our approach to nation and culture in general.  
Appadurai (1996) and Huntington’s (1996) conceptions of culture and civilization that 
are permeable and impermanent seem to be apparent. 
The progressive nature of technology, particularly communication technology, 
that allows us to communicate easily and regularly across national borders affects the 
 201 
way in which we involve our identities, and the ways in which these institutions affect 
our lives on a regular basis.  Contrary to some intellectual thought, the nation may not be 
gone, but the ways in which embedded, communicative individuals transform the nation 
may change its face forever.  Dialogic theory provides a transition point from which we 
might frame postmodern nationalism in a way that recognizes the Other embedded in 
national structures, across multiple narratives and layers of existence.  Nations provide a 
existential-phenomenological home, but the preceding discussion suggests that the 
manner in which we begin to imagine our existence in the nation is rapidly transforming. 
By definition, the multiple centers of postmodernity allow nations themselves to 
persist.  Postmodernity does not necessarily require a movement toward global politics 
(Habermas, 2001).  Their very existence valorizes multiple voices and narratives; 
globalization does not dissolve borders, it reinforces them but shifts the ways in which 
we view those borders as accessible and permeable.  As individuals living in a 
postmodern moment, we are no longer deeply embedded in one imagined community of a 
nation, but rather we are embedded within multiple identities that force us to comprehend 
a more globalized world.  Dialogic nationalism does not necessarily see the dissolution of 
the nation, rather it sees a need for phenomenological “centers” of identity, culture, 
economics, and politics but with more contingent, permeable borders.  It sees a need to 
view our embeddedness in the nation as more transformative and communicative across 
these borders as well as within those borders.  Within these borders we hear multiple 
voices that have literally transcended physical borders and have introduced new, 
multidimensional voices to the conversation on the nation, nationality, and nationalism.  
Dialogic theory provides a philosophical framework for interpreting such phenomena.   
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Chapter 6 
Epilogue - Toward a Theory of Dialogic Nationalism: Practical Applications 
At the beginning of this study I situated the question of how communication and 
rhetorical studies could inform a constructive hermeneutic for understanding of the 
nation, nationality and nationalism.  I explored the contribution of the ancients—
specifically, Isocrates in Greece and Cicero in Rome—to locate conceptions of the nation 
even in the ancient world as an attempt to combat any tendencies of what Roberts (2008) 
describes as “chronocentrism” or the “belief in the uniqueness of special difficulties in 
our own time as somehow more important than the past” (p. 93).  As we discovered, 
many scholars have considered the genesis of the nation to rest mainly in modernity, but 
further investigation into ancient rhetoric suggests otherwise.  Isocrates and Cicero (along 
with the more obvious contributions of Aristotle and Plato) both seriously contributed to 
the conversation about the nation, even if the qualities and structures of nation were 
somewhat varied and focused on political as well as communal understandings of the 
nation.   
As we can see, the ancients provided important ground for our conversation that 
included the nation within modernity and postmodernity.  We can see the principles and 
rhetorical power of the ancients in both philosophical standpoints quite clearly—there is 
structure, discreteness and boundedness while there is public participation as well as the 
centrality of interpersonal, dialogic communication when discussing the formation of the 
nation.  Consequently, I moved (rather abruptly) into the Enlightenment and the influence 
of modernity on what we know understand as the nation. The modern nation seems more 
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familiar to us in the contemporary world, but also a bit outdated in what some consider as 
postmodernity.   
The Enlightenment philosophers like Kant in particular seem to have had a 
significant impact of how the nation would be structured and respond to political, social, 
economic and communicative aspects of everything from interpersonal to intercultural 
communication and international politics.  The autonomous individual played a 
significant role in how nations were formed and imagined by its members, but not 
without a general guiding principle, which organized and shepherded those individuals 
into a communities of memory and culture.   
My task was intended to explore these phenomena throughout history not only as 
historical phenomena, but also as metaphors that can inform current phenomena 
pertaining to the nation.  As studies of the nation within postmodernity have emerged in 
the last 20 years, many have chosen to focus on globalization and cosmopolitanism in 
particular.  Without a doubt, these approaches are necessary when understanding the 
nation, but my focus to frame the nation itself presupposes the existence of these 
phenomena while attempting to explore the more specific phenomena of nation, 
nationality and nationalism.  My bias rests in the fact that a dialogic ethic can provide 
answers for current existential-phenomenological forces. Dialogic communication theory, 
in particular at it has been explicated by Martin Buber, seems to provide a philosophical 
home for the way I understand the emerging “post-national imaginary” (Appadurai, 1996, 
p. 177).  Dialogic nationalism does not necessarily call for the end of the nation as we 
know it, rather it acknowledges a discrete Other while allowing meaning to emerge 
between the two to create a third alternative.  In this sense, dialogic communication as 
 204 
framed by Buber—not just dialogue —allows us to view the nation as a communicative 
phenomenon that engages the Other differently.  Monologue will persist even in these 
discussions of dialogic nationalism.  Dialogic nationalism is not suggesting that by 
turning toward the Other we will resolve all the political, economic and social problem of 
the world, completely avoiding diplomatic breakdowns and war.  However, dialogic 
nationalism highlights the centrality and importance of the embedded individual and the 
dialogic act as influential and transformative for people whose identity is closely tied to 
the nation.  Dialogic nationalism is an integrative approach to seeing the nation and 
nationalism as an ever-changing phenomenon in terms of how people imagine their place 
in the world simply through an encounter with the Other, but framed by national identity.  
In the midst of an apparent breakdown of a grand guiding narrative, dialogic theory may 
be able to provide some starting points from which we can explore the multiple 
narratives, and the communication of those narratives and how they affect the idea of the 
nation.  I have attempted to bracket the nation and nationalism through the lens of 
communication; however, other issues such as language and religion introduce even more 
complexity to the nature of the changing globe and the role of the nation itself.  The 
scope of this project does not allow for a more detailed elaboration on such issues, as 
whole chapters could be dedicated to them; however, I hope that this study can serve as a 
foundation for those discussions, and place the nation into dialogue with barriers (and 
bridges) of language and religion.   
There are several areas in our daily lives that affect the way in which we 
communicate with Other and, in turn, encourage us to reconsider our place in the world.  
One may argue that those international and intercultural interactions may in fact affect 
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the way one reacts to difference and multiplicity, forcing them into the cocoon of 
isolation.  However, all indicators seem to at least shift our thinking about the world into 
new realms.  Just as Appadurai (1996) suggests that transportation, immigration and 
technology are transforming modern man into a post-national imaginary, I would suggest 
that our lives are affected by those phenomena everyday either directly or indirectly.  We 
no longer passively absorb information about the world around us through unidirectional, 
monologic media such as television and radio, but as McLuhan (1989) suggested, we are 
engaged in more frequent interpersonal/social relations, mediated through technology, 
that enlarge our local village to a global one.   
The forces of postmodernity seem as if they will forever change and challenge the 
nation as we know it, deterritorializing the nation more than before.  One might only 
mention the social and communicative phenomena emerging in the Arab world at the 
moment, the global debate on immigration, or the global financial and economic crisis, to 
see how these events are shaping – or rather reshaping—our world.  This is not to say that 
these events will not be wrought with conflict and seemingly monologic behaviors, but 
the pressures of multiple voices and new forms of instantaneous communication may 
restructure the nation, as formed in modernity.  Autonomous individuals still play a role 
in how this will happen, but individuals tied together in even more powerful forms of 
communication may change the way in which we view the nation into the future.   
Like Bhabha (1996), Roberts (2008) points out that globalization, which should 
be investigated well beyond the frame of three decades, has fostered the phenomenon of 
identity hybridization, or a “dialectic between two or more identities” (p. 98). Roberts 
contests the notion that mass media, as espoused by Appadurai (1998) and McLuhan 
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(1989), are the only forces that influence our notions of increased globalization, but 
rather how in the postmodern moment interpersonal communication, cultural 
performances, and public participation have an even more prominent and influential 
presence (Roberts, 2008).  Dialogic theory not only provides a framework for such an 
approach to globalization and the state of the nation, but also points us in the direction of 
how the idea of the nation is relying on more personal, participatory forms of 
communication rather than the traditional, institutional, almost monolithic forms, of 
communication as characterized in modernity.   
Indicators of the Changing Nation? 
My experience in this form of dialogic nationalism lies directly in my work with 
international students in the United States.  Working with this population has encouraged 
me to think about this very subject and to academically engage the origins of the nation 
and nationalism as well as their transformative character.  With the largest number of 
international students studying in the United States ever (Farrugia, et al., 2012, p. 2), the 
mere number of international students may be a clear indication of the changing character 
of the nation and nationalism. International students live “between” (Bhabha, 1996; 
Hegde, 1998) national and cultural contexts on many levels and offer insight into how we 
might characterize the pragmatic shift of our thinking about this idea of the nation.  
Students have long played an influential role in national change whether through 
surreptitious activity or overt protestations; Tiananmen Square, the Wall in East Berlin, 
Otpor in Serbia (York, 2001), all exemplify the power of student voices in civil society, 
particularly when it comes to the changing character of a nation.  International students 
can provide insight for thinking about the changing character of the nation within 
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globalization and postmodernity as their experience occupies a liminal space that 
transcends the traditional understanding of the nation and nationalism.  Many of these 
students, not all, are part of the socially influential sectors of society, which can often 
encourage change at home and abroad.  The narratives of international student 
experiences can provide a hermeneutic entrance through which the postmodern nation 
may reveal itself through human communication.   
Very little research has contributed to the conversation about international student 
flows and its effect on the perception of the nation and nationalism.  A few, but 
significant, studies that have been done (Szelenyi, 2006; Szelenyi & Rhoads, 2007; 
Kramer, 2009) seem to indicate that international students—genuine “postnational 
imaginaries” who are part of the “diasporic public sphere” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 177; p. 4) 
— in fact, place a considerable amount of pressure on the concept of nation, and 
therefore on practices in international relations.   
I hope that my exploration about the rhetorical/communicative nature of the 
nation and its changing character can lead to even more research about how the changing 
nature of human contact is forcing us to live more interculturally and internationally, 
particularly from the standpoint of philosophy of communication.  To build upon 
Waltzawick, Beavin and Jackson’s (1967) edict “we cannot not communicate,” (p. 49) I 
would suggest that, in our current interconnected, globalized world, “we cannot not 
communicate interculturally.” It is my stance that the presence of an international student 
in the classroom and on a university campus, and our interactions with that student, 
whether directly or indirectly, not only presents new cultural perspectives on a subject, 
but also encourages us to question our own convictions and worldviews.   
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My question about the nation and nationalism originated from such heated 
debates over immigration and how migrants can influence perceptions about the overall 
economic, social and political health of a nation.  Immigration, or what Appadurai (1996) 
coins the “diasporic public sphere,” (p. 4) is a useful pragmatic public problem that 
illustrates the power of nationalistic rhetoric and communicative action framed within the 
context of the Other, and the conceptual matrix of postnational theory.   Much research 
has focused on the impact of immigration on individuals, identity, social justice, 
cosmopolitanism and public policy (Abbott, 1969; Busey, 1969; Carens, 1999; Demo, 
2005; Gerstle, 2001; Ingram, 2002; Jones, 1992; Kraut, 1982; Payrow, 2007;  Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Scott, 1984; Seglow, 2005; Vertovec, 
2001), but little research has attempted to frame the problem of immigration within a 
framework of postmodern nationalism addressing issues of identity hybridization, which 
may result in the deterritorialization of the nation itself.   
More specifically, the subject of immigration is often a polarizing, politically 
charged debate that engages societies to either emphasize or reconsider their current 
political and social standpoints (Carens, 1999; Demo, 2005; Ingram, 2002; Seglow, 2005; 
Vertovec, 2001).  It invokes emotional reactions as well as rational inquiries into the state 
of private and public postmodern life.  Current debate in the U.S. about immigration 
speaks volumes about the power of migration and inter-border, cross-cultural 
interactions. Immigration has been a robust debate throughout history, as it seems to 
directly affect the ways in which individuals and groups identify with their national 
heritage and create or reinforce particular social standpoints when citizens feel 
threatened—that is, immigrants present unknown social risks that devalue the perceived 
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comfort and feeling of protection of a particular community (Demo, 2005).  For these 
reasons, immigration can also reveal an interesting hermeneutic entrance when 
considering the nation and nationalism. By understanding migratory phenomena through 
communicative constructs, we may begin to understand how individuals, groups and the 
larger public form identities around the experience of migration and, in turn, affect the 
entire notion of the nation, nationality and nationalism. Immigration in the context of the 
nation can also offer ground for justifying the promotion of a model of dialogic 
nationalism.     
My hope is that this study can provide even more questions about the validity and 
possible transformation of the nation in the contemporary world through a philosophy of 
communication lens.  I believe that such an approach to the nation is heuristic in that it 
leads us to more specific phenomena that put direct pressure on the nation as we 
understand it.  Additionally, other conceptions of dialogic theory, like that of Emmanual 
Levinas and his views on dialogic reciprocity, may provide another framework in which 
we can refine this idea of dialogic nationalism; in other words, is Buber’s suggestion of 
turning toward the Other and acknowledging the Other enough to explicate the shifting 
nature of the nation through a philosophy of communication lens. Within the limits of 
this project, many questions have gone unanswered because of the sheer complexity of 
the idea of nation and the plethora of scholarly conversations that have engaged studies 
about the nation and nationalism.  However, this has provided a starting point from which 
we can ground additional questions of dialogic nationalism and its applicability in 
conversations about the nation in postmodernity. 
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Dialogic nationalism may provide a transitional hermeneutic for the postmodern 
nation. As we are engaged in more intellectual relationships, we are confronted with 
difference, hanging onto our own identities while allowing them—either intentionally or 
unintentionally—to be transformed from within.  My hope is that this study of nation and 
nationalism from antiquity to the postmodern provides a unique 
rhetorical/communicative view of the nation and nationalism.  I also hope that this 
discussion of the postmodern nation from a communicative/dialogic standpoint is 
heuristic as it has many applications for various national and cultural phenomena and, 
ultimately, how we imagine the world around us. 
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